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Abstract. A forecast for an event should be based on a probability distribution of the
possible outcomes of the event. In assessing the forecast, the forecast is given a penalty
according to the outcome that occurs. The penalty, or score, is determined by a scoring rule
and proper scoring rules are preferred; under a proper scoring rule, there is no incentive
for a forecaster to issue a forecast that differs from the forecast they believe is appropriate.
For proper scoring rules, the accuracy of a forecaster is defined to be their expected score
over all possible forecasts and outcomes. Other measures of forecaster performance can be
obtained by expressing accuracy as a sum of several terms, a process known as decomposing
the accuracy. Each term of a decomposition measures a quality of the issued forecasts;
qualities considered important are those that represent features of the joint distribution of the
forecasts and outcomes. In the main decomposition, which we call the URR decomposition,
the terms are uncertainty, resolution and reliability. The form of the URR decomposition
is known for scoring rules of discrete events and their precise-probabilistic forecasts, which
are forecasts issued as precisely-known probability distributions. We extend this URR
decomposition to events with outcomes in any space and forecasts that may be functions
of a probability distribution. We also determine in general form a second decomposition of
accuracy, the RDC decomposition, in which the terms refer to the qualities of refinement,
discrimination and correctness of the forecasts; the RDC decomposition has previously only
be calculated in the specific instance of a binary event under the Brier scoring rule (Brier,
1950). The URR and RDC decompositions must be modified if the issued forecasts or
recorded outcomes are separated into groups or bins before being assessed, and we give
these amended decompositions. In a different setting, the URR and RDC decompositions
we derive can also be used to examine the properties of interval-probabilistic forecasts.
Interval-probabilistic forecasts are specific to binary events and issue a range of probabilities
that the event will occur. There is little previous work on interval-probabilistic forecasts
and to apply the URR and RDC decompositions we first define and characterise proper
scoring rules for interval-probabilistic forecasts, known as interval-proper scoring rules, before
establishing the URR and RDC decompositions of a particular interval-proper scoring rule,
the interval-Brier scoring rule.
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“And he said also to the people, When ye see a cloud rise out of the
west, straightway ye say, There cometh a shower; and so it is.
And when ye see the south wind blow, ye say, There will be heat; and
it cometh to pass.” (Luke 12:54-55 Carroll and Prickett, 1997)
“Consider the medical practice of John Mirfield, a priest and ad-
viser at St Bartholomew’s Hospital, London, at the end of the [14th]
century. He advises his fellow physicians that, if they wish to know
whether a patient might survive or not, they should follow this proce-
dure: Take the name of the patient, the name of the messenger sent to summon
you, and the name of the day upon which the messenger first came to you; join all
their letters together, and if an even number result, the patient will not escape; if
the number be odd, he will recover. Such numerological practices are not
peculiar to Mirfield: variant methods include the Sphere of Apuleis,
wherein one assigns a numerical value to each letter of a name and
subtracts thirty from the total to determine whether the patient will
live or die. Considering that the standardised spelling of names has
yet to be introduced, this is extraordinary: a practice of introducing
sufficient random variables so that the whole matter is one of chance,
or, as Mirfield would rather have it, divine providence. Other diag-
nostic advice of Mirfield’s includes this: take the herb cinquefoil and, while
collecting it, say a paternoster on behalf of the patient. Then boil it in a new jar
with some of the water which the patient is destined to drink; if the water be red
in colour after this boiling, then the patient will die.” Mortimer (2009, pages
191-192)
“All men at all times have been wanting to know the future.”
Schumacher (1974, page 186)
⌊ 1.1 ⌋ Some Background
A forecast is a statement about an event, the outcome of which is, at the time of the forecast,
unknown, but which can be known at some future time. A forecast can, therefore, be veri-
fied, or checked against the actual outcome when it occurs. If the forecast statement makes
mention in some way of the likelihood or chance of an outcome then the forecast is referred to
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as a probabilistic forecast; for example, ‘there is a 20% chance of rain today’, ‘there is a 40%
likelihood of a recession next year’, or ‘in 9 out of 10 cases, patients admitted to this ward
will recover in a week’. If we allow probabilities of 0 or 1, then categorical forecasts can be
regarded as a special case of probabilistic forecasting, making the verification of probabilistic
forecasts a broad subject.
Indeed, probabilistic forecasts now appear in many different areas of the extended sciences.
Gneiting and Katzfuss (2014) provide examples from hydrology, geology, medicine, epidemi-
ology, economics and politics that refer to probabilistic forecasting. Yet, it has been in
meteorology that much of the study of probabilistic forecasting has been made. Some of the
reasons why meteorology has been such fertile soil for the growth of probabilistic forecasting
theory and practise are “experience in making forecasts for many variables and locations
and in quantifying the uncertainty in forecasts, and the timely availability of formal and/or
informal outcome (and other) feedback. Moreover, meteorological outcomes (i.e. future
weather events) are not influenced by the forecasts. Although some of these characteristics
are shared by forecasting in other fields, few if any fields share all of the characteristics.”
(Murphy and Winkler, 1992).
Even early weather forecasters were considered in their pronouncements. As Sheynin (1984)
describes, Dalton in his Meteorological Essays (1793), writes that the “probability of a fair
day . . . to that of a wet one, . . . is as ten to one”, while at the turn of the 19th century,
Lamarck issued forecasts in which “he indicated the probable states of the weather” for
France, although Lamarck seems to have reported probabilities in qualitative terms (us-
ing, at least on one occasion “a scale of . . . probabilities trés-grandes, grandes, moyennes,
and indéterminables”). Such weather forecasts, in which possible future weather conditions
were accompanied by qualitative probabilities or odds-based numerical assessments appeared
throughout the 19th century, with forecasters “[feeling] a need to characterise the uncertainty
in their forecasts explicitly” (Murphy, 1998).
Issuing different possible events together with their probabilities was not necessarily a de-
fensive act; indeed, Murphy (1998) quotes a meteorologist of the time, W.S. Nichols’s view,
that “knowledge of the degree of certainty with which an event may be expected, increases
the value of the information”, a feeling seconded by Cooke (1906a) who advocated “[i]t is
more scientific and honest to be allowed occasionally to say ‘I feel very doubtful about the
weather for to-morrow, but to the best of my belief it will be so-and-so’”, although Cooke
(1906b) mentions that the additional advantage of probabilistic forecasts over exact fore-
casts is that probabilistic forecasts “eliminate beforehand the adverse opinion which a great
number of incorrect [exact] forecasts must produce”. Probabilistic forecasts empower not
only the forecaster, for “weather forecasts expressed in probability terms . . . enable users of
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the forecasts to make the best possible decisions” (Murphy, 1998).
A pivotal change occurred with the introduction, by Hallenbeck (1920), of quantitative prob-
abilities to express the uncertainty of each possible outcome of an event. The immediate
question is how the probabilities should be determined. In Hallenbeck (1920) “maps . . . were
designed to show the frequency, in percentages, of [the event, but] . . . these maps are used
only as a basis at most, and the probability of [the event] . . . is not often accepted at its face
value. General and local conditions usually are such as to justify modifying the indicated
probability, sometimes materially”.
In broad terms, probabilities “can be accorded at least two different interpretations. Firstly,
the probability can be interpreted as a (limiting) relative frequency. . . . Alternatively, the
probabilit(ies) . . . can be interpreted as the forecaster’s degree of belief” (Murphy, 1998).
Yet, there are many subtleties (see, for example de Eliá and Laprise, 2005). Sanders (1963)
proposed the “healthier [interpretation] that a [probabilistic] forecast is a fallible judgment
which can use all the objectively processed help it can get. The objective technique provides
a probability reference point which the forecaster ‘sharpens’ by critical appraisal with the
use of additional information . . . the subjectively modified objective [probabilistic forecast] is
the best product.” More conclusively, to Epstein (1966), “the conceptual basis . . . is the ‘sub-
jectivist’ view of probability . . . The term ‘subjectivist’ as used here should not be confused
with the term ‘subjective’ as used in contradistinction to ‘objective’ . . . the latter term refers
to the manner in which the probabilities are derived ; the former to the manner in which they
are used or interpreted. From a subjectivist point of view, a probability must be believed to
be meaningful. In general, I am far more likely to believe the probability suggested by a well-
tested objective system than one based on an ill-defined subjective evaluation. On this basis
my own personal probability . . . will in general agree more readily with objectively rather
than subjectively, derived forecasts. In the same vein, the [forecaster’s probability] should
be his personal probability whether or not it is wholly subjectively or objectively derived.
Indeed, this is a good argument for the normal procedure of providing the forecaster with
objective probabilities as guidance material, and allowing him to issue modified statements
according to his further subjective judgment and belief.”
While the innovation of Hallenbeck (1920) was to produce a directional shift in the discipline
of probabilistic forecasting, probabilistic forecasting was not overwhelmingly accepted. For
example, Dexter (1962) thought that one should “not have probabilities in the forecast” and
especially “not even try to pin [the forecaster] down to a strict expression of probabilities”.
The dissent was sufficiently widespread for Brown (1970) to note, “[the] advantages seem
so overwhelming that it is somewhat surprising how few forecasts are actually put in terms
of explicit probabilities. There must, therefore, be factors which militate against putting
University of Exeter 3 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 1
forecasts in such terms.” Brown goes on to suggest that possible reasons for this reticence
might include “(a) Forecasters may be . . . ignorant of the language of probabilities . . . (b)
Desire for vagueness may afflict some forecasters who . . . [would like to] be ‘proved correct’
independently of the actual course of events. Vagueness may also be a bureaucratic necessity
at times.. . . (c) Users may pressure forecasters to come out flatly behind one alternative or
another. . . . (d) Epistemological difficulties arise when [assigning probabilities].. . . (e) Desire
for credit, in a sense the opposite to the desire for vagueness, may influence forecasters to
make specific rather than probability predictions.”. There was the additional reason, “with
the evolving view of meteorology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an
exact physical science, key segments of the community adopted the view that the weather
forecasting problem was best understood as a deterministic problem”, and “[r]elatively few if
any developments related to probability forecasts can be identified during the period between
the mid-1920s and the early 1940s” (Murphy, 1998). Whether the complexities of meteo-
rological phenomena can be modelled or there is “uncertainty inherent in the forecasting
process” (Murphy, 1998), the exact forecasts offered by physical models are not currently
perfect, and were not so in the 1940s, prompting (Brier, 1944) to argue that “1. The scientific
and economic (or, military) value of weather forecasts can be enhanced by increased use of
probability statements, and 2. The verification problem (both scientific and economic) can
be simplified if forecasts are stated in terms of probabilities.”.
Although the debate about whether (and how) to issue probabilistic forecasts was to con-
tinue (and remains a point of discussion), Brier (1950) was to ask the crucial question: if
a probabilistic forecast is published, how should such a forecast be assessed? Whereas a
categorical forecast has the advantage that once an outcome for the event being forecast
is observed, the forecast can be unequivocally said to have been correct or incorrect, the
verification of a probabilistic forecast is less clear: if a binary event is forecast to have a
positive outcome with probability p ∈ (0, 1) and then the outcome observed is negative, was
the forecast right or wrong? Brier (1950) was the first to propose a “verification score”, a
formula or rule, for computing how close a probabilistic forecast is to the outcome that oc-
curs; shortly thereafter, Good (1952) proposed an alternative scoring rule. Given the scoring
rule, the accuracy of the forecaster is their expected score: the average of their scores.
A scoring rule allows one to assess a forecaster’s skill. “Skill is the forecaster’s ability to
analyze and classify the antecedent weather so that, . . . the [forecast] probability of a sub-
sequent event is increased above, or decreased below, the relative frequency of that event in
all weather situations (hereafter referred to as the ‘climatic frequency’).” (Gringorten, 1951).
And, “[s]kill must be measured in relation to something . . . Then the forecaster’s skill lies
in his ability to recognize factors in his array of synoptic information which, to him, make
the likelihood of occurrence of meteorological events in a particular instance different from
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the climatological likelihood.” (Sanders, 1963). Sanders (1963) defined skill in an absolute
sense: as the difference between the expected score of the forecaster and the expected score
if every forecast followed the climatology. Such absolute skill was to be distinguished from
relative skill, in which the absolute skill was divided by the expected score under climatology.
This distinction was first made by Murphy (1974): “[t]wo basic types of skill scores can be
identified: 1) difference skill scores and 2) ratio skill scores. A difference skill score simply
represents the difference between a measure of the ‘accuracy’ . . . of the relevant climato-
logical probabilities . . . and the ‘accuracy’ of the forecasts according to the same measure.
Difference skill scores, then, measure the amount by which the ‘accuracy’ of the forecasts
improves upon the ‘accuracy’ of the climatological probabilities.. . . A ratio skill score, on the
other hand, consists of a ratio in which a difference skill score appears in the numerator and
one of the terms in this difference, in general the measure for [climatology], appears in the
denominator. Ratio skill scores, then, measure the fractional amount by which the ‘accu-
racy’ . . . of the forecasts according to a particular measure improves upon the ‘accuracy’ of
the climatological probabilities . . . according to the same measure.”
Before forecaster skill can be calculated, a scoring rule must be chosen. The forecaster should
be told the scoring rule (Gneiting, 2011a), however, once aware of the scoring rule, the nat-
ural response of the forecaster is to attempt to maximise their performance as measured
by their score. Brier (1950) referred to this distortion of behaviour as ‘hedging’ or ‘playing
the system’ and advised that “one essential criterion for satisfactory verification is that the
verification scheme [i.e. scoring rule] should influence the forecaster in no undesirable way”.
Epstein (1966) was more forthright, arguing that a forecaster “should believe his statement
. . . [otherwise] the forecaster is not being honest . . . [and] this is not proper behavior for a
forecaster. We must and shall expect our forecasters to be honest, both to themselves and
to the public.” This sentiment was repeated in Murphy and Epstein (1967a) who advocated
that the scoring rule “possesses the property that the best ‘hedge’ is no ‘hedge’ i.e. which
possesses the property that the [forecaster] can expect to obtain the best score if and only
if the forecasts he prepares express his true beliefs. In other words, . . . make his behavior
correspond with the proper . . . behavior.” Murphy and Epstein (1967a) define such scoring
rules as proper scoring rules. Brown (1970), using the same terminology as Shuford et al.
(1966), called such scoring rules “which are free of distorting incentives . . . ‘reproducing
scoring systems’”, because such scoring rules report or reproduce the true beliefs of the
forecaster. Proper scoring rules are occasionally also referred to as admissible scoring rules
(Brown, 1974; Shuford et al., 1966). Brown (1970) provides some interesting examples of
scoring rules that appear reasonable but are, in fact, improper.
Of course, scoring rules that promoted the publication of a forecaster’s actual view have
what Winkler and Murphy (1968) refer to as normative goodness: the scoring rule encour-
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ages the forecaster to publish what they ought to forecast (this includes the requirements
that the probabilistic forecasts are coherent i.e. satisfy the conditions for being a proba-
bility). But, normative goodness is not the only criterion that a scoring rule must satisfy.
As Winkler and Murphy (1968) note, a scoring rule must also faithfully capture substantive
goodness (that is, give greater value to forecasts that demonstrate scientific knowledge and
less value to forecasts that are whimsical or arbitrary).
Even before the terminology of ‘proper scoring rule’ had been established, McCarthy (1956)
had provided a mathematical definition of proper scoring rules, stating that a “payoff rule
is said to ‘keep the forecaster honest’” if the expected score of a forecaster is optimised
if and only if the forecaster’s issued probability matches the forecaster’s true belief in the
chance of the outcome. The specific scoring rules of both Good (1952) and (as confirmed by
Murphy and Epstein (1967a)) Brier (1950) satisfy this definition. McCarthy (1956) goes on
to prove that any proper scoring rule must have a particular functional form.
Numerous refinements of McCarthy’s characterisation theorem for proper scoring rules have
been given since. McCarthy’s statement was limited to the case in which the observation can
take finitely many different values and the forecast probabilities are discrete; McCarthy did
not offer a proof of his theorem. Apparently independently, Shuford et al. (1966) stated and
proved the characterisation theorem for a binary observation. This result of Shuford et al.
(1966) is referred to and proved again in Brown (1970) and an advanced, probability-theoretic
generalisation of the result is given by Schervish (1989). Brown (1970) also reconsiders the
original setting of McCarthy’s theorem, wherein the observation is a multi-category ran-
dom variable, and provides the proof missing in McCarthy’s original work. Using a similar
approach, Savage (1971) also states and proves, in McCarthy’s framework, the conditions a
proper scoring rule must satisfy. Hendrickson and Buehler (1971) prove McCarthy’s theorem
in the more general case in which the observation is a random variable with a probability
density function. Gneiting and Raftery (2007) have proved a general version of McCarthy’s
theorem in which the probability forecasts are restricted only to be probability measures,
and more recently Frongillo and Kash (2014) have given a wholly general characterisation
theorem.
Although the characterisation theorem narrowed the class of functions that could be consid-
ered when seeking a proper scoring rule, there remained many different functions that could
be selected as proper scoring rules. This introduced the complication that different proper
scoring rules could give different and inconsistent measures of accuracy (Winkler and Murphy,
1968). To address this problem, the characterisation theorem was supplemented by an ax-
iomatic directive: desirable mathematical properties that a proper scoring rule should satisfy
were listed as axioms and from these axioms the list of possible proper scoring rules was de-
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rived; and, to certain axioms, there corresponds a unique proper scoring rule, so adherence
to the axioms removes all choice from the selection of a scoring rule. Examples of particular
meta-features of scoring rules are: (i) locality (the scoring rule depends only on the forecast
for the outcome that does occur) (see, for example Bernado, 1979; Shuford et al., 1966),
(ii) sensitivity-to-distance (more favourable scores are achieved if higher probabilities are
assigned to outcomes close to the outcome that does occur) (Epstein, 1969; Murphy, 1970;
Staël von Holstein, 1970). The axioms associated with particular scoring rules are discussed
in Shuford et al. (1966), Selten (1998) and more recently Jose (2009).
The (mathematical) definition of a proper scoring rule is, in fact, a consequence of the be-
havioural assumption that the score a forecaster receives provides the forecaster with a utility
and that the forecaster “chooses his [forecasts] in such a way as to maximize his expected
utility” Winkler (1969). It is further assumed that the utility function is a linear function
of the score. As Winkler (1969) then notes, “[s]ince his utility function is linear, this is
equivalent to maximising his expected score in the probability assessment task [provided the
scoring rule awards a higher score for a better forecast]”.
The assumption that utility is a linear function of the score is contentious. Even in the very
early developments of the theory of probabilistic forecast verification, mention was made of
the need to consider nonlinear utilities (Good, 1952). If the score is interpreted as a non-
monetary award, for example promotion, extended holiday or some other such award, then
nonlinear utility has some credence. Less obvious is that an objection to a linear score can
be made when the score is interpreted as a monetary reward. But, it is easy to appreciate
that a certain sum of cash is of proportionally greater utility to an individual when they
have no money, than it is to the same individual should they have much more money. As
Brown (1970) reasons “there is the well-known nonlinear utility of money . . . if you make
awards too substantial you may find yourself in a situation where some of your respondents
become overcautious, and prefer to go for small but relatively certain gains in preference to
maximizing their expected gain through a riskier strategy.” And, so a “point of some inter-
est is the possibility of relaxing the assumption that the assessor’s utility function is linear
with respect to money. If this assumption is not met, then it might not be optimal for the
assessor to honestly report his judgments.” (Winkler, 1969). “A nonlinear utility function
implies that ‘risk’ considerations may be relevant . . . ” (Murphy and Winkler, 1970). The
utility function may be nonlinear by being either convex, in which case the forecaster is a risk
taker, or concave, whereupon the forecaster is a risk-avoider (Murphy and Winkler, 1970).
“What are the implications of nonlinear utility functions for the process of probability as-
sessment . . . ? If the [forecaster] is able to specify his utility function, then this function can,
and should, be incorporated into the assessment process.” (Murphy and Winkler, 1970). The
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details of how to adapt the criterion of maximising the expected score when the utility func-
tion is nonlinear (but invertible) is given in detail in Winkler (1969). Assuming that the
forecaster continues to maximise their expected utility, Winkler and Murphy (1970) examine
the consequences of a nonlinear utility when the Brier score is adopted and find that “the
utility function of the [forecaster] may cause him to ‘hedge’ in some manner. Generally, a
risk-taker will ‘hedge’ toward a categorical forecast, and a risk-avoider will ‘hedge’ away from
a categorical forecast (i.e. toward a forecast in which all the probabilities are equal).” But,
as Murphy and Winkler (1970) continue, “(on) the other hand, if the [forecaster’s] utility
function is not known, then the function cannot, of course, be incorporated into the assess-
ment process. Therefore, the [forecaster’s] statements may differ from his judgments. For
some utility functions the differences might be quite large . . . ”. Nonetheless, the position
has been, generally, to assume that the forecaster’s utility function is a linear function of
their score, for, as Savage (1971) notes “such linearity assumptions . . . are presumably toler-
able if only moderate sums of money are involved. In the purely mathematical formulation
. . . no precautions have been, or need be, taken to keep these sums moderate, but it is fairly
clear how such precautions could be taken in applying the theory. . . ”. Recently, however,
Caravalho (2015) has reopened the debate.
Brier (1950) had introduced scoring rules in response to perceived failures of earlier methods
to verify probabilistic forecasts. Both Cooke (1906a) and Hallenbeck (1920) had measured
the performance of their probabilistic forecasts, by comparing (in a table), each probabilis-
tic forecast of a binary event with the frequency of occurrence: a low-probability forecast
suggests occurrence is unlikely and so the frequency of occurrence should be small, while a
high-probability forecast suggests occurrence is likely, and the number of occurrences should
be high; numerically, the forecast should be close to the actual frequency of occurrence for
the forecasts to be regarded as acceptable. But, such a comparison can be misleading, for
“knowledge of a good relationship between forecast and observed probabilities is not sufficient
to indicate how useful the forecasts are, for it is also necessary to know the frequency with
which forecasts are made in the various categories.” (Brier, 1950). To assess the relationship
between forecast and observations, it is the joint distribution of the forecasts and observa-
tions that is important, so not only is it necessary to have the conditional distribution of the
observations given the forecasts, but the marginal distribution of the forecasts must also be
known, to allow the joint distribution to be inferred. Herein, Brier (1950) anticipates both
the distributions-oriented approach to forecast verification that would later be advocated by
Murphy and Winkler (1987) and the forecast evaluation approach of Gneiting et al. (2007)
(more of both approaches shall be mentioned later).
The scoring rule offers a clear and elegant method of determining accuracy, or average score.
Since Brier (1950)’s scoring rule, many alternative proper scoring rules have been proposed.
University of Exeter 8 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 1
In part, this proliferation of scoring rules has been because the assessment of probabilistic
forecasts by their accuracy necessarily overlooks the evidently subtle ways in which prob-
abilistic forecasts could be in error. “Beyond the question of how good such probabilistic
judgments are in a general sense, the issue of how good they are in very specific ways is
of interest, too” (Yates, 1982). In an attempt to capture different aspects of forecast per-
formance, one response is to use different scoring rules. Another, is to define the forecasts’
properties that are regarded as important and then try to measure them.
As far as can be ascertained, Bross (1953) was the first to consider different qualities of a
“predicting system which leads to probabilities . . . a Probability Predicting System (or PPS
for short)” specifically to “tell whether the scheme is doing a good job . . . by examining the
record of the Predicting System. First, let us consider those events which were classed as
‘very likely’. Suppose that this classification was used in a hundred cases and in ninety of
these cases, the event actually occurred. This would indicate that the classification ‘very
likely’ was justified.” (Bross, 1953, page 39). “More generally, if we were to consider cases
in which the PPS gave some other numerical value of the probability, which I will represent
symbolically by p, then if the system is valid it should be true that
p =
Number of cases in which event occurred
Total number of cases where the probability assigned was p
[sic].” (1.1)
(Bross, 1953, page 47). The term reliability or calibration is now used in place of Bross’s
validity. And, while validity is still regarded as a fundamental property of forecasts, Bross
is quick to qualify that validity should not be the sole consideration, for, while “validity
is a desirable property of a probability predicting system, the fact that a system has this
property does not automatically insure that it will be a useful system in practice. A sec-
ond important auxiliary requirement of a PPS is that it be ‘sharp’.” (Bross, 1953, page 48).
Bross does not give a definition for sharpness, stating “[i]t is not very easy to give a clear-
cut definition of sharpness . . . . Perhaps the closest that we can come to a mathematical
formulation is one similar to the quantity information in . . . information theory.” (Bross,
1953, page 52). Nonetheless, Bross does give several examples of different levels of sharpness
and these examples suggest that Bross regards sharpness as the extent to which forecasts
are “discriminatory” (Bross, 1953, page 49) i.e. how distinct the forecasts are for different
outcomes. (Later, Matheson and Winkler (1976) would refer to validity as the ‘honesty’ of
the forecaster and sharpness as the ‘expertise’ of the forecaster.)
The quality defined by equation 1.1 is a distributional quality: it refers directly to the con-
ditional distribution of the observations. Additional distributional features were introduced
(see, for example Murphy and Epstein, 1967b) and methods were developed to enhance the
assessment of these distributional features.
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There were now two seemingly disparate methods of evaluating probabilistic forecasts: mea-
suring accuracy using proper scoring rules, and measuring forecast qualities (specifically,
validity and sharpness) through the features of the distributions of the forecasts and out-
comes.
At the same time, there emerged the concern that “[o]ne of the factors that has contributed
to the difficulties and controversies of forecast verification is the failure to distinguish care-
fully between the scientific and practical objectives of forecasting” (Brier, 1944). Assessing
the proximity of forecasts to the true outcome “will not necessarily be appropriate” (Brier,
1944) as an evaluation for the users of forecasts who make decisions and take actions for
which there are economic, social and environmental consequences. Each decision or action
by a user will result in a benefit to the user if conditions match the forecast, but a reduction
in this benefit should conditions differ from the forecast; the loss to the user can be mitigated
for a cost (for example, insurance). An operationally optimal forecast is one which maximises
the benefit to the user net of costs and losses. So, Gringorten (1951) argued that the use-
fulness “of a forecast should be judged by . . . the value of [the] forecast for given operational
needs” later adding “that on one and the same day, two forecasters might make probabil-
ity statements, each statement as valid as the other, and both forecasters equally skillful
or performing with the same degree of accuracy or both. Yet one forecaster’s probability
statements might serve the operations better” (Gringorten, 1958). This view was supported
by Thompson and Brier (1955) who added that “it is not an uncommon experience to find
that a group of forecasts which may show a high verification score need not necessarily be
economically useful predictions . . . ”.
That forecasts designed to promote scientific accuracy tend not to recognise the costs and
losses associated with users’ actions based on these forecasts, is often a pragmatic choice
rather than dismissiveness by the forecasters, because costs and losses are often highly in-
dividual and the forecast is aimed at the public as a whole. A perfect scientific forecast,
one that it is both exact and correct (Winkler and Murphy, 1968), is also perfect from an
operational perspective. But if a forecast is imperfect, the nature of the imperfections, that
is the qualities of the forecast, will influence the operational value of the forecast and oper-
ational and scientific measures of value will diverge. In the main, operationally optimal and
scientifically accurate forecasts are not regarded as coincident. Indeed, Murphy and Epstein
(1967b) persuasively argued that inasmuch as forecast verification consisted of the evaluation
of forecasts, there were two distinct evaluation tasks: “the process of assessing the [useful-
ness] of predictions . . . [or] operational evaluation . . . [for which] only a single attribute, or
‘desirable’ property, of the predictions is of concern, their [usefulness]. The ‘value’ of a pre-
diction is measured in terms of the [use], to the decision maker, of the consequence that
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results. However, since the measure of the attribute [usefulness] will be different for differ-
ent decision makers and for different decision situations, a universal measure for operational
evaluation does not exist.” For this reason attention is usually focused on the “process of
assessing the absolute and/or relative perfection of predictions, [that is] empirical evaluation
or verification” (Murphy and Epstein, 1967b) and assumes that “the forecaster’s duty ends
with providing accurate and unbiased estimates of the probabilities” (Brier, 1944). More so,
addressing the (scientific, or, empirical) verification of forecasts should expose the qualities
of the forecasts, which will allow users of the forecasts to perform (to some degree) their own
operational verification.
What is clear is that whether the concern is about agreement between the accuracy of a
forecaster and the forecasts’ properties, or about the disagreement between operational and
scientific value of the forecasts, establishing a measure of the qualities of the forecasts and
finding their relationship to the accuracy of the forecaster issuing the forecasts was of fun-
damental importance if these concerns were to be meaningfully addressed.
The first attempt to determine a relationship between the properties of forecasts and the
accuracy of a forecaster was by Sanders (1963), with the informal, but insightful, recommen-
dations of Bross (1953) serving as a foundation. Sanders (1963) showed that the expected
value of the proper scoring rule of Brier (1950) could be written as the sum of two terms; this
separation of accuracy into parts is a process known as decomposing or factorising the ex-
pected score/accuracy. Sanders called the first term of his decomposition sharpness and the
second term validity. Sanders’s choice of terminology was deliberate as he regarded the two
components as direct quantitative representatives of Bross’s forecast properties of the same
names, interpreting Bross’s sharpness as the ability to separate different outcomes into dis-
tinct groups (or, “sorting ability”) and validity as the ability to correctly assign probabilities
to the different groups (or, “labeling ability”) (Sanders, 1963, page 197). Different forecasters
will have different values of sharpness and validity and Sanders argued that “[t]he effective-
ness of the forecasts in contrast to the climatological control can be assessed by calculating
the gain due to sharpness and the penalty due to lack of validity.” These conclusions echo
the remarks of Bross (1953, page 61) that when examining the “validity versus sharpness” of
different forecasters “[t]he place to draw [the] line is where the advantage of increasing the
sharpness is offset by the decreasing validity, but the actual determination of this point is no
easy matter.” Later, Gneiting et al. (2007) were to reintroduce the “paradigm of maximizing
the sharpness . . . subject to calibration”.
Epstein and Murphy (1965) give a geometric interpretation of Sanders’s decomposition and
elaborate on Sanders’s description of the two components, adding “[v]alidity refers to the
resemblance, on an independent collection of predictions, between the probabilities assigned
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to, and the observed relative frequencies of, the events, while sharpness refers to the discrim-
ination among events exhibited by the probabilities.” Changing the balance between validity
and sharpness in Sanders’s factorisation for each fixed level of accuracy, generates a surface
which was examined by Blattenberger and Lad (1985) (although they used the terms relia-
bility for validity and refinement for sharpness, a convention used by several other authors).
DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) generalised the factorisation of Sanders to a broader group of
scoring rules for probabilistic forecasts of a binary observation.
Murphy (1973) advanced Sanders’s decomposition, by factorising Sanders’s sharpness term
into two further terms: the first term, which is the variance of the observation, was called
“the uncertainty inherent in the events”, the second term, was given the name resolution.
For an event with only two possible outcomes, resolution is “the variability of the observed
frequency of [the] event, when the forecast probability of [the] event varies” (Atger, 2003).
In general, resolution is the extent to which the forecasts contribute to reducing uncertainty.
Murphy (1973) referred to validity as reliability and so gave the first uncertainty-resolution-
reliability (URR) decomposition.
Yates (1982) (see also Yates and Curley, 1985) made an additional extension to the decom-
position of Murphy (1973), to arrive at a “covariance decomposition”. The uncertainty term
remains and “reflect(s) aspects of forecasting performance not under the forecaster’s con-
trol. . . the remaining terms in the decomposition index aspects that are under the forecaster’s
influence”. The resolution term of Murphy (1973) is also present. But Yates factorises Mur-
phy’s reliability term into four terms, of which one is the negation of Murphy’s resolution
term, and introduces three new terms. Of these new terms, the first is proportional to
the covariance between the forecasts and the outcomes (a higher covariance increasing the
accuracy). Yates (1982) refers to this term as the “heart of forecasting skill”, a notion to
be repeated later by Murphy and Winkler (1987). The second of the three new terms of
Yates (1982) is the variance of the forecasts. For Yates, “the aim of the forecaster should
be to minimize the variance of his or her forecasts . . . [but] the only way [the variance of
the forecasts] can take on its absolute minimum possible value of zero is when the forecaster
offers constant forecasts. This strategy would make the covariance term zero, too. So the
proper objective of the forecaster should be to minimize [the variance of the forecasts], given
that he or she exercises his or her fundamental forecasting abilities as represented by [the
covariance between the observation and the forecasts]”. Such a conditional minimisation
results when, for each different outcome of the observation, all probabilistic forecasts pre-
ceding the outcome are the same. “If, under these conditions, [there are distinct forecasts
preceding every pair of different outcomes], one has the situation in which the forecaster
has perfect foresight, in that he or she exhibits perfect discrimination of instances in which
[each different outcome occurs]. The only thing that would possibly mar the forecaster’s per-
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formance is mislabeling; the forecaster’s numerical [probabilities are] inappropriate” (Yates,
1982). The third of the new terms of Yates (1982) is reliability-in-the-large (which follows
Murphy and Epstein, 1967b), being the (squared) difference between the average forecast
probability and the average outcome.
The importance of Yates (1982)’s decomposition was that it incorporated alternative qual-
ities that might be used to assess forecasts, some of which had been suggested previously
by Murphy and Epstein (1967b) as desirable. All previous decompositions had established
quantities for components that represented qualities derived from philosophical premises
about what a good forecast is. But, Yates (1982)’s decomposition created components that
suggested qualities that the forecasts should have. Two similar decompositions to that of
Yates (1982) had been proposed earlier by Theil (1966, pages 29,33).
Some of the attributes of the decompositions of Yates (1982) and Theil (1966), and their
formal expressions, reappear in a second decomposition of the Brier score for probabilistic
forecasts, introduced by Murphy (1986) and complementary to the decomposition of Murphy
(1973). This alternative decomposition of Murphy (1986) presented the accuracy of the Brier
scoring rule as the sum of two new terms, which we shall call (Murphy (1986) did not name
the two terms) correctness and excess. Excess quantifies the ability of the forecaster to vary
their forecasts sufficiently so that different forecasts are offered for different outcomes, but
without too much variability of the forecasts so as to make the forecasts equivocal. Correct-
ness considers how close the average forecast for an observation is to the subsequent outcome
of the observation. Murphy and Winkler (1987) (see too, Murphy and Winkler, 1992) ex-
tended the decomposition of Murphy (1986), introducing two further attributes, refinement
and discrimination, and expressed excess as refinement less discrimination, giving, under the
Brier scoring rule, the first presentation of the refinement-discrimination-correctness (RDC)
decomposition; the RDC decomposition of Murphy and Winkler (1987) reinforced the qual-
ities promoted by Yates’s decomposition demonstrating even more clearly that optimality is
obtained when the probabilistic forecast preceding each outcome is a constant, where this
constant preferably matches the outcome (recalling that the above decompositions all refer
to the scoring rule of Brier (1950) for which the observation has a value of 0 or 1).
The key decompositions of Sanders (1963), Murphy (1973), and Yates (1982) are all spe-
cific to the Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) (or, scoring rules derived therefrom, known as
quadratic scoring rules). But, as Winkler (1996) notes “[i]nvestigations of decompositions
have concentrated on quadratic rules, perhaps because they are the most commonly-used
scoring rules in practice and because they are easy to decompose. An exploration of de-
compositions of other rules would increase our storehouse of measures of various attributes
of ‘goodness’ of probabilities.” Winkler (1996) did make partial steps in this direction (gen-
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eralising Matheson and Winkler (1976)) and, previously, DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) had
established a general sharpness-reliability decomposition of any proper scoring rule for prob-
ability forecasts of a binary observation. But, little other progress was made until Bröcker
(2009) established the general URR decomposition under any (proper) scoring rule for prob-
abilistic forecasts of an observation with finitely many values (for an intuitive derivation of
Bröcker’s result see Siegert (2017)). URR decompositions that had, for other scoring rules,
previously required extensive derivations, for example, scoring rules related to the ignorance
scoring rule of Good (1952) and Roulston and Smith (2002) and their decompositions given
in Weijs et al. (2010) and Tödter and Ahrens (2012) (and even for quadratic scoring rules
more general than the Brier scoring rule, (see, for example Young, 2010)) could now be
more routinely established. And, by rewriting scoring rules for point forecasts as scoring
rules for probabilistic forecasts (see, Gneiting, 2011a), it was also now possible to deter-
mine URR decompositions for the accuracy of scoring rules for point forecasts; for example,
the URR decomposition for the quantile scoring rule obtained in Bentzien and Friederichs
(2014). However, Bröcker’s generalisation was restricted to the URR decomposition and no
comparable generalisation for the RDC decomposition has, up to now, been published.
⌊ 1.2 ⌋ Plan of Thesis
In the next chapter, chapter 2, we develop entirely general URR and RDC decompositions
for proper scoring rules of forecasts that refer, either explicitly or implicitly, to the probabil-
ity distribution of the observation. The URR decomposition extends the result of Bröcker
(2009) for proper scoring rules of probabilistic forecasts. The RDC decomposition generalises
the only known earlier work in this direction, that of Murphy and Winkler (1987) (see also
Murphy, 1986). When computing the decompositions, especially from small data sets, it
may be necessary to group forecasts and/or outcomes into subgroups and, in each subgroup,
replace the value of each member with a representative value, thereby increasing the number
of times each forecast and/or outcome value appears in the data. If data is subgrouped or
binned in this manner, the decompositions need to be amended: the resolution and reliabil-
ity terms of the URR decomposition and/or the discrimination and correctness terms of the
RDC decomposition must be augmented to account for the binning. At the end of chapter
2 we derive general decompositions when data is binned.
Throughout chapter 2, probabilities associated with forecasts are considered exact (either
numerically or in distributional terms). In chapters 3 and 4, we study the verification of
forecasts where each forecast is issued as an interval of probabilities, or, interval-probabilistic
forecasts; in these chapters the observation is binary. In chapter 3 we are concerned with the
definition and characterisation of scoring rules for interval-probabilistic forecasts that are
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proper; we call such scoring rules interval-proper scoring rules and give several examples. A
particular example of an interval-proper scoring rule, the interval-Brier scoring rule, is the
focus of chapter 4, in which we derive a URR decomposition and RDC decomposition for
the interval-Brier scoring rule, and in so doing, introduce expressions for the attributes of
interval-probabilistic forecasts.
The final chapter briefly discusses topics which lead on from the work of the earlier chapters.
In the thesis, later chapters do use results from earlier chapters and these dependencies are
an important factor in determining the order in which the chapters have been presented,
but each chapter presents a separate idea and is as self-contained as possible, save some
references to the ideas and results of earlier chapters in an attempt to avoid repetition.
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2 Decompositions and Dual Decompositions for
Proper Scoring Rules
Summary. A scoring rule is a rule for measuring how close a forecast for an event is to
the outcome for the event. Before the outcome is known, the expected value of the scoring
rule, referred to as the expected score, can be used as a measure of forecast performance.
It is now well-known that the expected score of a proper scoring rule can be decomposed
into several terms, each term reflecting a particular performance property of the forecasts.
In what is arguably the most well-known decomposition there are three terms: uncertainty
(the difficulty of the forecasting environment), resolution (the extent to which the forecasts
reduce the uncertainty of the event’s outcome) and reliability (how close, on average, the
outcomes following a repeated forecast are to the forecast). This primary decomposition
has two limitations. Firstly, a general form of the decomposition, applicable to any proper
scoring rule, is known only when the forecasts are probabilistic forecasts. For other types of
forecast, the primary decomposition must be determined specifically for each scoring rule.
We address this shortfall by giving a general primary decomposition for proper scoring rules
for all types of forecast. Secondly, the primary decomposition does not account for all the
important properties of the forecasts, in particular, the properties of discrimination (whether
different outcomes are preceded by distinct forecasts) and correctness (how close the average
forecast for an outcome is to the outcome). We derive a dual decomposition, the terms of
which are precisely these properties; our dual decomposition is applicable to all proper
scoring rules of all types of forecast. The terms of both primary and dual decompositions
are readily evaluated, although too few data can make estimating the terms difficult. A
common technique to counter sparse data, is binning. But, binning changes the forecast
properties and must be accompanied by changes to the decompositions. We give general
primary and dual decompositions when binning is used.
⌊ 2.1 ⌋ Introduction
A forecast may be described as any statement that presupposes the unknown outcome of
an event. The problem of how to assess whether forecasts are good, and how ‘good’ should
be interpreted, has led to so abundant a literature that any comprehensive overview is all
but impossible. Nonetheless, we have in chapter 1 attempted to outline the main historical
developments.
By definition, the event that is the subject of the forecast will have an uncertain value and,
therefore, the forecast should (implicitly or explicitly) refer to a probability distribution over
the possible values of the event (Cooke, 1906a; Lindley, 1982). It is the case then that
although, when the outcome for the event, when it occurs, it will be known precisely (e.g.
‘rain’ or ‘no rain’), a forecast for the event can be less definite (e.g. ‘chance of rain 20%’);
we do not consider, here, the problem of error in observing the event’s outcome (see Ferro,
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2017). How then is it possible to evaluate how close the forecast is to the outcome?
One approach is to use a scoring rule (Winkler, 1996). A scoring rule is a function that
assigns to each forecast-outcome pair, a value or score, reflecting how close the forecast and
outcome are to each other. Before the outcome is known (in which case it may be called the
observation), the expected score can be calculated for each forecast by averaging the scores
the forecast obtains for each possible outcome (i.e. each value of the observation).
Some care needs to be taken when choosing a scoring rule. For, having been presented with
a scoring rule, a forecaster may attempt to improve their expected score by issuing a fore-
cast that differs from the forecast they believe to be best (a practice referred to as ‘hedging’
(Brier, 1950; Murphy and Epstein, 1967a)). A scoring rule that allows for such distorted be-
haviour is considered improper and should be discarded. Consequently, only proper scoring
rules will be considered.
We define the accuracy of a forecaster to be the average, over all possible forecasts, of
the forecasts’ expected scores. As such, accuracy is an example of a verification measure:
a (often simple) numerical summary of the correspondence between the forecasts and ob-
servation. While verification measures have the attraction of being definitive and simple,
Murphy and Winkler (1987) note that the ‘joint probability distribution [of forecast and
observation] contains all information that is relevant to the evaluation of a . . . forecast sys-
tem’ and therefore, ‘this [joint] distribution – or, equivalently, the factors involved in the
factorizations of the joint distribution – should play a central role in verification studies.’
This prompts Murphy and Winkler (1987) to ‘ask the following question: What, if any, are
the relationships between [verification] measures and the general framework for verification
[based on] basic indicators of performance such as the joint distribution’?
In short, the answer is the factorisation of verification measures into components that are
‘directly related either to the [joint, conditional and marginal] distributions themselves or to
summary measures of these distributions’ (Murphy and Winkler, 1987). These factorisations
provide, in part, a response to the call by Murphy and Winkler (1987) for a ‘ “diagnostic”
approach to verification . . . [for although common] verification measures are quite useful
. . . to compare . . . forecasters in some overall sense . . . they are not particularly helpful when
it comes to obtaining a more detailed understanding of the strengths and weaknesses in
forecasts’.
In other words, with reference to the more prominent verification measure of accuracy, better
accuracy does not, on its own, indicate a better forecaster (Murphy, 1993; Yates and Curley,
1985). Accuracy, as an average, subsumes many of the finer features of the scores that con-
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tribute to it, and it is these finer features that inform about the qualities (Murphy, 1993) or
attributes (Epstein and Murphy, 1965) of the forecasts.
Forecasts are important not as an end in themselves, but because they are used to make de-
cisions. Each attribute will have differing relevance depending on the decision, and knowing
the attribute profile of the forecasts determines the forecasts’ suitability (or, ‘goodness’) for
the decision at hand and helps to inform where forecasts can be improved. It is, therefore,
the different attributes that determine how ‘good’ the forecasts are.
Historically (see chapter 1 and, for example, Murphy and Winkler (1987)), the attributes
of most interest, are: uncertainty (the variability of the observation), which indicates the
difficulty of the forecasting environment and places the accuracy obtained in context; resolu-
tion (whether the forecasts decrease doubt about the outcome); reliability (whether, having
issued a particular forecast several times, the outcomes that follow the forecast are, on av-
erage, close to the forecast); refinement (the variability of the forecasts), which is suggestive
of the adaptability of the forecasts; discrimination (the extent to which different outcomes
are preceded by distinct forecasts); correctness (after a specific outcome has occurred on a
number of occasions, how close are the forecasts preceding it, on average, to the outcome).
We attempt here to settle the meanings of these attributes, warning that in past works by
many different authors some of these attributes have been given different names, or the same
names have been used with different meaning.
The aim, therefore, is to factorise, or decompose, accuracy into a sum of several terms care-
fully so that each term represents a particular attribute. Because the joint distribution can
be factorised into the product of a conditional and a marginal distribution in two different
ways, there are two decompositions of accuracy.
Of the aforementioned two decompositions, the more familiar is the uncertainty-resolution-
reliability (URR) decomposition, with component terms that are measures of the attributes
of uncertainty, resolution and reliability of the forecasts. The URR decomposition relates
to the conditional distribution of the observation given the forecast. To date, the most gen-
eral form of the URR decomposition has been derived by Bröcker (2009) (see also Siegert,
2017). However, this version of the URR decomposition is limited to proper scoring rules
for a particular type of forecast: (precise-)probabilistic forecasts i.e. forecasts that are issued
as statements about the exact probability distribution of the event’s outcomes. URR de-
compositions for other types of forecasts have been determined, but only for specific scoring
rules (see, for example Bentzien and Friederichs, 2014; Christensen, 2015). In this chapter,
we develop a URR decomposition that is entirely general, being applicable to proper scoring
rules of all types of forecast.
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A second decomposition of accuracy, the refinement-discrimination-correctness (RDC) de-
composition, has component terms that are measures of the refinement, discrimination and
correctness of the forecasts. The RDC decomposition is dual to the URR decomposition in
that it relates to the conditional distribution of the forecast given the observation. The RDC
decomposition has only been determined for the Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) by Murphy
(1986) and Murphy and Winkler (1987). We construct a general RDC decomposition appli-
cable to proper scoring rules of all forecast types.
Although the URR decomposition has been pre-eminent in the literature, the RDC decom-
position is just as important: the two ‘factorizations [of the joint distribution] constitute
complementary rather than alternative ways to approach the verification problem . . . the
two factorizations are concerned with different attributes of the forecasts and/or observa-
tions. Thus, a complete verification study would necessarily involve the evaluation of factors
associated with both factorizations.’ Murphy and Winkler (1987). Nonetheless, because the
URR decomposition is both the earlier and more widely studied decomposition, we may refer
to it as the primary decomposition, with the RDC decomposition being called the dual (or,
occasionally, secondary) decomposition. However, we emphasise that these labels mark the
relative familiarity of the decompositions rather than their relative importance.
The outline for the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, we establish
notation. Following immediately thereafter, in section 2.3, we clarify the role of decom-
positions and their limitations. Having established the importance of decompositions we
consider, in section 2.4 one method of generalising the URR and RDC decompositions and
highlight the problems that restrict this approach from being completely general. The ap-
proach in section 2.4 is not, however, fruitless, and gives a good deal of direction to our
derivation, in section 2.5, of the entirely general URR and RDC decompositions. Section 2.6
presents examples of both decompositions for different scoring rules: specifically, we consider
probabilistic forecasts (see, for example Dawid, 1986, for details) and point forecasts (where
one or more summary measures of a probability distribution, for example the mean, median
or quantiles are issued (see, for example Gneiting, 2011a,b)). The computation of the com-
ponent terms of the decompositions is discussed in section 2.7. In calculating the attributes,
a problem can arise when no, or few, forecasts or outcomes in the sample data are the same;
one mitigating solution is to classify the data into groups and in each group replace all data
with the same value, an approach known as binning. If binning is performed, adjustments
to the decompositions are required, adjustments which we make in section 2.8. We conclude
briefly in section 2.9.
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⌊ 2.2 ⌋ Notation
Let X be the unknown value of an event. Often, X is called the observation, and the value
taken by X, x, the outcome (of the event) or verification; the set of all possible outcomes
is X . Denote by P the set of all probability distributions for X; we let P be the random
quantity whose value is a probability distribution for X i.e. an element of P. The elements
of P will be denoted by lower case letters such as p, q, and r. To each element of P there
corresponds a distribution function; we denote the distribution functions by upper case let-
ters such as F , G, and H .
An important probability distribution for X will be the point-mass distribution at x, δx, for







0 if x′ < x
1 if x ≤ x′.
(2.1)
A probabilistic forecast is a choice of p ∈ P. To evaluate the match between a probabilistic
forecast and observation, we can use a scoring rule, which is a function that assigns to each
probabilistic forecast, p, and outcome, x, a real-number, S(p, x), known as a score. We take
S to be negatively-oriented so that a lower value for S(p, x) indicates a better match be-
tween p and x (Winkler and Murphy, 1968). The values of a scoring rule have, primarily, an
ordinal scale; negative scores are acceptable and, in general, a zero-score is not a perfect score.
Before the true outcome of the observation is known, we can, for any forecast, p, calculate
its expected score, being the average of the scores S(p, x) over the possible outcomes of the
observation (i.e. values of x). Then, the expected score of forecast p when X has probability






S(p, x) dG(x). (2.2)
We adopt the convention of presenting all expectations as integrals even when X is a discrete
set.
A rational forecaster, for whom the correct probability distribution for X is q, will issue
the forecast pmin that minimises S(p, q) . If pmin 6= q, the forecaster has issued a forecast
different to the forecast they consider correct, q, the reason being that they will achieve
a better expected score, under S, by doing so, a practice known as hedging (Brier, 1950;
Murphy and Epstein, 1967a). Any scoring rule under which hedging can occur, is considered
inappropriate or improper (Murphy and Epstein, 1967a). To avoid the perversities of im-
proper scoring rules, we consider only proper scoring rules. The formal definition of a proper
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scoring rule is (see Bröcker, 2009; Gneiting and Raftery, 2007; McCarthy, 1956; Winkler,
1996; Winkler and Murphy, 1968, and others): a (negatively-oriented) scoring rule is proper
if and only if
S(q, q) ≤ S(p, q) ∀p, q ∈ P. (2.3)
For proper scoring rules, we define the accuracy of the forecaster (or, their forecasts) to be
the expected score over all forecasts and outcomes, E[S(P,X)].
⌊ 2.3 ⌋ Limitations of the Decompositions
As has been discussed in the introduction to this chapter, under the general framework for
verification advocated by Murphy and Winkler (1987), the fundamental task is to assess the
properties of the joint, conditional and marginal distributions of the forecasts and outcomes.
In line with this purpose, there are firm, probability-based, definitions of the attributes of
probabilistic forecasts. For clarity we consider the case when X is a discrete random variable.
Then, following, for example, Bröcker (2012, 2015), forecasts are
(i) said to have no resolution, if
Pr(X = x|P = p) = Pr(X = x) for all p ∈ P, x ∈ X , (2.4)
(ii) perfectly reliable, if
Pr(X = x|P = p) = Prp(X = x) for all p ∈ P, x ∈ X , (2.5)
(iii) classified as having no discrimination, if
Pr(P = p|X = x) = Pr(P = p) for all x ∈ X , p ∈ P. (2.6)
These definitions allow one to establish certain formal theorems regarding the attributes.
For example, as Bröcker (2015) shows, an application of Bayes’ Rule proves that forecasts
have no resolution if and only if forecasts have no discrimination. But, whether the equations
(2.4) to (2.6) are satisfied can be difficult to assess.
In the absence of a direct, distributional assessment of forecast quality, the URR and RDC
decompositions offer an indispensable method of indirectly evaluating the attributes of the
forecasts. However, some caution must be exercised because the measures of the attributes
given by the decompositions are not wholly commensurate with the exact, distributional
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measures of equations (2.4) to (2.6).
To see that the decompositional measures are imperfect evaluations of the attributes let X
be a binary observation, with values 0 and 1, and define the forecasts to be probabilities
Prp(X = 1) for all p ∈ P; for ease of exposition, and as no confusion should arise, we write
p for Prp(X = 1). If we adopt the (half-)Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950), S(p, x) = (p− x)2,
then as shown in Murphy and Winkler (1987), the URR decomposition of accuracy is
E[S(P,X)] = E[(P −X)2]
= E[(X − E[X])2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uncertainty
−E[(E[X|P ] − E[X])2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Resolution
+E[(P − E[X|P ])2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reliability
. (2.7)
Murphy and Winkler (1987) also derive a second, dual decomposition for S,
E[S(P,X)] = E[(P −X)2]
= E[(P − E[P ])2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Refinement
−E[(E[P |X] − E[P ])2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discrimination
+E[(X − E[P |X])2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Correctness
. (2.8)
Although Murphy and Winkler (1987) did not give names to the component terms of this
dual decomposition, we have labelled them as indicated (terminology which we justify when
considering the decomposition in more general terms) and refer to the decomposition as the
RDC decomposition.
For X binary we may restate distributional condition (2.4) as
no resolution if:E[X|P = p] = E[X] for all p ∈ P (2.9)
Similarly, distributional condition (2.5) becomes
perfect reliability if:E[X|P = p] = p for all p ∈ P (2.10)
and distributional condition (2.6) becomes
no discrimination if:E[P |X = x] = E[P ] for all x ∈ X . (2.11)
From equations (2.9) to (2.11), it is seen that for resolution, reliability and discrimination,
their terms in the decompositions (2.7) and (2.8) measure the extent of the difference between
the left- and right-hand sides of the equations (2.4) to (2.6).
In particular, from equations (2.9) to (2.11), we see immediately that if forecasts have no
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resolution then the resolution term of the URR decomposition is E[(E[X|P ] − E[X])2] = 0,
forecasts that are perfectly reliable have a reliability term in the URR decomposition of
E[(P − E[X|P ])2] = 0, and forecasts that are totally non-discriminating have a discrimina-
tion term in the RDC decomposition equal to E[(E[P |X] − E[P ])2] = 0.
So, a necessary condition for perfect reliability is a zero reliability term in the URR decom-
position. Similarly, a zero resolution term in the URR decomposition is a necessary condition
for forecasts with no resolution, and a zero discrimination term in the RDC decomposition
is a necessary condition for non-discriminatory forecasts. From the contrapositive we have
that if the resolution term of the URR decomposition is non-zero, then the resolution of the
forecasts must be non-zero too and similar statements may be made about reliability and
discrimination. (If the decompositions are being evaluated from data, statistical tests are
required to determine whether any term is different to zero.).
If X is binary, it is evident that from E[X|P = p] = E[X] we have Pr(X = x|P = p) =
Pr(X = x) for x = 0, 1, so in this case, zero decompositional resolution implied no distri-
butional resolution. However, in general, the terms of the decomposition are not sufficient
quantities for the distributional attributes: if the resolution term of the URR decomposi-
tion is zero it does not imply that the resolution attribute is zero, and the same is true
for reliability and discrimination. In the following simple example we illustrate that a zero
decompositional discrimination does not imply a zero distributional discrimination even if
X is binary.
Consider tossing a fair coin to give a value X equal to either 0 (for tails) or 1 (for heads).
As the coin is fair Pr(X = 0) = Pr(X = 1) = 1/2. A forecaster, before the outcome of the
coin toss, issues a probabilistic forecast, p for the probability that X = 1. The forecasts are
issued so that if the outcome is X = 0, the preceding forecast is either p = 1/4 or p = 3/4
with equal likelihood: Pr(P = 1/4|X = 0) = Pr(P = 3/4|X = 0) = 1/2. If the outcome
is X = 1, the preceding forecast is always p = 1/2: Pr(P = 1/2|X = 1) = 1. From the
definition of resolution, the forecaster has resolution, because by Bayes’ Theorem,
Pr(X = 0|P = 1/4) = 1 6= Pr(X = 0) = 1
2
Pr(X = 0|P = 1/2) = 0 6= Pr(X = 0) = 1
2
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Pr(X = 1|P = 1/4) = 0 6= Pr(X = 1) = 1
2
Pr(X = 1|P = 1/2) = 1 6= Pr(X = 1) = 1
2
Pr(X = 1|P = 3/4) = 0 6= Pr(X = 1) = 1
2
. (2.13)
If the (half-)Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) is chosen, then the resolution term of the URR
decomposition is (from equation (2.7)),
E[(E[X|P ] − E[X])2] = 1
4
(2.14)
in agreement with the non-zero resolution of equations (2.12) and (2.13).
The forecaster also has a level of discrimination, because
Pr(P = 1/4|X = 0) = 1
2
6= Pr(P = 1/4) = 1
4
Pr(P = 1/2|X = 0) = 0 6= Pr(P = 1/2) = 1
2
Pr(P = 3/4|X = 0) = 1
2




Pr(P = 1/4|X = 1) = 0 6= Pr(P = 1/4) = 1
4
Pr(P = 1/2|X = 1) = 1 6= Pr(P = 1/2) = 1
2
Pr(P = 3/4|X = 1) = 0 6= Pr(P = 3/4) = 1
4
. (2.16)
Calculating the discrimination term in the RDC decomposition given by equation (2.8), we
have
E[(E[P |X] − E[P ])2] = 0 (2.17)
which is contrary to the non-zero discrimination of the forecast shown by equations (2.15)
and (2.16).
Although, as this small example demonstrates, the decompositional measures are not suf-
ficient evaluations of the distributional attributes of a forecasting system, nonetheless they
provide an assessment of the forecasts’ qualities that is (i) contextual: through the decompo-
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sitions, all qualities are expressed in terms of the chosen scoring rule used to assess accuracy,
so that quality and accuracy are measured on equivalent bases, and (ii) relative: the de-
compositions emphasise the contribution of each quality to the accuracy of the forecasting
system and allow these contributions to be contrasted.
Decompositions, therefore, have a part in all verification analyses and it is of interest for
decompositions to be as widely available as possible.
⌊ 2.4 ⌋ Towards General Decompositions
Less than perfect correspondence between forecast and observation can be the consequence of
bias (failure of the forecast and observation to agree on average) and/or dissociation (wide
variation in the difference between forecast and outcome across forecast-outcome pairs).
However, variation of the forecasts in alignment with variation in the observation is essential
for correspondence. We isolate these positive and negative contributions to the correspon-
dence between forecast and observation by separating accuracy (i.e. overall correspondence)
into components reflecting bias, aligned variation (or, co-variation) and dissociation.
2.4.1 ‖ URR Decomposition
To begin, we simplify the discussion by supposing X takes only the values 0 and 1, and
forecasts are probabilities Prp(X = 1) for all p ∈ P; p is used instead of Prp(X = 1). Under
the (half-)Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950), S(p, x) = (p− x)2, the URR decomposition given
in equation (2.7) can be rewritten in terms of S as
E[S(P,X)] = E[S(E[X], X)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uncertainty
− (E[S(E[X], X)] − E[E[S(E[X|P ], X)|P ]])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Resolution
+ (E[S(P,X)] − E[E[S(E[X|P ], X)|P ]])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reliability
. (2.18)
Equation (2.18) is helpful in two-ways. Firstly, it will suggest a general interpretation to the
terms of the URR decomposition (see below) and, second, it will permit a ready extension
of the URR decomposition to more general observations and other scoring rules (which we
also discuss below).
Underlying the construction of the URR decomposition is the preliminary step of stratifying
the outcomes by forecast. With this stratification of the outcomes, we have the summary
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measures: (i) E[X], the overall mean of the outcomes (determined from the marginal dis-
tribution of the outcomes; the marginal distribution is also known as the base-rate or, in
meteorology, the climatology), (ii) E[X|P ], the within-stratum means of the outcomes (de-
termined from the conditional distribution of the observation given the forecast). Both E[X]
and E[X|P ] are, in our simple binary setting, probabilities and are, therefore, themselves
acceptable forecasts for X, and it is meaningful to write S(E[X], x) and S(E[X|P = p], x)
for all p, x.
Having established S(E[X], x) and S(E[X|P = p], x) as being well-defined, we now take
E[X] and E[X|P ] as mean values rather than probabilities. The quantity E[S(E[X], X)]
is the overall correspondence of the observation with its mean value and, as such, is a
measure of the total variation of the observation i.e. of uncertainty. Similarly, for each
p, E[S(E[X|P ], X)|P = p] is the overall correspondence between the observation and its
within-stratum mean value and is a measure of the within-stratum variation of the observa-
tion (for the stratum determined by P = p); because the forecast is fixed for each stratum,
the variation of the observation within a stratum is equally variation in the difference be-
tween the forecast and observation and indicative of dissociation. We take, therefore, as
a measure dissociation the average within-stratum variation of the observation across all
strata, E[E[S(E[X|P ], X)|P ]]. The difference between the total variation of the observa-
tion (uncertainty) and the within-stratum variation of the observation (dissociation) is the
between-strata variation of the observation. Between strata, the forecast also changes so
the between-strata variation of the observation reflects the alignment between forecast and
observation (whether different forecasts are followed by different outcomes); the quantity
E[S(E[X], X)] − E[E[S(E[X|P ], X)|P ]] is the resolution of the forecasts.
If one accounts for the negative impact of dissociation on total correspondence (i.e. accu-
racy), the remaining correspondence above perfect correspondence represents bias. The bias
E[S(P,X)] − E[E[S(E[X|P ], X)|P ]] is the reliability of the forecasts.
Second, if we treat E[X] and E[X|P ] as probabilities and write q = E[X] and qp = E[X|P =
p], then we can express equation (2.18) as
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E[S(P,X)] = E[S(q,X)] − (E[S(q,X)] − E[E[S(qP , X)|P ]])
+ (E[S(P,X)] − E[E[S(qP , X)|P ]])
E[S(P,X)] = S(q, q) − (S(q, q) − E[S(qP , qP ) ]) + (E[S(P,X)] − E[S(qP , qP ) ])
E[S(P,X)] = S(q, q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uncertainty
−E[S(q, qP ) − S(qP , qP ) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Resolution




While we have arrived at equation (2.19) because E[X] and E[X|P ] are probabilities, as
presented the URR decomposition in equation (2.19) does not explicitly depend on the form
of S nor on the nature of X. Therefore, equation (2.19) suggests an entirely general URR
decomposition for scoring rules of probabilistic forecasts (see Bröcker, 2009). We also see
that, for proper scoring rules, both the resolution term and the reliability term of the URR
decomposition are non-negative.
2.4.2 ‖ RDC Decomposition
Continuing in the setting of X a binary 0/1 observation with each forecast given as probabil-
ity p (see above), for (half-)Brier scoring rule S(p, x) = (p−x)2, the dual RDC decomposition
of equation (2.8) is, in terms of S,
E[S(P,X)] = E[S(P,E[P ])]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Refinement
− (E[S(P,E[P ])] − E[E[S(P,E[P |X])|X]])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discrimination
+ (E[S(P,X)] − E[E[S(P,E[P |X])|X]])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Correctness
. (2.20)
Equation (2.20) is permissible because although the Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) is defined
for a binary secondary argument, there is clearly no mathematical difficulty in extending the
definition S(p, x) = (p − x)2 to a second argument that takes values in the interval [0, 1]
making S(p,E[P ]) and S(p,E[P |X = x]) well-defined for all p, x.
The RDC decomposition is dual to the URR decomposition in the sense that to prepare
for the RDC decomposition, the forecasts are stratified by outcome. We can then consider
the summary measures: (i) E[P ], the overall mean of the forecasts (determined from the
marginal distribution of the forecasts), (ii) E[P |X], the within-stratum means of the fore-
casts (determined by the conditional distribution of the forecasts given the observation).
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A measure of the total variation of the forecasts is the overall correspondence, E[S(P,E[P ])],
between the forecast and its mean value, which is the refinement of the forecasts. And,
within the stratum determined by X = x, the overall correspondence between the forecast
and the mean forecast, E[S(P,E[P |X])|X = x], is a measure of the variation of the forecasts
in the stratum. With the observation fixed for a stratum, all variation in the forecasts in
a stratum is variation in the difference between the forecasts and observation and so is a
measure of dissociation for the stratum. We define the total measure of dissociation to be
the average within-stratum forecast variation, E[E[S(P,E[P |X])|X]], over all strata. Be-
tween the strata the observation will take different values and the variation in the forecasts
accompanying a change in strata, and not assignable to dissociation, is the variation of
the forecasts to align with the observation. This variation of the forecasts for alignment,
E[S(P,E[P ])] − E[E[S(P,E[P |X])|X]] is forecast discrimination (the extent to which differ-
ent outcomes will be preceded by different forecasts). As above, removing the decremental
effect of dissociation on accuracy, any inaccuracy that remains is bias in the forecasts; we
call the bias, E[S(P,X)] − E[E[S(P,E[P |X])|X]], the (in)correctness of the forecasts.
2.4.3 ‖ Problems and Aims
The URR decomposition (2.19) refers to probabilistic forecasts. There is no immediate mod-
ification that would permit it to be applied to other types of forecast. For point forecasts,
for example, with scoring rule S(y, x), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y ⊂ X , it is not clear what to propose
for, say, the uncertainty term; one possibility for the uncertainty term is, following the above
derivation, S(E[X], X), but this requires that E[X] ∈ Y , which need not be the case, as we
may have E[X] ∈ X \Y .
A scoring rule for point forecasts can always be re-expressed in terms of probabilistic forecasts
(see Gneiting, 2011a) (and this is the approach taken by Bentzien and Friederichs (2014)),
but this approach, when considering decompositions, has both theoretical and practical diffi-
culties. Theoretically, the URR decomposition is derived by stratifying on the issued forecast
(i.e. the forecast that is the argument of the scoring rule). Re-expressing a scoring rule for
point forecasts in terms of the probabilistic forecast underlying the point forecast, requires
conditioning on the underlying probability forecast and, because there may be a number of
probability distributions that map to the same point forecast, this may lead to a different
decomposition to that obtained when the scoring rule is expressed in terms of point forecasts
and for which the conditioning is with respect to point forecasts. There is the additional
difficulty that the probability distribution underlying the point forecast may be latent, so
that even if it is theoretically justifiable to condition on a single probability distribution, in
practice it may not be possible to stratify the outcomes according to the underlying prob-
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ability distribution, a prerequisite to computing the decomposition terms. These problems
are not specific to point forecasts, but extend to non-probabilistic forecasts in general.
Different difficulties apply to the RDC decomposition. Subject to being able to extend the
chosen scoring rule to allow for a second argument that lies in the space of forecasts, the
RDC decomposition (2.20) is entirely general and can be applied to all types of forecast.
The extension is often readily done. However, even if S is proper, we cannot, in general,
conclude that the discrimination and correctness terms are non-negative. There is a fur-
ther, overarching, criticism of RDC decomposition (2.20): the summary measures E[P ] and
E[P |X] discount many material characteristics of the marginal and conditional distributions;
indeed, entirely different distributions may have the same summary measures. This is not
to say that RDC decomposition (2.20) is without all merit. Indeed, Murphy and Winkler
(1987) counsel that ‘the fundamental role played by [the joint and conditional] distributions
suggests that common summary measures (means, variances, etc.) of such distributions
should be useful verification measures in many situations.’ But, if we are to tend closer to
the general framework envisaged by Murphy and Winkler (1987) of the ‘careful and reasoned
evaluation’ of the conditional, marginal and joint distributions of forecast and observation,
we must attempt to establish decompositions with attributes defined by quantities that refer
more intimately to the distributions of the forecast and observation. Such decompositions
will not offer complete measures of the forecasts qualities as we have shown in the previ-
ous section. Nonetheless, the decompositions are at times the only assessment of forecast
quality available and in section 2.5 we derive entirely general decompositions that, for some
classes of forecast and observation and for some scoring rules, reduce to the decompositions
of equation (2.19) and (2.20) above.
⌊ 2.5 ⌋ Most General Decompositions
Define a forecast for the observation X to be a value, f (p), for some p ∈ P, of a function
f on P. The image space of f , Ff def= {f (p′)|p′ ∈ P}, is the set of possible forecasts for X.
We need not, at this stage, be more specific about the form of f , but we make it clear that
the forecast f (p) depends on p ∈ P, although this dependence may be implicit. We do not
place any constraints on the image space of the observation, X .
To allow for such an open description of a forecast, it is necessary to define a scoring rule in
more general terms.
Definition 2.5.1 (Scoring Rule). A scoring rule with respect to the class of forecasts Ff
is a real-valued function, S : Ff × X → R, with the value, for forecast f (p) and outcome
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x, S(f (p), x), referred to as a score. A scoring rule need not be symmetric in its arguments. 
We continue to regard all scoring rules as negatively-oriented. If X has probability distribu-
tion q and distribution function G, let
S(f (p), q)
def
= E[S(f (p), X)] =
∫
X
S(f (p), x) dG(x). (2.21)
We now generalise the definition of a proper scoring rule.
Definition 2.5.2 (Proper Scoring Rule). A scoring rule, S, with respect to the class of
forecasts Ff , is proper if and only if
S(f (q), q) ≤ S(f (p), q) ∀p, q ∈ P. (2.22)
S is strictly proper only if for p 6= q,
S(f (q), q) < S(f (p), q) . (2.23)

2.5.1 ‖ URR Decomposition
Fix S to be a proper scoring rule. A forecast, f , and outcome, x, correspond inasmuch as
they are close (in some sense) to one another. The score S(f , x) may be viewed as such a
‘distance’ between f and x. We use the word ‘distance’ in a general, descriptive sense and S
need not be a metric nor a quasi-distance (or, divergence) (Bröcker and Smith, 2007a): (a)
the score evaluated by S has (primarily) an ordinal scale and need not be greater than or
equal to zero; (b) S need not be symmetric in its arguments, and is typically not so because
of the differing identities of the forecast and the verification; (c) nor is there an a priori
imperative on any scoring rule that it satisfy the triangle inequality. (See Deza and Deza
(2014, page 4,5) for the distinction between a metric and quasi-distance.)
Given that, using S, we have a measure of the correspondence between forecast and ob-
servation, we ask what the best forecast is, i.e. what forecast has the best correspondence
to the observation? Because each forecast is a function of a probability distribution of the
observation, this question can be rephrased as: what is the best probability distribution
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(considering the forecasting system) to propose for the observation? Since, for r ∈ P, the
correspondence between the forecast f (r) and X is E[S(f (r), X)], i.e. the average ‘distance’
between f (r) and the possible outcomes, the best probability distribution is the probability
distribution, rmin, that minimises this ‘distance’ i.e. satisfies rmin = arg minr E[S(f (r), X)],
where the minimum depends on what we know about X (which determines the evaluation
of the expectation). We are reminded by Murphy and Winkler (1987) that in the context
of forecast evaluation ‘the joint distribution [of forecast and observation] contains all of the
relevant information’. In other words, the information about X will be either (i) the marginal
(or, unconditional) distribution of the observation, or (ii) the conditional distribution of the
observation given the forecast.
Let q be the unconditional probability distribution of X (that is, the marginal, base-rate,
climatology or historical probability distribution ofX), and let the conditional distribution of
X given the extant forecast, f (p), be qf (p). If we admit only the unconditional information
about X (in the case we have no forecast information) then the best forecast is, by the
propriety of S, f (q) and we have
min
r
E[S(f (r), X)] = min
r
S(f (r), q) = S(f (q), q) . (2.24)
However, if we know the extant forecast, f (p), then we have X ∼ qf (p) and the best forecast
is, by the propriety of S, f (qf (p)), with
min
r
E[S(f (r), X)] = min
r
S(f (r), qf (p)) = S(f (qf (p)), qf (p)) . (2.25)
As qf (p) is the optimal (here, minimising) probability distribution, and, by propriety
S(f (qf (p)), qf (p)) ≤ S(f (p), qf (p)) (2.26)
the difference
S(f (p), qf (p)) − S(f (qf (p)), qf (p)) (2.27)
is a measure of the sub-optimality of the extant forecast, f (p), relative to the optimal fore-
cast, f (qf (p)), and this difference is greater than or equal to 0 by the propriety of S.
To calculate the sub-optimality of the forecasts overall, we take the average,
E[S(f (P ), qf (P )) − S(f (qf (P )), qf (P )) ], (2.28)
which we define to be the reliability of the forecasts. The greater the value of the reliability
term, the more unreliable the forecasts. The forecasts are perfectly reliable (i.e. optimal)
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if f (p) = f (qf (p)) for all f (p). The first term in equation in (2.28) is simply accuracy,
E[S(f (P ), X)]. We refer to the second term of equation (2.28), E[S(f (qf (P )), qf (P )) ], as the
sharpness of the forecasts. The reason for this terminology is as follows. The forecast f (p) is
identified with a particular a stratum of outcomes (those outcomes that follow the forecast
f (p)). Were the outcomes limited to those within the stratum, the best forecast would be
f (qf (p)). If within the stratum, the outcomes correspond closely to their best forecast, then
they will be concentrated around their best forecast. If this is true for all strata determined
by the different forecasts, then the stratification of outcomes by the forecasts leads to a
well-delineated, clear, or sharp, partition of the outcomes.
Forecasts may be sharp but unreliable if in the strata determined by the forecasts, there is a
narrow spread of outcomes, but the outcomes in each stratum show little match to the pub-
lished forecast associated with the stratum (i.e. the stratum’s published forecast is different
to the stratum’s optimal forecast). For example, consider the repeated toss of a fair coin.
Suppose that forecasts are either f (p) = 1 or f (p) = 0 (i.e. stating with certainty that the
coin will land on heads or tails) but on every occasion that f (p) = 0 a head occurs and on
every occasion that f (p) = 1 a tail occurs; the forecasts are perfectly sharp because for every
forecast it is clear what outcome will occur, but totally unreliable because the forecast of
each stratum is maximally different from the optimal forecast for the stratum (the optimal
forecast being the outcome itself).
Equally forecasts may be reliable but unsharp: the issued forecasts are as close a match as
possible to the outcomes collectively, but provide little clarity about the outcome that will
occur (as the outcomes are broadly dispersed about the forecast and there are large overlaps
between the strata). For example, consider again the repeated toss of a fair coin, for which,
on every toss, the forecast is always f (p) = ‘probability of heads is 1/2’. The forecasts are
reliable because they are as close as possible to the outcomes collectively (i.e. both head and
tail), but are completely unsharp giving no guidance about the value that will occur (given
the forecast, the outcomes are dispersed over the entire observation space).
Sharpness, therefore, refers to how well the forecasts separate the outcomes into groups and
reliability refers to how well the outcomes in each group match their classifying forecast.
The level of sharpness must be assessed relative to the difficulty of separating the outcomes:
if it is difficult to divide the outcomes into groups, then low levels of sharpness may nonethe-
less be acceptable. To evaluate the difficulty of grouping the outcomes, we consider the
grouping of the forecasts in the absence of any issued forecasts. In this case, X has the
unconditional distribution, q, and there is a single stratum of all the outcomes with opti-
mal reference forecast f (q). How tightly concentrated all the outcomes are around f (q) is
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given by E[S(f (q), X)] = S(f (q), q) , which we call the uncertainty of X. We can compare
uncertainty to the sharpness of the forecasts. Noting that,
S(f (q), q) = E[S(f (q), qf (P )) ] (2.29)
and by propriety S(f (q), qf (p)) ≥ S(f (qf (p)), qf (p)) for all f (p), we have
S(f (q), q) ≥ E[S(f (qf (P )), qf (P )) ]. (2.30)
From the above definitions, we can reciprocally, consider sharpness as uncertainty in the
presence of forecasts, so that in moving from not having forecasts to having forecasts, un-
certainty always decreases (improves). The amount of improvement is
S(f (q), q) − E[S(f (qf (P )), qf (P )) ] ≥ 0 (2.31)
which is the resolution of the forecasts: with the introduction of forecasts, uncertainty about
the possible outcome of X resolves from S(f (q), q) to the lower level E[S(f (qf (P )), qf (P )) ].
It follows from the relationship between sharpness and resolution that forecasts can be un-
resolved but reliable, or unreliable and resolved. For example, it is clear that a forecasting
system that issues only the climatological forecast, f (q), is both totally unresolved and per-
fectly reliable (both resolution and reliability are zero).
We have, in summary, that accuracy is a combination of reliability and sharpness and that
sharpness can be expressed as uncertainty less resolution. This deconstruction of accuracy
may be expressed more formally as the Uncertainty-Resolution-Reliability (URR) decompo-
sition of the forecasts, given by the identity
E[S(f (P ), X)] = S(f (q), q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uncertainty
− (S(f (q), q) − E[S(f (qf (P )), qf (P )) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Resolution︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sharpness
+ E[S(f (P ), qf (P )) − S(f (qf (P )), qf (P )) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reliability
. (2.32)
Recently, Siegert (2017) has given an elegant derivation of Bröcker (2009)’s general URR
decomposition for proper scoring rules of precise-probabilistic forecasts. As Siegert (2017)
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emphasises, the URR decomposition is, fundamentally, a simple arithmetic identity, in which
the accuracy of the extant forecasts is equal to the sum of the differences between accuracy
and the accuracies of two other comparative sets of forecasts (which Siegert (2017) calls the
recalibrated forecasts and the reference forecasts). However, Siegert (2017) allows these com-
parative forecasts to be freely chosen (although Siegert (2017) does insist that these choices
be justified). It is this freedom that limits Siegert (2017)’s approach and the extension of
this approach to other types of forecast (and is contrary to the constrained choices of the
general framework of Murphy and Winkler (1987)). For, not only does the the allowance
of any choices for the comparative forecasts detach the resulting terms from the attributes
that they are intended to represent (for example, in Siegert (2017)’s decomposition, it is
feasible to swap the comparative forecasts for one another, confusing the meaning of the
decomposition’s terms), it is also the case that, as Siegert (2017) acknowledges, free choice
of the comparative forecasts, can lead to the terms of the decomposition being negative,
which further complicates their interpretation.
Although our URR decomposition satisfies the arithmetic identity highlighted by Siegert
(2017), our approach is the inverse. We derive, from meta-principles, mathematical quan-
tities that satisfy the descriptive definitions of the attributes of uncertainty, resolution and
reliability and then show that these mathematical quantities form a decomposition of accu-
racy.
2.5.2 ‖ RDC Decomposition
Fundamentally, the URR decomposition compares three probability distributions of the ob-
servation: the unconditional, or marginal, distribution of the observation, the conditional
distribution of the observation given the forecast and the distribution underlying the fore-
cast. Of these three probability distributions, the probability distribution underlying the
forecast is, from the perspective of the forecasting system, the ideal distribution for the
observation (the probability distribution underlying the forecast is the distribution the fore-
casting system believes should be the probability distribution of the observation); if the
conditional distribution of the observation given the forecasts is ideal (i.e. matches the ideal
distribution) then the forecasts are perfectly reliable (if X is discrete, for example, we have
Pr(X = x|f (P ) = f (p)) = Prp(X = x) for all p such that Pr(P = p) > 0 ). In contrast, the
unconditional distribution of the observation is, to the forecasting system, the base proba-
bility distribution (for the forecasting system to improve upon). The URR decomposition
shows where the conditional distribution of the observation (given the forecasts) lies between
the base and ideal distributions of the observation.
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However, the URR decomposition, by referring to just one member (the observation) of the
forecast-observation pair, provides only partial insight into the properties of the forecasting
system. To complete the evaluation of the forecasting system, the features of the forecasts
that precede the outcomes must also be analysed.
For verification purposes, within the general framework of Murphy and Winkler (1987), the
extent of our knowledge of the features of the forecasts is summarised by: (i) the uncondi-
tional (i.e. marginal, or historical) distribution of the forecasts, (ii) the conditional distribu-
tion of the forecasts given the observation.
We would like to develop a decomposition that refers to the forecasts and is dual to the
URR decomposition in that it places the conditional distribution of the forecasts given the
observation between a base distribution and an ideal distribution. The base distribution is
the unconditional distribution of the forecasts. It remains to define an ideal distribution for
the forecasts: the probability distribution that, were the outcome known, the forecasting
system would most like the forecasts to have.
It seems reasonable to propose that forecasts are ideal or perfect if, for each outcome x,
the forecast preceding x is categorical that x will occur. In other words, given X = x, the
ideal distribution of the forecasts, which we denote by δ∗x, is a point-mass distribution on
the forecasts at f (P ) = f (δx).
In broad terms, therefore, the correspondence between forecast and observation will lie on a
scale between ‘no correspondence’ and ‘perfect correspondence’. A forecasting system with
forecasts that correspond well with the observation will have a distribution of forecasts, con-
ditional on the observation, that is close to ‘ideal’, while a forecasting system with forecasts
poorly aligned with the observation will have a conditional distribution of the forecasts given
the observation that is closer to the ‘base’ unconditional distribution of the forecasts. We
can assess the forecasts by determining how close the conditional distribution of the forecasts
given the observation is to both the base and ideal distributions of the forecasts.
To position the conditional distribution of the forecasts given the observation on the scale
from base distribution to ideal distribution, we require the notion of ‘distance’ between
any two distributions of forecasts. We choose to define such a ‘distance’ between a nomi-
nated distribution of forecasts p∗ and a second distribution of forecasts r∗ as the average,
under r∗, of the distances between p∗ and each of the forecasts. This definition requires,
in turn, a notion of distance between a distribution of forecasts and a single forecast. We
define the distance between a distribution of forecasts and a forecast using a scoring rule, S∗.
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A particular use of the scoring rule S∗ will be to determine the distance between the ideal
distribution given X = x, δ∗x, and the extant forecast preceding X = x, say, f (p); we write
this distance as S∗(δ∗x, f (p)) following the conventions of all scoring rules. Of note, however,
is that the distance S∗(δ∗x, f (p)) also expresses a correspondence between f (p) and x, for
which we have, under the scoring rule S, the measure S(f (p), x). To be consistent in our
evaluation in quantifying correspondence between a forecast and outcome, we would like to
choose S∗ so that S∗(δ∗x, f (p)) = S(f (p), x). To distinguish S
∗ from S, we refer to S∗ as an
extended scoring rule. Let P∗ be the set of probability distributions over the set of forecasts,
Ff .
Definition 2.5.3 (Extended Scoring Rule). A real-valued function S∗ : P∗ × Ff → R is
called an extended scoring rule (for S) with respect to the class of forecasts Ff if, for each
f (p) ∈ Ff , x ∈ X ,
S∗(δ∗x, f (p)) = S(f (p), x). (2.33)
(We bring to attention the specific order of the arguments in both S∗ and S.) 
For interpretation purposes we are concerned only with proper extended scoring rules. The
definition of a proper extended scoring rule follows naturally from equation (2.3): letting
q∗ ∈ P∗ be the probability distribution of f (P ), define
S∗(p∗, q∗)
def
= E[S∗(p∗, f (P ))] for all p∗ ∈ P∗. (2.34)
Definition 2.5.4 (Proper Extended Scoring Rule). The (negatively-oriented) extended scor-
ing rule, S∗ : P∗ × Ff → R is said to be proper if and only if
S∗(q∗, q∗) ≤ S∗(p∗, q∗) for all p∗, q∗ ∈ P∗. (2.35)

With S∗ a proper extended scoring rule, let q∗ be the unconditional probability distribution
of the forecasts, and q∗x the distribution of the forecasts given X = x. Given X = x, we
would like conditional distribution, q∗x, to be as close as possible to the ideal distribution,




x) − S∗(q∗x, q∗x) (2.36)







Prδ∗0 (P = p)
Prq∗0 (P = p)
Prδ∗1 (P = p)
Prq∗1 (P = p)
Figure 2.1: X is a binary 0/1 observation, with forecasts Prp(X = 1) for different
probability distributions p. For simplicity, for each distribution p, write p for Prp(X = 1)
and allow for p ∈ [0, 1]. Each distribution of forecasts is a distribution for the values
of p. The ideal distributions of the forecasts are shown as thick vertical lines: the ideal
distribution of forecasts preceding x = 1 assigns probability of 1 to p = 1 (vertical red line)
i.e. ideally all forecasts preceding x = 1 should be p = 1; similarly, the ideal distribution
of forecasts preceding x = 0 assigns a probability of 1 to p = 0 (vertical black line). The
closer the actual distribution of forecasts preceding x = 1, q∗1, is to the ideal distribution,
δ∗1 , the better, and the closer the actual distribution of forecasts preceding x = 0, q
∗
0 , is
to the ideal distribution, δ∗0 , the better.
(which is always positive by the propriety of S∗) conveys how far from ideal the conditional
distribution of the forecasts is. Because the ideal distribution δ∗x identifies with perfectly
correct forecasts (for X = x), the further the conditional distribution q∗x is from δ
∗
x the more
incorrect the forecasts may be deemed to be. Averaging the difference in equation (2.36)
over all outcomes gives
E[S∗(δ∗X , q
∗
X) − S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ] (2.37)




X) ] = E[E[S
∗(δ∗X , f (P ))|X]]
= E[S∗(δ∗X , f (P ))]
= E[S(f (P ), X)] (2.38)
which is the accuracy of the forecasts.
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To interpret the second term of equation (2.37), E[S∗(q∗X , q
∗
X) ], we begin with some general
reasoning. If r∗ is the distribution of a group of forecasts, then the average ‘distance’ of the
forecasts in the group from r∗, S∗(r∗, r∗) , reflects the variation of the forecasts in the group:
if the forecasts in the group change, becoming more or less varied, r∗, being the distribution
of these forecasts, will change and so too then will the distance from each forecast in the
group to r∗ change, changing the average ‘distance’ S∗(r∗, r∗) ; each value of S∗(r∗, r∗) can
be associated with a particular spread of the forecasts.
Returning to the second term of equation (2.37), it is expected that forecasts will vary in
an attempt to adjust to changes in the observations. Forecasts will also (to a greater or
lesser extent) exhibit exogenous variations, which are variations for reasons beyond those
related to a need to adapt to movements in the values of the observations. Suppose that
the value of X is known i.e. we have X = x for some x. There is no reason for the fore-
casts that precede the value x of X to show any variation: with x fixed, it is not necessary
for the corresponding forecasts to differ between themselves. Any variation in the forecasts
preceding X = x, therefore, must be exogenous variation. The distribution of the forecasts
preceding X = x is, by definition, q∗x, and by the general reasoning above, the variation of
the forecasts within the stratum determined by the outcome X = x can be measured by
S∗(q∗x, q
∗
x) . Therefore, we define E[S
∗(q∗X , q
∗
X) ] as the excess variation of the forecasts (a
term which we re-appropriate from Yates (1982)).
(In)correctness, therefore, is accuracy less excess variation. The degree of (in)correctness,
or, whether forecasts are near to or far from ideal, depends on the scale. To determine the
scale, we must also assess the distance of the conditional distribution of the forecasts to the
unconditional distribution of the forecasts.
In direct analogy with equation (2.37), how far the conditional distribution of the forecasts
is from the unconditional distribution of the forecasts, is
E[S∗(q∗, q∗X) − S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ] = S∗(q∗, q∗) − E[S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ] (2.39)
Applying our earlier general reasoning, S∗(q∗, q∗) is the total variation of the forecasts as a
whole (with unconditional distribution q∗). We refer to S∗(q∗, q∗) as the refinement of the
forecasts (confusingly, the term refinement is sometimes used differently to refer to sharp-
ness as in, for example, DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) and Blattenberger and Lad (1985)).
Whether excess variation is relatively high depends on how the excess variation compares to
the total variation (i.e. refinement).
If the excess variation of the forecasts is close to the forecasts’ refinement then most of the
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forecasts’ variation is excessive, exogenously driven, and we conclude that excess variation
is high. The difference between refinement and excess,
S∗(q∗, q∗) − E[S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ], (2.40)
is known as the discrimination of the forecasts and, as the non-exogenous, or necessary,
component of the forecasts’ variation, indicates the ability of the forecasts to adjust to X,
i.e. to anticipate different outcomes for X. When excess variation is high, and thereby close
to refinement, discrimination is low and close to zero.
Equations (2.37) and (2.39) together, position the forecasts on the scale between ‘no cor-
respondence’ and ‘perfect correspondence’ with the observation. Collecting the refinement,
discrimination and correctness terms we have
E[S(f (P ), X)] = E[S∗(δ∗X , f (P ))]
E[S(f (P ), X)] = S∗(q∗, q∗) − (S∗(q∗, q∗) − E[S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ])
+ E[S∗(δ∗X , q
∗
X) − S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ]
E[S(f (P ), X)] = S∗(q∗, q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Refinement
− (S∗(q∗, q∗) − E[S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discrimination︸ ︷︷ ︸
Excess
+ (E[S(f (P ), X)] − E[S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Correctness
(2.41)
giving a second, dual decomposition for accuracy, the refinement-discrimination-correctness
(RDC) decomposition.
From equation (2.41) and the arguments preceding it, it can be seen that for any proper
scoring rule, S∗ : P∗ × Ff → R, S∗(q∗, q∗) is a measure of refinement and the difference
S∗(q∗, q∗) − E[S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ] is a measure of discrimination. However for these measures to
be comparable and consistent with the measures, under S, of uncertainty, resolution and
reliability, and for the difference E[S(f (P ), X)] − E[S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ] to be a true reflection of
(in)correctness, the proper scoring rule S∗ must be an extension of S. We consider this point
further in the examples that now follow.
⌊ 2.6 ⌋ Examples
We demonstrate the evaluation of the URR and RDC decompositions, with several examples
beginning with the (half-)Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) and revisiting the results of section
2.4. The simplicity and familiarity of the (half-)Brier scoring rule will be helpful in illustrat-
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ing the more abstract ideas proposed so far in this chapter. In several of the examples it will
be necessary to indicate the probability distribution that is referred to by an expectation or
distribution function. In such cases, the probability distribution is shown as a subscript. For
example, Eq[X] is the expected value of X when X ∼ q, and Fq is the distribution function
corresponding to q.
2.6.1 ‖ Brier Scoring Rule
Let 0 and 1 be the only possible values that the observation, X, can take. For each p ∈ P,
the forecast is f (p) = Prp(X = 1). Because each probability distribution of X is completely
identified by the value that the probability distribution assigns to the probability thatX = 1,
knowing p is equivalent to knowing Prp(X = 1), and so for simplicity of notation, we write
p for Prp(X = 1). Then the (half-)Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) is defined by
S(f (p), x) = S(Prp(X = 1), x) = S(p, x) = (p− x)2. (2.42)
Brier (1950) notes that S is a proper scoring rule. Because p = Prp(X = 1) = Ep[X], we
write equation (2.42) as
S(p, x) = (Ep[X] − x)2. (2.43)
2.6.1.1 | URR Decomposition
Taking the expectation of the equation (2.43) with respect to X under a probability distri-
bution r ∈ P, we have
S(p, r)
def
= Er[S(p,X)] = E
2
p[X] − 2Ep[X]Er[X] + Er[X] (2.44)
from which, letting q be the unconditional (i.e climatological) probability distribution of X,
S(q, q) = E[X] − E2[X] (2.45)
and (recalling the notation defined in equation (2.2))
S(f (qf (p)), qf (p)) ≡ S(qp, qp) = E[X|P = p] − E2[X|P = p]. (2.46)
By simple calculation, from equation (2.32) the URR decomposition of the Brier scoring rule
is equal to the decomposition in equation (2.7).
University of Exeter 40 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 2
2.6.1.2 | RDC Decomposition
Define the scoring rule S∗ by (recalling that f (p) = p)
S∗(r∗, p) = (Er∗ [P ] − p)2 for all r∗ ∈ P∗, p ∈ P. (2.47)
Then S∗ is proper, for
S∗(r∗, q∗) = Eq∗ [(Er∗ [P ] − P )2]
= E2r∗ [P ] − 2Er∗ [P ]Eq∗[P ] + Eq∗ [P 2]
= (Er∗ [P ] − Eq∗ [P ])2 + Eq∗ [(P − Eq∗ [P ])2] (2.48)
which is minimised for r∗ = q∗. And, noting that it is valid under the (half-)Brier scoring
rule for p ∈ P to be 0 or 1, the ideal distribution δ∗x is defined as the point-mass distribution
on f (δx) = Prδx(X = 1) = x, so that
S∗(δ∗x, p) = (Eδ∗x [P ] − p)2
= (Prδx(X = 1) − p)2
= (x− p)2
= S(p, x). (2.49)
Therefore, S∗ is a proper extended scoring rule for S. From equation (2.48), we have
S∗(q∗, q∗) = E[(P − E[P ])2], (2.50)
the variance of the forecasts under their historical distribution, and for all x,
S∗(q∗x, q
∗
x) = E[(P − E[P |X = x])2|X = x]. (2.51)
Referring to equation (2.41), the RDC decomposition for the (half-)Brier scoring rule is, with
a little calculation, given by the decomposition in equation (2.8).
2.6.2 ‖ Ranked Probability Scoring Rule
The quadratic scoring rule generalises the (half-)Brier scoring rule of the previous section (the
quadratic scoring rule is also referred to as the probability scoring rule (Murphy and Epstein,
1967b); the use of the terminology ‘quadratic scoring rule’ seems to have appeared first in
Winkler and Murphy (1968)). The most general form of the quadratic scoring rule is given
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by Gneiting and Raftery (2007, equation (18)), which in our negatively-oriented context is,








(where we have also multiplied by a factor of one-half). An alternative generalisation of the
(half-)Brier scoring rule Brier (1950) is to consider the cumulative distribution function of
the forecast relative to the cumulative outcome (the cumulative outcome being equivalent to
the cumulative distribution function for the point-mass distribution at the outcome). Letting
f (p) = Fp for each p ∈ P, Ax = {x′ ∈ X |x′ ≥ x} be a subset of X for each x ∈ X and define
(where the indicator function 1A(y) = 1 if y ∈ A and 0 otherwise)
S(f (p), x) = S(Fp, x) =
∫
X
(Fp(y) − 1Ax(y))2 dy (2.53)
The scoring rule defined by equation (2.53) is referred to as the ranked probability scoring
rule. Particular instances of the ranked probability scoring rule are the following.
(i) (Half-)Brier Scoring Rule (Brier, 1950), for dichotomous events: X ∈ {0, 1} = X ,
A0 = {0, 1}, A1 = {1}, p = Pr(X = 1), Fp(0) = 1 − p, Fp(1) = 1, then
S(f (p), x) = (p− x)2. (2.54)
(ii) (Discrete) Ranked Probability Score ((D)RPS) (Epstein, 1969; Murphy, 1971; Wilks,
2006) for events that can take one of a discrete number, n ≥ 2, different possible
values, one of which must occur: letting ej be an n-component vector with every
entry 0 except the jth component, which is 1 i.e. the jth natural basis vector of Rn,
X ∈ {ej |j = 1, . . . , n} = X . Let the ordering, or ranking on X be ej ≤ ek if and only
if j ≤ k. Then, Aej = {ek ∈ X |j ≤ k}. Setting pj = Pr(X = ej), we have under the
given ordering Fp(ek) = Prp(X ≤ ek) =
∑k
j=1 Prp(X = ej) =
∑k
j=1 pj . The discrete
ranked probability scoring rule is















A usual circumstance in which the DRPS is applicable is when an event has a finite
number of possible outcomes (either values or classes), only one of which may occur.
Then the observation X is a vector for which the jth component is 1 if and only if the
jth outcome (value or class) occurs for the event.
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(iii) Continuous Ranked Probability Score (CRPS) (Brown, 1974; Gneiting and Raftery,
2007; Matheson and Winkler, 1976) for events, the outcome of which takes a value in
the subset of the real-numbers: X ∈ X ⊂ R, Ax = [x,∞), Fp(x) = Prp(X ≤ x), then
S(f (p), x) =
∫
X
(Fp(y) − 1[x,∞)(y))2 dy. (2.56)
As shown in Murphy (1969) and Gneiting and Raftery (2007) the ranked probability scoring
rule is proper.
It will be helpful (particularly when determining the RDC decomposition), to note that the
ranked probability scoring rule may be written equivalently as
S(f (p), x) = S(Ep[1AX ], x) =
∫
X
(Ep[1AX (y)] − 1Ax(y))2 dy (2.57)
where we have f (p) = Ep[1AX ].
In the interests of clarity, we restrict attention to one particular case of the quadratic scoring
rule, the CRPS (all other cases of the quadratic scoring rule follow similarly). From above,
for the CRPS, X = R, Ax = [x,∞) and f(p) = Fp = Ep[1[X,∞)].
2.6.2.1 | URR Decomposition
We have, assuming sufficiently regular conditions for the interchange of expectation and
integration, for r ∈ P,
S(f (p), r) =
∫ ∞
−∞




Er[1[X,∞)(y)](1 − Er[1[X,∞)(y)]) dy. (2.58)
From equation (2.58), with q the unconditional (i.e. climatological) probability distribution
of X,
S(f (q), q) =
∫ ∞
−∞
E[1[X,∞)(y)](1 − E[1[X,∞)(y)]) dy (2.59)
and
S(f (qf (p)), qf (p)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
E[1[X,∞)(y)|f (p)](1 − E[1[X,∞)(y)|f (p)]) dy, (2.60)
from which (by equation (2.32)) the URR decomposition for the CRPS is
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E[S(f (P ), X)] =
E[S(f (P ), X)] =
∫ ∞
−∞





























As the information in p is the same as the information in Fp, expectations conditional on
f (p) = Fp may be written as expectations conditional on P .
2.6.2.2 | RDC Decomposition
Motivated by the representation of the quadratic scoring rule given in equation (2.57), define,




(Er∗ [FP (y)] − Fp(y))2 dy. (2.62)
Taking expectations of equation (2.62) with respect to FP , we have












P (y)] − E2q∗ [FP (y)]
)
dy, (2.63)
which is minimised for r∗ such that
Er∗ [FP (y)] = Eq∗ [FP (y)] (2.64)
for all y ∈ (−∞,∞). Because r∗ = q∗ satisfies equation (2.64), S∗ is a proper scoring rule
(but not strictly proper, because equation (2.64) may be satisfied by a distribution of FP
other than q∗). Noting that under S, point-mass distributions underlying the forecast are
permissible, the ideal distribution, δ∗x, is defined as the point-mass distribution at f (δx) =
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= S(Fp, x) (2.65)













(FP (y) − E[FP (y)])2
]
dy (2.66)







E[F 2P (y)|X = x] − E2[FP (y)|X = x]
)
dy. (2.67)
It is then readily shown (referring to equation (2.41)), that the RDC decomposition for the
CRPS is
E[S(FP , X)] =

































2.6.2.3 | Other Decompositions
The decompositions in equations (2.61) and (2.68) are not unique: there are other decom-
positions for the ranked probability scoring rule. The most evident of these decompositions
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is arrived at by noting that the CRPS can be expressed as the aggregate of a collection of
Brier scores (Brier, 1950). From equation (2.57), the expected CRPS can be written as
E[S(f (P ), X)] =
∫
X
E[(EP [1[X,∞)(y)] − 1[X,∞)(y))2] dy (2.69)
where, noting that for all y ∈ R, 1[X,∞)(y) ∈ {0, 1} is a binary observation with probability
of being equal to 1 given by EP [1[X,∞)(y)]. It is, therefore, the case that, writing SB for the
Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950),
(EP [1[X,∞)(y)] − 1[X,∞)(y))2 = SB(EP [1[X,∞)(y)],1[X,∞)(y)) (2.70)
and the expected CRPS is
E[S(f (P ), X)] =
∫
X
E[SB(EP [1[X,∞)(y)],1[X,∞)(y))] dy. (2.71)
Each expected Brier score (Brier, 1950) has both URR and RDC decompositions, which
when substituted for the integrand of equation (2.71) give the following alternative URR
decomposition for the CRPS,
E[S(f (P ), X)] =
E[S(f (P ), X)] =
∫ ∞
−∞




















and alternative RDC decomposition,
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E[S(f (P ), X)] =
E[S(f (P ), X)] =
∫ ∞
−∞




















The URR decomposition of equation (2.72) has been derived by Candille and Talagrand
(2005) (using the same approach, Candille and Talagrand (2005) also derive an alternative
URR decomposition for the RPS, reproducing a result first arrived at by Murphy (1972)).
We will refer to the decomposition of equation (2.72) as the URRB decomposition to distin-
guish it from the URR decomposition of equation (2.61).
The singular difference between the URR and the URRB decompositions is the conditioning
variables (with uncertainty, therefore, being the same in both decompositions). The condi-
tional expectations of the URR decomposition depend on the full distribution function (or,
P ), a stronger dependency than for the conditional expectations of the URRB, which depend
only on the distribution function at a point (i.e. FP (y)). Under the weaker conditioning of
the URRB decomposition, a larger group of outcomes can be associated with each forecast,
resulting, for each y, in a conditional expectation closer to E[1[X,∞)(y)], giving a lower (i.e.
poorer) resolution than under the URR decomposition; to maintain the same expected score,
the reliability of the URRB must then too be lower (i.e. better) than under the URR de-
composition. Because the URR decomposition is determined by minimisation, the URRB
decomposition can be said to under-report resolution and overstate reliability.
The RDC decomposition of equation (2.73), which we call the RDCB decomposition, too has
weaker conditioning than the RDC decomposition of equation (2.67): for each y, many differ-
ent outcomes will have the same value for 1[x,∞)(y). Therefore, for any y, E[FP (y)|1[X,∞)(y)]
will be closer to E[FP (y)] than E[FP (y)|X] ≡ FE[P |X](y). It follows that the discrimination
attribute of the RDCB decomposition will be lower (i.e. worse) than the discrimination at-
tribute of the RDC decomposition. And as both decompositions must equate to the same
expected score, the RDCB decomposition will have a lower (i.e. better) correctness attribute
than the RDC decomposition. In other words, the RDCB decomposition will give too low an
assessment of discrimination and too good an evaluation of correctness. Refinement is the
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same in both decompositions.
Still further URR decompositions have been proposed (for example for the RPS, Murphy
(1972) proposes a scalar decomposition in addition to the URRB decomposition; Murphy
(1972) calls the URRB decomposition the vector decomposition of the RPS). In the specific
context of the CRPS, Hersbach (2000) gives a thoroughly different URR decomposition. Al-
though Hersbach (2000)’s original presentation is in terms of ensemble forecasts, it is easily
reframed in terms of probabilistic forecasts and such a reworking of Hersbach (2000)’s URR
decomposition is given in the appendix to Candille and Talagrand (2005), where it is labelled
the Hersbach-Lalaurette URR decomposition.
Hersbach (2000)’s URR decomposition differs principally because of Hersbach (2000)’s in-
terpretation of reliability, which stems from the type of forecasts considered i.e. ensemble
forecasts. For ensemble forecasts, a measure of reliability is the uniformity of the rank his-
togram. Rank histograms were proposed by Anderson (1996), Hamill and Colucci (1997),
Talagrand et al. (1997) (see also Weigel, 2012; Wilks, 2006); Hamill (2001) shows that suit-
able (i.e. uniform, or, flat) rank histograms are a necessary condition of the reliability of
ensemble forecasts but not a sufficient condition and this has led to other assessments
of ensemble forecast reliability (see, for example Mason et al., 2007) and the discussions
Bröcker et al. (2011) and Mason et al. (2011) (see also Weigel, 2012); however, we do not
review the properties of rank histograms here, and mention them only to place in context
the motivation for Hersbach (2000)’s decomposition.
To translate Hersbach (2000)’s arguments to probabilistic forecasts, suppose that an inde-
pendent and identically distributed sample is drawn from the forecast (a probability dis-
tribution). The members of this sample together with the observation can be ranked (in
ascending order). The forecast may then be considered reliable if the probability that the
observation has rank i, is the same for all i: in this sense, the observation is (statistically)
indistinguishable from any other random variable with the same probability distribution as
was forecast. In other words, here reliability refers to the position of the observation in the
sample. To quantify this concept of reliability, we note that if each rank of the observation
is equally likely, then the probability distribution of the observation’s rank is a uniform dis-
tribution (or, equivalently, the cumulative distribution of the observation’s rank is a straight
line with unit slope). What amounts to the same assessment is that (for large sample sizes),
the observation is equally likely to fall on the α-quantile for all values of α. Therefore, if we
were to construct a histogram with class boundaries set to the different values of α ∈ [0, 1]
and determine the frequency with which the observation fell between the α-quantiles (with
respect to the sample from the forecast), i.e. the frequency with which the observation had
rank equal to α, then the resulting frequency histogram would be flat for reliable forecasts.
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In this histogram construction, we note that the classes have the same width (equal to dα)
so the density and frequency histogram are equivalent.
Rather than examining the reliability criterion in position-(or, rank-)space of the observa-
tion, we can assess this same criterion in the value-space of the observation by transforming
the histogram. To do so, the α-axis is mapped to the range of the observation and the
corresponding density graph expressed against these values. But, the equally-spaced classes
of α will map, in general, to unequally-spaced classes on the range of the observation (i.e.
α-quantiles, for different α, are not necessarily equally-spaced). So to maintain the trans-
formed densities as densities, they must be divided by the ratio of the new class width to
the previous class width. Having completed the transformation, the new densities can be
compared to the similarly transformed uniform densities: an aggregate measure of their
difference (under Hersbach (2000) the squared difference), gives a measure of reliability as
expressed in Hersbach (2000)’s decomposition.
Being of a fundamentally different perspective, Hersbach (2000)’s URR decomposition does
not bear direct comparison to our URR decomposition (nor to the URRB decomposition).
It remains open how Hersbach (2000)’s approach could lead to a comparable RDC decom-
position.
2.6.3 ‖ Ignorance Scoring Rule
Following the work of Bernado (1979) and Benedetti (2010), the ignorance scoring rule
for precise-probabilistic forecasts has become a strong alternative to the quadratic scoring
rule(s). The ignorance scoring rule was first proposed by Good (1952) for binary events and
later re-introduced by Winkler and Murphy (1968) (as the logarithmic scoring rule) and,
more recently, by Roulston and Smith (2002) for observations that can take a discrete num-
ber of values. Its most general form, for continuous observations, is given by Gneiting et al.
(2005). The ignorance scoring rule is proper (see, for example Gneiting and Raftery, 2007).
Several extensions to the ignorance scoring rule have also been proposed, for example, the
ranked divergence/ignorance score of Weijs et al. (2010) and the continuous ranked igno-
rance score of Tödter and Ahrens (2012).
For each p ∈ P, let ϕp(·) be the probability density function (with respect to an appropriate
measure, for example, the Lebesgue measure for X continuous) associated with p; write
ϕp(·|·) for a conditional probability density. Set f (p) = ϕp(·). The ignorance scoring rule is
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defined by
S(f (p), x) = − logϕp(x). (2.74)
Here ‘log’ indicates the natural logarithm (although, logarithm to the base 2 and the com-
mon logarithm have also been used; such details will not affect the results that follow).
2.6.3.1 | URR Decomposition
Let r ∈ P. We then have (with the measure implicit in the term dx),
S(p, r) = −
∫
X
ϕr(x) logϕp(x) dx. (2.75)
If we let q be the unconditional (i.e. climatological) probability distribution of X, then it is
immediate from equation (2.75) that
S(q, q) = −
∫
X
ϕq(x) logϕq(x) dx (2.76)
and
S(qp, qp) = −
∫
X
ϕq(x|p) logϕq(x|p) dx. (2.77)
Noting that ϕq(x) = E[ϕq(x|P )], a little algebra shows that from equation (2.32) the URR







































This URR decomposition matches that given by Weijs et al. (2010) and Tödter and Ahrens
(2012).
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2.6.3.2 | RDC Decomposition
For p∗ ∈ P∗, let ψp∗(·) be the probability density function for p∗ with respect to a suitable
measure. Define the scoring rule S∗ by
S∗(r∗, p) = − logψr∗(p). (2.79)
Then, we can write (subsuming the measure in the term dp)







= φψq∗ (ψr∗) (2.80)
To consider the propriety of S∗, define the function. We can show the propriety of S∗ by
demonstrating that
ψq∗ = arg min
ψr∗
φψq∗ (ψr∗) subject to
∫
P
ψr∗(p) dp = 1. (2.81)
To prove that (2.81) holds, form the Lagrangian







; λ ∈ R (2.82)





















= 〈−(g/h) − λ, h〉 (2.84)
so that ∇hL(h) = −(g/h) − λ. A necessary condition that gmin be a minimum of L(h) is
∇hL(h)|h=gmin = 0 i.e. −g = λgmin. But, gmin is a value for h and so satisfies the constraint∫




g(p) dp = λ
∫
P
gmin(p) dp = λ (2.85)
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giving gmin = g i.e. equation (2.81) holds and S
∗ is proper.
As a proper scoring rule on P∗ × Ff , S∗ may be used to determine measures of refinement
and discrimination. From equation (2.80), we have
S∗(q∗, q∗) = −
∫
P
ψq∗(p) logψq∗(p) dp, (2.86)






ψq∗(p|x) logψq∗(p|x) dp, (2.87)












We note that the discrimination term (2.88) is precisely the discrimination quantity put
forward by Bröcker (2015, equation (10)).
However, the scoring rule S∗ is not an extension of S, as δ∗x places all probability on the
point-mass δx so that
S∗(δ∗x, p) = − logψδ∗x(p)
6= − logϕp(x) unless p = δx. (2.89)
It is not necessarily the case, therefore, that discrimination (2.88) is comparable with the
resolution term of equation (2.78). Moreover, while we can define (in)correctness as
E[S(f (P ), X)] − E[S∗(q∗X , q∗X) ], (2.90)














this measure may not be a faithful guide to the correctness of the forecasts under S, and
may not be non-negative.
However, Bröcker (2015) has shown that discrimination (2.89) is commensurable with reso-
lution in equation (2.78), which suggests that correctness (2.91) is a reasonable reflection of
the correctness of the forecasts.
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While a proper extended scoring rule would give a complete RDC decomposition, there is
no clear proper extended scoring rule for the ignorance scoring rule (2.73).
2.6.4 ‖ α-Quantile Scoring Rule
Fix α ∈ (0, 1). The α-quantile under probability distribution p ∈ P of the observation, X,
taking values in R, is defined by
F−1p (α) = inf{y ∈ R|α ≤ Fp(y)}. (2.92)
Often the infimum is obtained, in which case F−1p (α) is that value xα such that α = Fp(xα).
An α-quantile forecast is a point forecast: f (p) = F−1p (α) ∈ X . We follow Gneiting (2011a)
and define the (negatively-oriented) α-quantile scoring rule by
S(f (p), x) = S(F−1p (α), x)





α(x− F−1p (α)) if F−1p (α) ≤ x,
(1 − α)(F−1p (α) − x) if F−1p (α) ≥ x.
(2.93)
The propriety of the α-quantile scoring rule is demonstrated in Gneiting and Raftery (2007)
(see also the appendix of Friederichs and Hense (2008)).
2.6.4.1 | URR Decomposition
For any r ∈ P,
S(F−1p (α), r) = α(Er[X] − F−1p (α)) + F−1p (α)Fr(F−1p (α)) − Er[X1[X,∞)(F−1p (α))]. (2.94)
Two instances of equation (2.94) will be of importance. Fixing q to be the unconditional
(i.e. climatological) probability distribution of X,
S(F−1q (α), q) = αE[X] − E[X1[X,∞)(F−1q (α))] (2.95)
and for qF−1p (α) the conditional probability distribution of X given the forecast F
−1
p (α),
S(f (qF−1p (α)), qF−1p (α)) = αE[X|F
−1
p (α)] − E[X1[X,∞)(F−1q (α|F−1p (α)))|F−1p (α)]. (2.96)
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Using equations (2.95) and (2.96) in equation (2.32), the URR decomposition for the α-
quantile scoring rule is
E[S(F−1P (α), X)] =









































Some algebra shows that equation (2.97) agrees with the URR decomposition of
Bentzien and Friederichs (2014). Note too, that an α-quantile forecast is perfectly reliable
if F−1p (α) = F
−1
q (α|F−1p (α)) for all p ∈ P.
2.6.4.2 | RDC Decomposition
Define the scoring rule S∗ by




(1 − α)(F−1p (α) − F−1r∗ (1 − α)) if F−1r∗ (1 − α) ≤ F−1p (α),
α(F−1r∗ (1 − α) − F−1p (α)) if F−1r∗ (1 − α) ≥ F−1p (α).
(2.98)
Note that for each r∗ ∈ P∗, F−1r∗ (1 − α) is a value for F−1P (α) (for some value of P ) and is,
therefore, also in R.
For S∗ to be proper it is required that for all r∗ ∈ P∗, S∗(q∗, q∗) ≤ S∗(r∗, q∗) . To show this,



































q∗ (1 − α)) = 1 − α,





























+ F−1r∗ (1 − α)(α− 1) + F−1r∗ (1 − α)Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α)). (2.100)
Consider two cases:
Case (i): F−1q∗ (1 − α) > F−1r∗ (1 − α).

































+ F−1r∗ (1 − α)(α− 1) + F−1r∗ (1 − α)Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α))




q∗ (1 − α)) − Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α))
)
+ F−1r∗ (1 − α)(α− 1) + F−1r∗ (1 − α)Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α))
= F−1r∗ (1 − α)(1 − α) − F−1r∗ (1 − α)Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α))
+ F−1r∗ (1 − α)(α− 1) + F−1r∗ (1 − α)Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α))
= 0.
(2.101)
Case (ii): F−1q∗ (1 − α) < F−1r∗ (1 − α).
University of Exeter 55 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 2

































+ F−1r∗ (1 − α)(α− 1) + F−1r∗ (1 − α)Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α))




r∗ (1 − α)) − Fq∗(F−1q∗ (1 − α))
)
+ F−1r∗ (1 − α)(α− 1) + F−1r∗ (1 − α)Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α))
=
(








F−1q∗ (1 − α) + F−1r∗ (1 − α)
)
(1 − α + α− 1)
= 0
(2.102)
where we have used the fact that Fq∗(·) is, as a distribution function, non-decreasing so
F−1r∗ (1 − α) > F−1q∗ (1 − α) gives Fq∗(F−1r∗ (1 − α)) ≥ Fq∗(F−1q∗ (1 − α)) = 1 − α.
In summary, for F−1r∗ (1 − α) 6= F−1q∗ (1 − α) i.e. r∗ 6= q∗, S∗(r∗, q∗) ≥ S∗(q∗, q∗) , as required.
Further, it is the case under the α-quantile scoring rule that a zero probability for some
values of X is permissible. Consequently, we define the ideal distribution of the forecasts
given X = x, δ∗x as the point-mass distribution at the forecast f (δx) = F
−1
δx
(α) = x for
α ∈ (0, 1). Then F−1δ∗x (1 − α) = F
−1
δx







(1 − α)(F−1p (α) − F−1δ∗x (1 − α)) if F
−1
δ∗x
(1 − α) ≤ F−1p (α)
α(F−1δ∗x (1 − α) − F
−1
p (α)) if F
−1
δ∗x





(1 − α)(F−1p (α) − x) if x ≤ F−1p (α)
α(x− F−1p (α)) if x ≥ F−1p (α)
= S(F−1p (α), x). (2.103)
From the propriety of S∗ and equation (2.103), S∗ is a proper extended scoring rule for S.
To determine the attributes of the RDC decomposition, two particular instances of equation
(2.99) are important:
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q∗ (1 − α))
]
(2.104)
and, for x ∈ R,
S∗(q∗x, q
∗
x) = (1 − α)E
[








q∗ (1 − α|X = x))|X = x
]
. (2.105)
From equations (2.104) and (2.105), using equation (2.41) we obtain after some simplification,
the RDC decomposition





































































⌊ 2.7 ⌋ Computing the Decompositions
Analytical formulae for the terms of the URR and RDC decompositions for several exam-
ples are given in section 2.6. Computational formulae for the decompositional attributes
are also required if they are to be estimated. We consider a common forecasting scheme in
which the observation, X, takes values on the real line, and each probabilistic forecast, P ,
is a distribution function for X. The CRPS is then a suitable scoring rule (see equation
(2.56)). We present expressions, based on the empirical distribution function, that can be
used to calculate the attributes of the CRPS. We choose the empirical distribution as the
basis for our computational formulae because it is usual in applied forecast verification to
adopt empirical distributions when evaluating the expected score (see, for example, Brier
(1950), Ferro and Fricker (2012) and Bröcker (2012, Section 7.5.3)). For the circumstances
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just described, the wide range of outcomes and the large choice of probabilistic forecasts
has the consequence that in any sample of forecast-outcome pairs it is rare for values of
either forecast or outcome to be repeated. This makes the computation of the attributes of
the decompositions unstable as we now illustrate with a toy model (for similar models, see
Weigel and Bowler (2009) and Bouallègue et al. (2015)).
In the toy model, the forecast for X is the distribution P = N (Θ, ξ2), i.e. a Gaussian/normal
distribution with mean Θ and variance ξ2, where ξ is a fixed, predetermined value and Θ is
a random variable such that X and Θ have joint distribution,
(X,Θ)T ∼ N2((µX, µΘ)T, (σ2X , σ2Θ)T; ρ) (2.107)
a bi-variate normal distribution with mean vector (µX , µΘ)










We have, therefore (see, for example Mood et al., 1974) that
X ∼ N (µX, σ2X)
Θ ∼ N (µΘ, σ2Θ)
X|Θ=θ ∼ N (µX + (ρσX/σΘ)(θ − µΘ), σ2X(1 − ρ2))
Θ|X=x ∼ N (µΘ + (ρσΘ/σX)(x− µX), σ2Θ(1 − ρ2)). (2.109)
Although the model is Gaussian, it is not unnecessarily restrictive, for as Weigel and Bowler
(2009) note “given that skewed distributions can be normalized by appropriate transforma-
tions, the toy model . . . can in principle be generalized to non-normal variables”.
The attributes of the URR and RDC decompositions of the CRPS can, under the toy model,
be evaluated analytically by the formulae in (2.110) and (2.111) (Φ(z) is the cumulative stan-
dard normal distribution function at z, φ(·) is the density function of the standard normal
distribution; the following abbreviations are made: UNC is uncertainty, RES is resolution,
REL is reliability, REF is refinement, DIS is discrimination, COR is correctness, SCR is the
expected score).
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c(y, w) = Φ
(
y − (wσΘ + µΘ)
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d(y, w, z) = Φ
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With ξ fixed, each forecast is uniquely determined by the value of Θ. Therefore, in a sample
of size T of forecast-outcome pairs, each outcome, xt, is preceded by a forecast given as a
value for Θ, θt, for t = 1, . . . , T . Under the assumption of empirical distributions for the joint
and marginal distributions of the outcomes and forecasts, with a little work it can be shown
that the expectations in equations (2.61) and (2.68) of the URR and RDC decompositions
of the CRPS, reduce to the estimators given in (2.112).





































































































































































To illustrate the evaluation of the attributes, we choose parameter values µΘ = 1, σθ = 2,
µX = 0, σX = 1, ρ = 0.25 and ξ = 3 and simulate samples in R (Ihaka and Gentleman, 1996;
R Core Team, 2017) using the mvrnorm function in the MASS library (Venables and Ripley,
2002). Specifically, for each m = 1, . . . ,M = 1000, a sample of T = 50 forecast-outcome
pairs, (θt, xt), t = 1, . . . , T was generated and used to estimate the decomposition terms us-
ing the computational formulae in (2.112) (although, in general, these estimates are biased
(see Ferro and Fricker, 2012)); each xt and θt are rounded to 2 decimal places. From the
M estimates of each attribute a histogram for the value of the attribute is constructed on
which the exact value of the attribute, calculated using the formulae in (2.110) and (2.111),
was displayed. All integrals were computed using Monte Carlo integration (where the Monte
Carlo samples used to compute the integrals were common to all integrals to obviate their
effect on the variation of the estimates of the attributes). The histograms, each augmented
with the exact attribute value, are presented in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b.
In Figure 2.2, it can be seen that for the resolution, reliability, discrimination and correct-




Figure 2.2: Histograms of the attributes of the CRPS. For each attribute, a set of
M = 1000 estimates were calculated, each estimate based on a sample of T = 50 forecast-
outcome pairs that was simulated from the toy model of equations (2.107) to (2.109) with
parameter values µΘ = 1, σθ = 2, µX = 0, σX = 1, ρ = 0.25 and ξ = 3. The URR
attributes are: expected score ( ), uncertainty ( ), resolution ( ) and reliability ( ).
The RDC attributes are: expected score ( ), refinement ( ), discrimination ( ) and
correctness ( ). The exact values of the attributes are marked by vertical lines.
ness attributes there is disagreement between the empirical estimates and the exact attribute
value. A principal cause of this disagreement is sparsity: most forecasts and outcomes ap-
pear infrequently in the sample.
Sparsity affects those attributes that have conditional expectations in their expressions. Con-
sider the calculation of the resolution and reliability attributes of the URR decomposition:
the sample of forecast-outcome pairs must be stratified according to the forecast values. If a
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particular instance of a forecast does not appear in a sample, no outcomes will be recorded
in this forecast’s stratum and the expectation of the observation conditioned on this forecast
will have a computed value that is spuriously null; even if the forecast is issued, but only
on a few occasions, the small number of times the forecast is issued, reduces the sample size
of the corresponding outcomes to a value too small for the conditional expectation to be
estimated with any stability. A similar difficulty can arise on computing the terms of the
RDC decomposition when many different values of the observation are recorded with each
value appearing on only a few occasions at most. We address the sparsity problem in the
next section.
⌊ 2.8 ⌋ Decompositions Under Binning
As the illustration at the end of the previous section showed, under-representation, or spar-
sity, of forecasts or outcomes can lead to false estimates of the terms of the decompositions.
Previous authors (see, for example Atger, 2003; Bröcker and Smith, 2007b) have considered
the sparsity problem for the attributes of the URR decomposition. One approach taken by
these authors has been to divide the set of possible forecasts into a small number of groups,
or categories, or bins and then to allocate each sample forecast-outcome pair to the bin
in which the forecast lies. For each bin, a representative forecast is nominated (examples
include the mid-forecast and average forecast for the bin) and all forecasts in the bin are
changed to the bin’s nominated forecast value and these redefined forecasts used to evaluate
forecast quality. If the bins are chosen in such a way as to ensure that each bin has a suitably
large number of the sample forecast-outcome pairs, then the problem of sparsity is alleviated.
However, two difficulties arise from the method of binning. Firstly, while the attributes
are evaluated using binning, the accuracy of the forecasts (i.e. the expected score) is still
calculated from the original sample forecast-outcome pairs (as sparsity is not a problem
for the computation of accuracy); consequently, the left-hand and right-hand sides of the
URR decomposition are no longer equal (Atger, 2003). Secondly, the choice of bins, and the
choice of nominated forecast for each bin, will determine how the forecasts are relabelled
and will, therefore, affect the calculated values of the attributes: different choices of bins
and nominated forecasts, may lead to two different sets of values for the attributes of the
URR decomposition.
Atger (2004) and Bröcker (2012) discuss the problem of how best to choose bins and the nom-
inated forecasts when computing the attributes of the URR decomposition. In this section,
our emphasis is on correcting the URR decomposition under binning so as to ensure that
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the left-hand side (accuracy) is equal to the right-hand side (attributes). Stephenson et al.
(2008) provide such a correction for the URR decomposition of the Brier scoring rule (Brier,
1950) by introducing two further terms to the right-hand side of the URR decomposition.
Here, we give a general corrected URR decomposition that holds for all scoring rules of
all types of forecast under any binning. We also derive a corrected RDC decomposition to
adjust for the binning of outcomes.
2.8.1 ‖ URR Decomposition
Having chosen a set of bins, let β : Ff → Ff be a function that maps the original issued
forecasts to their nominated bin values. We refer to such a function as a binning of the issued
forecasts. It is the issued forecasts, f (p), p ∈ P that are used to evaluate the accuracy of
the forecasts, but it is the binned forecasts, β(f (p)), p ∈ P that are used to determine the
attributes of the forecasts.
If we regard the binned forecasts as the forecasts that are issued, then by substituting β(f (p))
for f (p) in equation (2.28), we have that for binned forecasts the reliability term is
E[S(β(f (P )), qβ(f (P ))) − S(f (qβ(f (P ))), qβ(f (P ))) ] ≥ 0 (2.113)
which agrees with the definition given by Bröcker and Smith (2007b).
Replacing f (p) with β(f (p)) in equation (2.31), the resolution term is
S(f (q), q) − E[S(f (qβ(f (P ))), qβ(f (P ))) ] ≥ 0. (2.114)
Uncertainty, which does not depend on the forecasts (and is, therefore, unaffected by binning)
remains as
S(f (q), q) . (2.115)
By definition, the variability of the outcomes around the binned forecast β(f (p)) is
S(β(f (p)), qβ(f (p))) , in contrast with the variability of the outcomes about the issued forecast
f (p), which is S(f (p), qf (p)) . Taking the expectation over all forecasts, the difference
E[S(f (P ), qf (P )) ] − E[S(β(f (P )), qβ(f (P ))) ] (2.116)
is a measure of the change in variability of the outcomes caused by binning. It is easily seen
that the first term of equation (2.116) is the accuracy of the issued forecasts and the second
term in equation (2.116) is the accuracy of the binned forecasts.
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The difference in variability quantified by equation (2.116) arises from the presence of ad-
ditional outcomes corresponding to each binned forecast (i.e. nominated forecast of each
bin). If all forecasts in each bin were the same, then there would be no additional outcomes
because the outcomes attached to the bin would be the same outcomes associated with the
singular forecast of the bin. But, if there are distinct forecasts in the same bin, the outcomes
associated with a binned forecast will be a union of all outcomes paired with the forecasts
in the bin.
The totality of the outcomes associated with a bin will have a variability that depends on
the covariance between the forecasts and outcomes: if there is little correspondence between
outcomes and forecasts, then the spread of different forecasts in the bin will not lead to a
more diverse set of outcomes for the bin (although the number of different outcomes may
increase, the distribution of all outcomes in the bin will differ little from the distribution of
the outcomes corresponding to each forecast in the bin), but if there is good correspondence
between outcomes and forecasts, having a range of forecasts in the bin will increase the
variability of the outcomes of the bin.
We may, therefore, factorise the difference in variability defined by equation (2.116) into two
parts: (i) the within-bin variance of the forecasts, which, recalling that q∗ is the uncondi-
tional, i.e. historical, probability distribution of the forecasts, and q∗β(f(p)) the conditional
distribution of the forecasts given the forecasts fall in the bin β(f (p)), we define as
E[S∗(q∗β(f (P )), q
∗
β(f (P ))) ] (2.117)
and (ii) the remaining part which must represent the extent to which, within each bin, on
average, the outcomes co-vary with the forecasts,
E[S(f (P ), qf (P )) ] − E[S(β(f (P )), qβ(f (P ))) ] − E[S∗(q∗β(f (P )), q∗β(f (P ))) ]. (2.118)
Equations (2.113) to (2.118) give the general URR decomposition for binned forecasts,
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E[S(f (P ), X)] =
E[S(f (P ), X)] =S(f (q), q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uncertainty
− (S(f (q), q) − E[S(f (qβ(f (P ))), qβ(f (P ))) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Resolution|Bins︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sharpness|Bins
E[S(f (P ), X)] = + E[S(β(f (P )), qβ(f (P ))) − S(f (qβ(f (P ))), qβ(f (P ))) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reliability|Bins
E[S(f (P ), X)] = + E[S∗(q∗β(f (P )), q
∗
β(f (P ))) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-Bin Forecast Variation
+ E[S(f (P ), qf (P )) ] − E[S(β(f (P )), qβ(f (P ))) ] − E[S∗(q∗β(f (P )), q∗β(f (P ))) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-Bin Covariation
. (2.119)
2.8.1.1 | Example: Brier Scoring Rule
Referring to section 2.6.1, for the Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950),
S(p, x) = (p− x)2
S(p, r) = p2 − 2pEr[X] + Er[X] (2.120)
and
S∗(r∗, p) = (Er∗ [P ] − p)2
S∗(r∗, q∗) = (Er∗ [P ] − Eq∗ [P ])2 + Eq∗ [(P − Eq∗ [P ])2]. (2.121)
Suppose there are m bins B1, . . . , Bm. For the forecast p ∈ P, define β(p) to be the expected




E[P |P ∈ Bi]1{Bi}(p). (2.122)
Noting that the value of β(p) indicates the bin containing p (i.e. the expected value of the
forecasts in a bin will differ from the expected value of the forecasts of every other bin),
conditioning on the bin containing a forecast p is equivalent to conditioning on the value of
β(p), so that if p ∈ Bi, then
β(p) = E[P |P ∈ Bi] = E[P |β(P ) = β(p)] (2.123)
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and we can write, more generally,
β(P ) = E[P |β(P )]. (2.124)
We evaluate the terms of the binned decomposition (2.119) individually. Uncertainty is equal
to
S(q, q) = q(1 − q) = E[X](1 − E[X]). (2.125)
Resolution under binning is
S(q, q)−E[S(qβ(P ), qβ(P )) ]
= E[X](1 − E[X]) − E[E[X|β(P )](1 − E[X|β(P )]]
= E[(E[X|β(P )] − E[X])2]. (2.126)
The last of the standard three terms of the URR decomposition, reliability, is, given binning,
E[S(β(P ), qβ(P )) − S(qβ(P ), qβ(P )) ]
= E[β2(P ) − 2β(P )E[X|β(P )] + E[X|β(P )] − E[X|β(P )] + E2[X|β(P )]]
= E[(β(P ) − E[X|β(P )])2]. (2.127)
The effect of binning is to introduce two additional terms to the URR decomposition. The









= E[E[(P − E[P |β(P )])2|β(P )]]
= E[E[P 2|β(P )] − E2[P |β(P )]]. (2.128)
The second of the new terms, within-bin covariation, is
E[E[S(P,X)|β(P )]] − E[S(β(P ), qβ(P )) ] − E[S∗(q∗β(P ), q∗β(P )) ]
= E[−2E[PX|β(P )] − β2(P ) + 2β(P )E[X|β(P )] + E2[P |β(P )]] (2.129)
and, substituting β(P ) = E[P |β(P )], we have −β2(P ) +E2[P |β(P )] = 0, leaving the within-
bin covariation as
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E[−2E[PX|β(P )] + 2β(P )E[X|β(P )]]
= −2E[E[(P − β(P ))(X − E[X|β(P )])|β(P )]]
= −2E[E[(P − E[P |β(P )])(X − E[X|β(P )])|β(P )]]. (2.130)
The five attributes under binning, agree with those of the empirical result of Stephenson et al.
(2008, equation (7)).
2.8.2 ‖ RDC Decomposition
In those circumstances in which the range space of the observation is sufficiently large that
it is unlikely for any outcome to occur more than a few times, binning can be applied to
the outcomes too. We are unaware of any discussion in the literature on the binning of
outcomes, it being a topic relevant to computing the terms of the less studied RDC decom-
position. Here, we give a general RDC decomposition when outcomes are binned.
Let β∗ : X → X be a mapping of the actual outcomes to the set of values nominated for
the outcome bins i.e. β∗(x) is the nominated value of the bin in which outcome x lies. If
the binned outcomes are treated as the outcomes, a re-statement of the RDC decomposition
(2.41) under binning, gives discrimination (compare with equation (2.40)) to be
S∗(q∗, q∗) − E[S∗(q∗β∗(X), q∗β∗(X)) ] (2.131)
and correctness (compare with equation (2.37)) is
E[S(f (P ), β∗(X))] − E[S∗(q∗β∗(X), q∗β∗(X)) ]. (2.132)
Refinement, being a property of the forecasts alone, is unaffected by the binning applied to
the outcomes and is unchanged as
S∗(q∗, q∗) . (2.133)
Equations (2.131) and (2.132) summarise the variability of forecasts preceding the binned
outcomes. For a particular outcome, x, with bin, β∗(x), we can compare the total variability
of the forecasts preceding x to the variability of the forecasts preceding the binned outcome
β∗(x), by calculating the difference
E[S(f (P ), X)|X = x] − E[S(f (P ), β∗(X))|β∗(X) = β∗(x)]. (2.134)
Aggregating the difference in equation (2.134) over all possible outcomes, the change in the
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variability of the forecasts as a result of binning is
E[E[S(f (P ), X)|X]] − E[E[S(f (P ), β∗(X))|β∗(X)]] (2.135)
or, the accuracy of the forecasts with respect to the original outcomes less the accuracy of
the forecasts with respect to the binned outcomes.
The aggregate difference (2.135) is brought about by the set of forecasts associated with
the binned outcome being larger than the set of forecasts associated with each individual
outcome in the bin. If there is one outcome in a bin then the forecasts of the binned outcome
are necessarily the same as the forecasts for the sole outcome of the bin and the difference
of (2.134) for the bin is zero. Should there be a multitude of different outcomes in a bin,
however, then the variability of the forecasts for the bin will differ from the variability of the
forecasts preceding any outcome in the bin provided that the forecasts for each outcome in
the bin have either different locations or different dispersions, or both. We identify, therefore,
two components to equation (2.135).
The first component is the change in forecast variability under binning that results from
different outcomes being preceded by forecasts of differing spreads: we approximate this
effect by the variability of the outcomes in the bin (the greater the outcome variability in
a bin, each outcome accompanied by differing forecasts, the more dispersed the forecasts of
the bin). The within-bin variance of the outcomes is, from our definitions,
E[S(f (qβ∗(X)), qβ∗(X)) ]. (2.136)
The second component is the change in forecast variability arising from differing outcomes
being preceded by distinct forecasts: as outcomes change there is a shift in the forecasts
preceding the outcomes, contributing to a more diverse set of forecasts. This co-movement
of the forecasts with the outcomes is the quantity
E[E[S(f (P ), X)|X]] − E[E[S(f (P ), β∗(X))|β∗(X)]] − E[S(f (qβ∗(X)), qβ∗(X)) ]. (2.137)
which we refer to as the within-bin covariance.
The terms (2.131) to (2.137), give, in combination, the binned RDC decomposition
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E[S(f (P ), X)] =
E[S(f (P ), X)] =S∗(q∗, q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Refinement
− (S∗(q∗, q∗) − E[S∗(q∗β∗(X), q∗β∗(X)) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discrimination|Bins︸ ︷︷ ︸
Excess|Bins
E[S(f (P ), X)] = + (E[S(f (P ), β∗(X))] − E[S∗(q∗β∗(X), q∗β∗(X)) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Correctness|Bins
E[S(f (P ), X)] = + E[S(f (qβ∗(X)), qβ∗(X)) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-Bin Variance
+ (E[E[S(f (P ), X)|X]] − E[E[S(f (P ), β∗(X))|β∗(X)]] − E[S(f (qβ∗(X)), qβ∗(X)) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-Bin Covariance
. (2.138)
in parallel with the binned URR decomposition of equation (2.119).
2.8.3 ‖ Classification of the New Terms
In their discussion of the binned URR decomposition for the Brier scoring rule, Stephenson et al.
(2008) argue that the two new terms of the binned URR decomposition should be combined
with the resolution term to give a generalised resolution term (and reduce the binned URR
decomposition to three terms). In the same context, Siegert (2017) suggests that the two
new terms be merged with the reliability term. We propose a compromise.
For the URR decomposition: (i) the within-bin variance of the forecasts should be combined
with the resolution term, because, the more variable the forecast within a bin, the greater
the increase in the number of outcomes attached to the bin, affecting the resolution of the
forecasts; (ii) the within-bin covariance be combined with the reliability term, because the
within-bin covariance conveys how much the outcomes are in alignment with the forecasts,
an element of reliability. Making these allocations,
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E[S(f (P ), X)] =




 S(f (q), q) − E[S(f (qβ(f (P ))), qβ(f (P ))) ]











S(β(f (P )), qβ(f (P ))) − S(f (qβ(f (P ))), qβ(f (P )))
]
+E[S(f (P ), qf (P )) ] − E[S(β(f (P )), qβ(f (P ))) ]





As a consequence of this allocation, neither binned resolution nor binned reliability need be
positive.
With similar justification, for the RDC decomposition we join the within-bin variance of
the outcomes with the binned discrimination term and the within-bin covariance with the
correctness term, giving the modified RDC decomposition to be
E[S(f (P ), X)] =





∗(q∗, q∗) − E[S∗(q∗β∗(X), q∗β∗(X)) ]











S(f (P ), β∗(X))] − E[S∗(q∗β∗(X), q∗β∗(X))
]
+E[E[S(f (P ), X)|X]] − E[E[S(f (P ), β∗(X))|β∗(X)]]






2.8.4 ‖ An Illustration
To demonstrate the results of binning, consider again the CRPS, for which (from equations
(2.56) and (2.62))
S(f (p), x) =
∫
R
(Ep[1[X,∞)(y)] − 1[x,∞)(y))2 dy (2.141)






(Er∗ [FP (y)] − Fp(y))2 dy. (2.142)
With binning we have the CRPS for the binned forecasts
S(β(f (p)), x) =
∫
R
(Eβ(f (p))[1[x,∞)(y)] − 1[x,∞)(y))2 dy. (2.143)
The URR and RDC decompositions for unbinned forecasts and observations are given in





E[1[X,∞)(y)](1 − E[1[X,∞)(y)]) dy




















E[f (P )2(y)|β(f (P ))] − E2[f (P )(y)|β(f (P ))] dy
]
(2.144)
giving the binned URR decomposition to be
E[S(f (P ), x)] = UNC − (RES|B − WBV)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Binned Resolution












(f (P )(y) − E[f (P )(y)])2
]
dy
Discrimination|Bins (DIS|B) = E
[∫ ∞
−∞
(E[f (P )(y)] − E[f (P )(y)|β∗(X)])2 dy
]












E[1[X,∞)(y)|β∗(X)](1 − E[1[X,∞)(y)|β∗(X)]) dy
]
(2.146)
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from which the binned RDC decomposition can be written
E[S(f (P ), x)] = UNC − (DIS|B − WBV(O))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Binned Discrimination






To illustrate the evaluation of the binned attributes, we use again the toy model of section
2.7. Introducing binning, let BΘ be the number bins for the parameter Θ and define the





−∞ i = 0,





1 ≤ i ≤ BΘ − 1,
∞ i = BΘ.
(2.148)
Each forecast cumulative distribution function of X, f (p) = Fp, is, under the toy model,
associated with a unique value for Θ and the forecasts are grouped according to the bins in
which their Θ-parameter values fall. We choose for the representative forecast of the bin to
which the forecast Fp is allocated, the cumulative distribution function β(Fp) equal to the
normal distribution with variance ξ2 and mean β(Θ), the mean of Θ in the bin. With this
binning there are exactly BΘ different binned forecasts; the mean of Θ given bin (bi−1, bi]
will be denoted βi, i = 1, . . . , BΘ.










−∞ i = 0,





1 ≤ i ≤ BX − 1,
∞ i = BX .
(2.149)
Define the representative outcome for the bin containing the observed value X = x, β∗(x), to
be the mean of the outcomes in the bin containing x. There are then BX binned outcomes;
denote the representative outcome for the ith bin (b∗i−1, b
∗
i ] by β
∗
i .
Under the toy model, the analytical formulae for the attributes of the URR decomposition
(2.145) and the RDC decomposition (2.147) are listed in (2.150) to (2.153).










d(y, u, z) − 1[zσX +µX ,∞)(y)
)2































f(bi, z) − f(bi−1, z)
e(bi) − e(bi−1)
]
dz − g(y, i)
)2

























g(y, i) − 1[zσX+µX ,∞)(y)
)2
























h(b∗i , w) − h(b∗i−1, w)





















h(b∗i , w) − h(b∗i−1, w)
a(b∗i ) − a(b∗i−1)
]

















i )) − a(b∗i−1)








i )) − a(b∗i−1)




























b(y, w) = Φ
(





c(y, w) = Φ
(
y − (wσΘ + µΘ)
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Binned Resolution = RES|B − WBV
Binned Reliability = REL|B + SCR − SCR|B − WBV
Binned Discrimination = DIS|B − WBV(O)
Binned Correctness = COR|B + SCR − SCR|B(O) − WBV(O)
(2.153)
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In practice, the URR and RDC decompositions must be estimated from a sample of forecast-
outcome pairs. Following the approach of section 2.7, each forecast is uniquely determined
by the value of Θ; a sample of size T of forecast-outcome pairs has the form (θt, xt) for
t = 1, . . . , T . Estimators for the attributes of the decompositions are derived by using the
empirical distribution to model the joint and marginal distributions of the forecasts and out-
comes. Under the empirical distributions, the representative forecast for each forecast-bin
is, by our choice, the arithmetic average of the forecasts in the bin and we write β(θt) = θ̄t
for the representative forecast of the bin containing the forecast θt. Similarly, under our
choice of using the average of the outcomes in a bin as the representative outcome for the
outcome-bin, we write β∗(xt) = x̄t for the representative outcome of the bin containing the
outcome xt. Then the empirical estimators for the attributes of the binned URR decompo-
sition (under which the forecasts alone are binned; for each t, the forecast θt is replaced with
the simple arithmetic average, θ̄t, of the forecasts in the bin in which θt falls) are presented in
equations (2.154) and (2.155) (with the additional abbreviations: R̂ES|B is resolution|bins,
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and
Binned Resolution = R̂ES|B − ŴBV
Binned Reliability = R̂EL|B + ŜCR − ŜCR|B − ŴBV
(2.155)
The empirical estimators for the attributes of the binned RDC decomposition (for which
the outcomes alone are binned; for each t, the outcome xt is replaced with the simple
arithmetic average, x̄t, of the outcomes in the bin in which xt lies) have the expressions in
equations (2.156) and (2.157) (with abbreviations: D̂IS|B is discrimination|bins, ĈOR|B is












































































































































Binned Discrimination = D̂IS|B − ŴBV(O)
Binned Correctness = ĈOR|B + ŜCR − ̂SCR|B(O) − ŴBV(O)
(2.157)
The formulae of (2.154) to (2.157) were applied to each of M = 1000 samples, a single
sample being T = 50 forecast-outcome pairs simulated for the toy model of section 2.7 with
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parameter values µΘ = 1, σθ = 2, µX = 0, σX = 1, ρ = 0.25 and ξ = 3 (the simulated
samples were generated in R (Ihaka and Gentleman, 1996; R Core Team, 2017) using the
mvrnorm function in the MASS library (Venables and Ripley, 2002) and both outcomes and
forecasts were rounded to 2 decimal places). All integrals in the empirical estimators were
computed using Monte Carlo integration (where the Monte Carlo samples used were common
to all integrals so that any variation in the estimates of the attributes may be attributed to
variation in the samples of forecast-outcome pairs).
The M = 1000 estimates of each attribute are presented in the histograms of Figure 2.3; on
each histogram the exact value of the attribute under binning is also displayed.
Binning forecasts reduces sample sparsity by increasing the number of occasions on which
each (representative) forecast is repeated in the sample; in like manner, when the outcomes
are binned, each (representative) outcome occurs more often in the sample. If representative
forecasts and outcomes are repeated often in the sample, data sparsity is reduced and each
conditional expectation can be calculated from a larger number of data.
We see from Figure 2.3 that there is closer agreement between the sample estimates of the
binned attributes and their exact values than was evident for the sample estimates of the
unbinned attributes in Figure 2.2. However, binned resolution remains poorly estimated. A
possible cause of this underestimation is that the within-bin variation of the forecasts has
a larger effect on binned resolution than on binned reliability (in binned reliability there
are several terms that can partly mute the contribution of the within-bin variation). That
discrimination and correctness do not display the same contrast, may be explained by the
variability of the forecasts: by choice of model parameters in our illustration, the forecasts
have larger variation than the outcomes, therefore, it is more likely there will be values in the
extreme bins for forecasts than for outcomes, and the few values in the extreme bins of the
forecasts will destabilise the estimation of the expectation that is conditional on the forecasts.
It is also of interest to examine whether the binned attribute values do converge to the true
(i.e. unbinned) attribute values as the number of bins increases indefinitely. Figures 2.4
and 2.5 show the values of the attributes of the URR and RDC decompositions with and
without binning for different numbers of bins. The values calculated are the exact values for
the attributes evaluated using the expressions in (2.110), (2.111) and (2.150) to (2.153) (the
integrals are evaluated using Monte Carlo integration). The parameters chosen for the toy
model are: µX = 0, σX = 1, µΘ = 1, σΘ = 2, ρ = 0.25 and ξ = 3.
We see that the attributes of both decompositions under binning converge, as the number
of bins increases, to the attributes of the unbinned decomposition. The attributes of the




Figure 2.3: Histograms of the attributes of the CRPS when binning is used. For the
URR decomposition the forecasts alone are binned, for the RDC decomposition the out-
comes alone are binned. For each attribute, a set of M = 1000 estimates were calculated,
each estimate based on a sample of T = 50 forecast-outcome pairs simulated from the
toy model of equations (2.107) to (2.109) with parameter values µΘ = 1, σθ = 2, µX = 0,
σX = 1, ρ = 0.25 and ξ = 3. The URR attributes are: expected score ( ), uncertainty
( ), resolution ( ) and reliability ( ). The RDC attributes are: expected score ( ), re-
finement ( ), discrimination ( ) and correctness ( ). The exact values of the attributes
are marked by vertical lines.
binned RDC decomposition display a slower rate of convergence than the attributes of the
binned URR decomposition, although this may be a model artefact rather than a more gen-
eral pattern.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 also confirm that the binned attributes can be negative (when, as is often
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of the attribute values of the unbinned and binned URR de-
compositions of the CRPS for forecasts and outcomes that follow the toy model in section
2.7; parameters: µΘ = 1, σΘ = 2, µX = 0, σX = 1, ρ = 0.25, and ξ = 3. The attributes
are: uncertainty ( ), resolution ( ), reliability ( ), binned resolution
( ), and binned reliability ( ).
a practical necessity, the number of bins is small).
⌊ 2.9 ⌋ Discussion and Conclusion
Formally, the qualities of forecasts are expressed in terms of the probability distributions of
forecast and observation, but it can be difficult to translate these definitions into equivalent
computable quantities. Quantities that indirectly measure the qualities of the forecasts can
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of the attribute values of the unbinned and binned RDC decom-
positions of the CRPS for forecasts and outcomes that follow the toy model in section
2.7; parameters: µΘ = 1, σΘ = 2, µX = 0, σX = 1, ρ = 0.25, and ξ = 3. The at-
tributes are: refinement ( ), discrimination ( ), correctness ( ), binned
discrimination ( ), and binned correctness ( ).
be established by decomposing the expected score, or accuracy, of the forecasts into the sum
of terms, each term quantifying a particular quality, or attribute, of the forecasts.
The attributes of uncertainty, resolution and reliability can be assessed from the URR de-
composition, while quantities for the attributes of refinement, discrimination and correctness
are determined from the separate RDC decomposition.
Bröcker (2009) gave a general approach for establishing the URR decomposition for all scor-
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ing rules of probabilistic forecasts of discrete observations. But Bröcker (2009)’s result did
not extend beyond probabilistic forecasts of events with finitely many values. Here, we give
a general URR decomposition that is applicable to probabilistic and point forecasts of any
observation (continuous or discrete).
We also derive a similarly general RDC decomposition, knowing of only one prior version
of the RDC decomposition for the Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950), which is derived by
Murphy and Winkler (1987) (see also Murphy, 1986). By developing a general RDC decom-
position we give a score-related measure to, in particular, discrimination. A score-related
discrimination measure provides a firm basis for the comparison of discrimination with the
values of the URR attributes and has the benefit of further enabling the extension of the
assessment of discrimination beyond categorical forecasts, in which discrimination is a promi-
nent quality.
Both URR and RDC decompositions are typically expressed in terms of the issued forecasts
and recorded outcomes. But, in cases where it is rare for any forecast to be issued more
than once or a particular outcome to be recorded more than once, the sparsity of data in
samples reduces the stability and accuracy of the computed attributes. One response to this
problem has been to give all forecasts and outcomes that are close to one another (i.e. are
in the same bin) the same value. But, this approach makes the standard URR and RDC
decompositions only approximate. We quantify the approximation error and give modified
URR and RDC decompositions that take account of binning and which are applicable to all
scoring rules of probabilistic and point forecasts.
The decomposition of accuracy is not the only method of deriving quantitative expressions
for the qualities of the forecasts. For some attributes, many methods have been proposed for
how to quantify them (see chapter 1), and new methods continue to be suggested. But, as
Murphy and Winkler (1987) note, such ‘measures have tended to proliferate, with relatively
little effort being made to develop general concepts and principles [but] it should not be
necessary to approach the verification problem from different perspectives in different situa-
tions; all situations should yield to a common approach’. We believe that a thorough study
of decompositions offers this common approach.
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3 Proper Scoring Rules for Interval-Probabilistic
Forecasts of Binary Events1
Summary. For a binary event with outcome X = 0 (non-occurrence) or X = 1
(occurrence), probabilistic forecasts can be issued as precise-probabilistic forecasts (an
exact value for the probability that X = 1, Pr(X = 1) e.g. ‘chance of rain = 0.14%’),
or as interval-probabilistic forecasts (a range of values for Pr(X = 1) e.g. ‘chance of
rain: 10-20%’). A common instance of interval-probabilistic forecasts is rounded precise-
probabilistic forecasts. To evaluate any probabilistic forecast a scoring rule can be used.
An important requirement for scoring rules, if they are to provide a faithful assessment
of a forecaster, is that they be proper, by which is meant that they encourage forecasters
to issue their true beliefs as their forecasts. Proper scoring rules for precise-probabilistic
forecasts i.e. precise-proper scoring rules, have been studied extensively. But, if a
precise-proper scoring rule is adapted to interval-probabilistic forecasts, propriety can be
lost. Complementing parallel work by other authors, we derive a general characterisation
of scoring rules that are proper for interval-probabilistic forecasts i.e. interval-proper
scoring rules. From the general characterisation of interval-proper scoring rules, we
determine particular scoring rules that correspond to the familiar scoring rules used for
precise-probabilistic forecasts. Of these, the most inviting is the interval-Brier scoring rule,
which we use to assess interval-forecasts simulated from actual precise-probabilistic forecasts.
⌊ 3.1 ⌋ Introduction
As was emphasised in the previous chapter, any forecast of an uncertain event should be
based on a probability distribution of the outcome for the event. A forecast that makes ref-
erence to the full probability distribution of the event’s outcome is known as a probabilistic
forecast.
In this chapter we restrict attention to binary events: events for which the outcome can take
one of two values, 0 and 1 (here, 0 and 1 may be representative); we refer to the unknown
outcome of the event, X, as the observation. As X is binary, a full probability distribution
of X can be expressed by a single number: for the probability distribution p of X we also
write p = Prp(X = 1) for the probability that X takes the value 1 under p. A probabilistic
forecast, therefore, may state a value in the interval [0, 1] for p. In this case, because a
precise value for p is given, we shall call such a probabilistic forecast a precise-probabilistic
forecast. One approach to evaluating precise-probabilistic forecasts is to use a scoring rule,
which is a function, S, of p and the outcome x of X (Winkler, 1996). The value S(p, x) is
the score of the forecast p when the outcome is x. We assume that lower scores are better
1A version of this chapter was published as Mitchell and Ferro (2017).
University of Exeter 82 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 3
(i.e. that scoring rules are negatively oriented (Winkler and Murphy, 1968)). The expected
score for a forecast p is the average of S(p, x) over all possible values for x. If the probability
distribution of X is q, write S(p, q)
def
= E[S(p,X)] for the expected score. Proper scoring rules
are scoring rules for which the expected score S(p, q) is optimised (i.e. minimised) when
the forecast matches the assessed distribution of X (i.e. p = q). For ease of reference, we
shall refer to proper scoring rules for precise-probabilistic forecasts as precise-proper scoring
rules.
Rather than issuing a precise-probabilistic forecast, a probabilistic forecast of a binary obser-
vation is often expressed as a range of probabilities (for example, “Chance of rain: 25-30%”),
a practice adopted by meteorological offices around the world. The forecaster will compute
their forecast probability precisely but must issue a range of probabilities. We call a proba-
bilistic forecast issued as a range of probabilities, an interval-probabilistic forecast.
Suppose that the forecaster can articulate their precise true belief, q, that X = 1, but must
issue an interval of probabilities for the outcome X = 1. Let 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an−1 <
an = 1 be a partition of the interval [0, 1], with subintervals Ii = [ai−1, ai] for i = 1, . . . , n.
An interval-probabilistic forecast is a choice of Ii for some 0 < i ≤ n.
A scoring rule, s, for an interval-probabilistic forecast, Ii, gives a value s(Ii, x) when the
value of X is x. Let q be the actual (and precise) belief q that X = 1. Having issued the
interval Ii, the forecaster’s expected score, with respect to q, is s(Ii, q)
def
= Eq[s(Ii, X)]. A
scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts is proper if the interval containing q optimises
the expected score and is strictly proper if the only interval that optimises the forecaster’s
expected score is the interval that contains q. Assuming that lower values of s indicate better
scores, we say, formally, the following.
Definition 3.1.1. (Propriety for Interval Probabilistic Forecasts) Let X ∈ {0, 1}, be a
random variable, and let the probability q be the forecaster’s actual belief that X = 1. The
scoring rule, s, is defined to be proper if
s(Ii, q) ≤ s(Ij , q) for all i, j and q ∈ Ii. (3.1)
The scoring rule s is strictly proper only if
s(Ii, q) < s(Ij , q) for all i, j and q ∈ Ii, q /∈ Ij. (3.2)

We refer to scoring rules that are proper for interval-probabilistic forecasts as interval-proper
scoring rules.
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The following lemma shows that an interval-proper scoring rule can be obtained from another
interval-proper scoring rule.
Lemma 3.1.2. Let s be an interval-proper scoring rule and define the interval-probabilistic
scoring rule s∗ by
s∗(Ik, x) = s(Ik, x) + ψ(x) (3.3)
for ψ any function of x not depending on k. Then s∗ is an interval-proper scoring rule. 
Proof. With s∗ defined by equation (3.3), and q the probability distribution of X,
s∗(Ik, q) = s(Ik, q) + E[ψ(X)]. (3.4)
Therefore, as ψ does not depend on k, if q ∈ Ii, we have s interval-proper if and only if
s(Ii, q) ≤ s(Ij, q) ∀j
⇔ s∗(Ii, q) − E[ψ(X)] ≤ s∗(Ij , q) − E[ψ(X)] ∀j
⇔ s∗(Ii, q) ≤ s∗(Ij , q) ∀j (3.5)
which holds if and only if s∗ is interval-proper. 
An application of Lemma 3.1.2 requires that an interval-proper scoring rule already be
known. There are many possible ways of constructing an interval-probabilistic scoring rule,
s, from a given precise-proper scoring rule S (e.g. maximum of S over an interval, average
of S over an interval). However, an illustration in the next section shows that even when S
is precise-proper and for each i, s(Ii, X) is defined simply as the value of S at the mid-point
of Ii, s need not be an interval-proper scoring rule. In response to this difficulty, we present
in section 3.3 a general characterisation for any interval-proper scoring rule. This result
is a special case of more general results that have been proved by Lambert et al. (2008),
Lambert and Shoham (2009), Lambert (2013) and Frongillo and Kash (2014). But, their
results, while powerful, are abstract and this has prompted us to offer a short new proof
of the characterisation of interval-proper scoring rules. From this general characterisation,
we derive, in section 3.4, particular interval-proper scoring rules that are analogues of some
familiar precise-proper scoring rules. All interval-proper scoring rules are determined under
the assumption that all the forecasts are closed intervals i.e. Ii = [ai−1, ai] for all i. However,
to avoid difficulties arising in practice if a forecaster’s precise-probabilistic forecast lies on a
boundary of two sub-intervals (e.g. q = ai for some i), it is more natural for the sub-intervals
to be semi-open intervals i.e. I1 = [a0, a1], Ii = (ai−1, ai] for i > 1. We show in section 3.5
that the same characterisation theorem (and, therefore, interval-proper scoring rules) apply
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for semi-open forecast intervals. The need for interval-proper scoring rules is illustrated
in section 3.6 where we apply our results to the verification of probability of precipitation
(PoP) forecasts issued by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and the United Kingdom
Meteorological Office: I’d like to thank the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, in particular,
Dr. D. Griffiths and Ms. I. Ioannou, and the UK Meteorological Office, specifically Dr. M.
Mittermaier, for their help in making the data available. Section 3.7 concludes, with a brief
discussion on which partitions are optimal for a given interval-proper scoring rule.
As a brief aside we note that interval-probabilistic forecasts differ from forecasts expressed as
imprecise-probabilities (see, for example Coolen (2004) and related works). With imprecise-
probabilities a forecaster issues two separate precise probabilities representing the lower and
upper bounds of the range of their belief. In contrast, with interval-probabilities a forecaster
is presented with a predetermined set of intervals and chooses the interval containing their
precise belief.
⌊ 3.2 ⌋ Problems Obtaining Interval-Propriety
Fix the partition 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an = 1, with Ii = [ai−1, ai] for i = 1, . . . , n. Given
a precise-probabilistic scoring rule, S, the scoring rules s(Ii, x) = EP [S(P, x)|P ∈ Ii], and
s(Ii, x) = minp∈Ii S(p, x) are immediate suggestions for an interval-proper scoring rule. How-
ever, such interval scoring rules are not necessarily proper even if S is a precise-proper scoring
rule.
To demonstrate, given λ ∈ [0, 1], let p̂i = (1 − λ)ai−1 + λai and consider the interval scoring
rule
s(Ii, x) = S(p̂i, x). (3.6)
It suffices to set S(p, x) = (p−x)2 the (half-)Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) (which is proper
(see, for example Winkler and Murphy, 1968)); in this case, we refer to s as the Brier λ-
scoring rule. Defining ∆i = ai − ai−1, Theorem 3.2.3 gives conditions under which the Brier





∆k + ak − aj−1
∆k + ∆j
. (3.7)
Then αk,k+1 ≥ αk,j for all j > k. 
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≥ ∆k + ak − aj−1
∆j + ∆k
⇔ ∆k(∆j + ∆k)
∆k + ∆k+1
− ∆k ≥ ak − aj−1
⇔ ∆k(∆j − ∆k+1)
∆k + ∆k+1
≥ −∆k+1 + ak+1 − aj−1














≤ ∆k+1 − ak+1 + aj−1 (3.10)









Then βk,k−1 ≤ βk,j for all j < k. 
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βk,k−1 ≤ βk,j (3.13)
⇔ ∆k−1(∆k + ∆j)
∆k + ∆k−1
≤ ak−1 − aj−1
⇔ ∆k−1(∆k + ∆j)
∆k + ∆k−1
≤ ∆k−1 + . . .+ ∆j (3.14)
which holds if and only if
0 ≤ ∆2k−1 + (∆k−2 + . . .+ ∆j+1)(∆k + ∆k−1) + ∆j∆k. (3.15)
Inequality (3.15) always holds, as the right-hand side is always positive and therefore βk,k−1 ≤
βk,j for all j < k.

We now state and prove the theorem.






≤ λ ≤ 1 if q ∈ [a0, a1],
∆k
∆k+∆k+1
≤ λ ≤ ∆k−1
∆k+∆k−1
if q ∈ [ak−1, ak] for 1 < k < n,
0 ≤ λ ≤ ∆n−1
∆n+∆n−1
if q ∈ [an−1, an].
(3.16)

Proof. The Brier λ-scoring rule is proper if and only if s(Ii, q) ≤ s(Ij , q) for q ∈ Ii i.e.
S( p̂i, q) ≤ S( p̂j, q) for q ∈ Ii. For S the Brier scoring rule, we have
S( p̂i, q) = p̂
2
i − 2p̂iq + q for all i. (3.17)
Therefore, the Brier λ-scoring rule is proper for i 6= j, q ∈ Ii, if and only if, substituting
p̂i = (1 − λ)ai−1 + λai, and noting that p̂i < p̂j ⇔ i < j,
q ≤ 1
2
(ai−1 + aj−1) +
λ
2
(∆i + ∆j) i < j, (3.18)
q ≥ 1
2
(ai−1 + aj−1) +
λ
2
(∆i + ∆j) i > j. (3.19)
Equation (3.18) must hold for all q ∈ Ii = [ai−1, ai], in particular, for q = ai. It follows that,
for propriety, when i < j,









⇔ ∆i + ai − aj−1 ≤ λ(∆i + ∆j)
⇔ αi,j def=
∆i + ai − aj−1
∆i + ∆j
≤ λ. (3.20)
By Lemma 3.2.1, λ ≥ αi,i+1. We note that if equation (3.20) holds, then for q < ai, equation
(3.18) is true.












Applying lemma 3.2.2, λ ≤ βi,i−1. Again, we note that if equation (3.21) holds, then for
q > ai−1, equation (3.19) is valid.
If 1 < i < n then both i > j and i < j are possible, and propriety exists if and only
if αi,i+1 ≤ λ ≤ βi,i−1. If i = n, there is no j > i, and we can conclude only that
λ ≤ βi,i−1 = βn,n−1 (the lower bound on λ being 0). If i = 1, there is no j < i, set
and we can only state that λ ≥ αi,i+1 = α1,2 (the upper bound on λ being 1).

From equation (3.16), values of q lying in different intervals impose different restrictions on
λ. But, for propriety, the same value of λ must apply for every value of q. A circumstance in
which this can occur is when the partition consists of equally-spaced points, as the following
corollary to Theorem 3.2.3 proves.
Corollary 3.2.4. If λ = 1/2, then the Brier λ-scoring rule is proper if and only if the
intervals are determined by equally spaced points.
Proof. Suppose λ = 1/2. Then, from Theorem 3.2.3, the Brier λ-scoring rule is proper if
and only if











⇒ ak − ak−1 ≤ ak−1 − ak−2; k = 2, . . . , n. (3.23)
For 1 ≤ k < n, we have, from equation (3.22)
ak − ak−1 ≤ ak+1 − ak (3.24)
and k + 1 lies in the set {2, . . . , n} so, from equation (3.23),
ak+1 − ak ≤ ak − ak−1. (3.25)
Equations (3.24) and (3.25) together give ak+1 − ak = ak − ak−1, 1 ≤ k < n, showing that









As an example, refer to Figures 3.1a and 3.1b. In each figure, the horizontal axis shows q (the







for i = 1, . . . , 10. The bounds of the probabilistic intervals are shown on the vertical axis.
The value of λ differs between Figures 3.1a and 3.1b. For a given value of λ, the optimal
interval, that is, the interval that achieves the lowest expected Brier λ-score, is shown for
each value of q. In each figure an optimal interval is displayed as light-grey if q does not lie
in the interval and dark-grey if q does lie in the interval. The Brier λ-scoring rule is proper
if and only if every value of q lies in the optimal interval (which occurs if and only if the
45◦-line passes through every optimal interval). Therefore, the Brier λ-scoring rule is proper
if and only if no intervals are light-grey. It is evident that only for λ = 1
2
(Figure 3.1b) is
the Brier λ-scoring rule proper.
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(a) λ = 0.1 (b) λ = 0.5
Figure 3.1: For each value of q, the interval forecast that gives the lowest expected Brier
λ-score is shown. If q does not lie in an interval (indicating impropriety), the interval is
coloured red ( ); if q does lie in the interval (demonstrating propriety), the interval is
coloured green ( ). The Brier λ-scoring rule is, therefore, proper if and only if there are
no red intervals. Only for λ = 12 is the Brier λ-scoring rule proper.
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But, for non-equally spaced intervals, a satisfactory value for λ may not exist; whether the
λ-Brier scoring rule is proper, depends on the choice of the partition ai, i = 0, . . . , n, which
the forecaster is presented with.
Is there a partition such that for every value of λ, the Brier λ-scoring rule is improper?









, so no matter which value is chosen for λ, for each q ∈ [ak−1, ak],
condition (3.16) is violated and so the Brier λ-scoring rule is improper. There are infinitely
many partitions for which the λ-Brier scoring rule is improper for every value of λ. Figure
3.2 gives an example.
Figure 3.2: The partition is ai =
i
10 for i = 0, . . . , 10, i 6= 4, a4 = 0.38. For each
value of λ, the point • indicates a value of q ∈ [a4, a5] for which the interval containing q
(red interval) differs from the interval for which the expected Brier λ-score is a minimum
(green interval). For the given partition, for every value of λ the interval at which the
expected Brier λ-scoring rule is a minimum ( ) is different to the interval containing q
( ); the Brier λ-scoring rule is improper for all values of λ.
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⌊ 3.3 ⌋ Characterisation of Interval-Proper Scoring Rules
We would like to be able to write down the general form of those scoring rules that are
proper for interval-probabilistic forecasts. Interval-probabilistic forecasts are a particular
example of the wider class of statistical functionals (functions of probability distributions)
(see for example, Gneiting, 2011a). Recently, Lambert et al. (2008), Lambert and Shoham
(2009), Lambert (2013) and Frongillo and Kash (2014) have derived a general expression
for scoring rules that are proper for statistical functionals (scoring rules that are proper for
some particular statistical functionals are given in Gneiting (2011a)). To arrive at a form for
scoring rules that are proper for interval-probabilistic forecasts, we can therefore, contextu-
alise these general results, in particular those of Lambert (2013), to our setting. However,
for binary observations, it is possible to give a straightforward derivation of the form that
an interval-proper scoring rule must have.
Let s be a negatively-oriented strictly proper scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts.
Recall that the expected value of s(Ii, X), with respect to the observation, X, under q, is
s(Ii, q)
def
= E[s(Ii, X)] = s(Ii, 0)(1 − q) + s(Ii, 1)q. (3.27)
By the propriety of s,
s(Ii, q) ≤ s(Ij, q) for all i, j and q ∈ Ii. (3.28)
Condition (3.28) must be satisfied for every q ∈ Ii = [ai−1, ai], in particular, for q = ai.
Setting i = k, j = k + 1 and q = ak in equation (3.28), we have
s(Ik, ak) ≤ s(Ik+1, ak) . (3.29)
Similarly, setting i = k + 1, j = k and q = ak (noting that ak ∈ Ik+1), in equation (3.28),
s(Ik+1, ak) ≤ s(Ik, ak) . (3.30)
From inequalities (3.29) and (3.30),
s(Ik, ak) = s(Ik+1, ak) . (3.31)
Using equation (3.27), equation (3.31) may be written as
{
s(Ik, 0) − s(Ik+1, 0)
}
(1 − ak) +
{
s(Ik, 1) − s(Ik+1, 1)
}
ak = 0 (3.32)
and this must hold for every k = 1, . . . , n− 1.
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One possible solution to (3.32) is the trivial solution s(Ik, x) = 0 for all values of k and
x. But such a solution violates the strict propriety of s: suppose that i < j and choose
q ∈ Ii; by strict propriety we should have s(Ii, q) < s(Ij, q) , but because s(Ik, x) = 0 for
all k and x we have s(Ii, q) = s(Ij , q) , a contradiction. So, the trivial solution is inadmissible.
Excluding the trivial solution, for each k = 1, . . . , n − 1, the solution must then have the
form,
s(Ik, 0) − s(Ik+1, 0) = −akγk
s(Ik, 1) − s(Ik+1, 1) = (1 − ak)γk (3.33)
where γk is a constant.
It is also the case that, by the propriety of s,
s(Ik, ak−1) ≤ s(Ik+1, ak−1)
from which
{
s(Ik, 0) − s(Ik+1, 0)
}
(1 − ak−1) +
{
s(Ik, 1) − s(Ik+1, 1)
}
ak−1 ≤ 0. (3.34)
Substituting the relationships in (3.33) into equation (3.34) gives
−akγk(1 − ak−1) + (1 − ak)γkak−1 ≤ 0
⇔ γk(ak−1 − ak) ≤ 0
⇔ γk ≥ 0. (3.35)
We can, therefore, write
s(Ik, x) − s(Ik+1, x) = γk(x− ak) for k = 1, . . . , n− 1 (3.36)
for non-negative constants γk. The difference equation (3.36) has a solution




with f an arbitrary function of x. Defining the function g by g(i) − g(i − 1) = γi, i =
1, . . . , n− 1, we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1. (Characterisation for Interval-Proper Scoring Rules) Let X ∈ {0, 1} be a
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binary observation. Given a partition 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an−1 < an = 1, let s be a strictly
interval-proper scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts Ii = [ai−1, ai] and i = 1, . . . , n
of the outcome X = 1. Then s has the form




g(i) − g(i− 1)
)
(x− ai) (3.38)
where f is an arbitrary function and g is a non-decreasing function. 
Under s given by equation (3.38), interval-probabilistic forecasts that are closer to the out-
come for X receive a lower (that is, better) score than interval-probabilistic forecasts that
are further from the outcome for X. For, suppose that X = 0. We have




g(i) − g(i− 1)
)
ai (3.39)
and the summation term increases as k increases (g being a non-decreasing function) so that
as Ik moves further away from 0 (as k increases) s(Ik, 0) increases. Similarly, if X = 1,




g(i) − g(i− 1)
)
(1 − ai) (3.40)
and the summation term is always positive and decreases in size as k decreases so that
s(Ik, 1) increases as Ik moves away from 1.
3.3.1 ‖ Choosing f and g
In equation (3.38), each choice for the function f and for the non-decreasing function g,
will give a new proper scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts. While any real-valued
function may be chosen for f and any non-decreasing real-valued function may be chosen for
g, it is helpful to have some method to guide these choices. Here we suggest one such method.
To begin, choose a non-decreasing function h : [0, 1] → R, and define the function g by
g(k) = h(ξk+1) for ξk ∈ Ik for k = 1, . . . , n; each choice of ξk may lead to a different g.
Replacing g by h in (3.38),








s(Ik+1, x) − s(Ik, x) = (h(ξk+1) − h(ξk))(ak − x). (3.42)
We now show that for a suitable precise-proper scoring rule S, we can conclude from equation
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(3.42) that in the limit of ever finer partitions, the differential equation
∂S(p, x)
∂p
= (p − x)dh(p)
dp
(3.43)
holds. By choosing S, equation (3.43) can be solved for h to allow g to be found, by setting
g(k) = h (ξk+1) (for some predetermined choice for the ξk+1).
To derive differential equation (3.43) from equation (3.42), a formal notion of convergence is
required. Some of the terminology that follows will be familiar from standard analysis (see,
for example Browder, 1996).
Definition 3.3.2. For each n ∈ N, let [a]n be the partition 0 = an,0 < an,1 < . . . < an,n = 1.
For n > m, the partition [a]n is a refinement of the partition [a]m, written [a]m ≤ [a]n,
if {am,0, . . . , am,m} ⊂ {an,0, . . . , an,n}. The partitions {[a]n}n∈N are said to be increasingly
refined if [a]n ≤ [a]n+1 for all n and the mesh, µn = max{an,i − an,i−1 | i = 1, . . . , n} tends
to 0 as n → ∞. 
We will use the notation In,i = [an,i−1, an,i], i = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let p ∈ [0, 1]. If the partitions {[a]n}n∈N are increasingly refined then ∀ǫ > 0,
∃N ≥ 0 such that for each n > N , there is a k (depending on n) such that |an,k − p| < ǫ. 
Proof. Fix ǫ > 0. Since the partitions {[a]n}n∈N are increasingly refined, there is an N ≥ 0
such that ∀n > N , µn < ǫ. Let n > N so that µn < ǫ. If p ∈ [0, 1] then there is some k such
that p ∈ In,k. Therefore, |an,k − p| ≤ |an,k − an,k−1| ≤ µn < ǫ. So for all n > N , there exists
a k (depending on n) such that |an,k − p| < ǫ. 
Definition 3.3.4. The interval-proper scoring rule s converges in the Lipschitz sense to the
precise-proper scoring rule S at p if and only if ∀ǫ > 0, ∃N ≥ 0 such that for all n ≥ N ,
|s(In,k, x)−S(p, x)| < ǫmin{|an,k−1−p|, |an,k−p|} for all x, and for all p ∈ In,k. If s converges
to S in the Lipschitz sense at every p ∈ [0, 1], then we shall say simply that s converges to
S in the Lipschitz sense. 
With these definitions we can state and prove the following proposition,
Proposition 3.3.5. Let s be an interval-proper scoring rule satisfying equation (3.42), with
h continuously differentiable. Suppose that s converges to the precise-proper scoring rule S
in the Lipschitz sense, where S is continuously partially differentiable with respect to p. If
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Proof. From equation (3.42), for any ξn,k ∈ In,k,







(an,k − x). (3.45)
Let ǫ > 0, p ∈ [0, 1]. Because S is partially differentiable with respect to p, ∃δ∗ > 0 such
that for |ξn,k+1 − ξn,k| < δ∗,
∣∣∣∣∣







































Let δ = min{δ∗, δ′, δ∗∗, δ′′, ǫ}.
As the partitions {[a]n}n∈N are increasingly refined, ∃N∗ ≥ 0 such that for n ≥ N∗, µn < δ2 .
The interval scoring rule s converges to S in the Lipschitz sense, so ∃N ′ ≥ 0 such that
∀n > N ′,
|s(In,j, x) − S(p, x)| <
ǫ
4
min{|an,j−1 − p|, |an,j − p|} (3.50)
for p ∈ In,j.
Considering the left-hand side of equation (3.50), for any p,
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Let N = max{N∗, N ′}, n ≥ N and k (depending on n) satisfy p ∈ In,k. We have ξn,k+1 −
ξn,k ≤ an,k+1 − an,k−1 ≤ 2µn < δ, |ξn,k − p| < µn < δ,
min{|an,k+1 − ξn,k+1|, |an,k − ξn,k+1|}
ξn,k+1 − ξn,k




min{|an,k − ξn,k|, |an,k−1 − ξn,k|}
ξn,k+1 − ξn,k
≤ |an,k − ξn,k|
ξn,k+1 − ξn,k
≤ 1. (3.53)
It follows from (3.45), (3.46) , (3.49) and (3.51) to (3.53) that
∣∣∣∣∣


































Similarly, using (3.47) and (3.48), from the right-hand side of equation (3.50),




















































On integrating both sides of (3.57) with respect to p, we obtain
S(p, x) + a(x) = h(p)(p− x) −
∫
h(p) dp (3.58)
where a(·) is a function of x alone. Taking the expectation of equation (3.58) in X under p
gives
S(p, p) + E[a(X)] = −
∫
h(p) dp. (3.59)
With X ∈ {0, 1}, we can write a(X) = a(0)(1 − X) + a(1)X so that E[a(X)] = a(0)(1 −
p) + a(1)p. The function eS(p) = −S(p, p) is known as the entropy of p associated with S
(Bröcker, 2009; Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). We have
∫
h(p) dp = eS(p) − a(0)(1 − p) − a(1)p. (3.60)




− (a(1) − a(0)). (3.61)
Equation (3.61) indicates that h(p) is (up to a constant), the derivative of the entropy of p
associated with S. This property of h was suggested to us by an anonymous referee of the
version of this chapter submitted for publication, and, in light of this property, the referee
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proposed we consider the limit of equation (3.41), which we now do, showing that equation
(3.41) is a discrete version of a well-known result from the theory of precise-proper scoring
rules. The core of our argument is contained in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.6. Suppose that h is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and (x − q)dh(q)/dq









(1A(·) is the indicator function of the set A, taking the value 1 if its argument is in A, and
0 otherwise). 
Proof. Let p ∈ [0, 1]. If p = 0 then both sides of equation (3.62) are zero. Suppose, therefore,
that p > 0, and for each n, fix k such that p ∈ (an,k−1, an,k]. We have p ≤ an,k and if an,i ≥ p
then an,i ≥ an,k and if an,i < p then an,i < an,k. Therefore, 1[0,p)(an,i) = 1[0,an,k)(an,i) and
this holds for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1. For k, therefore
n−1∑
i=1
1[0,an,k)(an,i)(x− an,i)(h(an,i) − h(an,i−1)) =
n−1∑
i=1
1[0,p)(an,i)(x− an,i)(h(an,i) − h(an,i−1)).
(3.63)

























































Fix ǫ > 0. From the continuous differentiability of h on (0, 1) (and since an,i ∈ (0, 1)), ∃N
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by the continuous differentiability of h, φ is continuous except at the single point p and the
points 0 and 1, and, as (x− q)dh(q)/dq is bounded on [0, 1) and φ(1) = 0, then φ is bounded
on [0, 1]. It is the case, then, that φ is Riemann-integrable on [0, 1], and ∃N ′ such that for















But, because φ(an,n) = φ(1) = 0,
n∑
i=1
φ(an,i)(an,i − an,i−1) =
n−1∑
i=1
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giving the result (3.62). 
Lemma 3.3.6 does not consider the case that (x− q)dh(q)/dq is bounded on (0, 1], for which
a separate lemma is required, and is now given.
Lemma 3.3.7. Suppose that h is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and (x − q)dh(q)/dq




















Consider, then the case of 0 < p < 1. For each n, fix k such that p ∈ (an,k−1, an,k]. If an,i ≥
an,k, then an,i > p and if an,i < p, then an,i < an,k. It follows that 1[an,k,1)(an,i) = 1[p,1)(an,i)
for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1,and we have
n−1∑
i=1
1[an,k,1)(an,i)(x− an,i)(h(an,i) − h(an,i−1)) =
n−1∑
i=1
1[p,1)(an,i)(x− an,i)(h(an,i) − h(an,i−1)).
(3.74)
The remainder of the proof is the same as that of Lemma 3.3.6, with the exception that we
define φ by




By assumption, h is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) so that φ is too other than perhaps
at 0 and 1. It is also the case that (x− q)dh(q)/dq is bounded on (0, 1] and because p > 0,
φ(0) = 0 so φ is bounded on [0, 1]. With these properties, φ is Riemann-integrable on [0, 1].
With the additional property that φ(an,n) = φ(1) = 0 by construction, the result follows as
in the proof of Lemma 3.3.6.

From equation (3.41), for the partition [a]n and for all k = 1, . . . , n, with ξn,k ∈ In,k we have
University of Exeter 101 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 3















Equation (3.76) holds for all choices of ξn,k ∈ In,k and so holds for ξn,k = an,k−1, allowing us
to write








By Lemma (3.3.6), the right-hand side of equation (3.77) converges, for suitable h, given





and, for S such that s converges to S in the Lipschitz sense, s(In,k, x) → S(p, x) as n → ∞.
Therefore, taking the limit of equation (3.41) as n → ∞,




Similarly, from equation (3.41),





























Replacing ξn,i with an,i−1 in equation (3.80), we obtain















Letting n → ∞, equation (3.81) gives (referring to Lemma 3.3.7 with appropriate h),
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We can compare equations (3.79) and (3.82) to the Schervish-representation of a proper scor-













1[p,1)(1 − r) dh(r) if x = 1. (3.83b)
Equations (3.79) and (3.83a) together and equations (3.82) and (3.83b) together suggest
that f should be set to
f(x) = (x+ 1)S(x, x). (3.84)
⌊ 3.4 ⌋ Examples
As examples of this method we take some familiar precise-proper scoring rules and derive
the corresponding analogues that are interval-proper. In all cases, we assume that the pre-
cise probabilistic forecast that X = 1 is p ∈ [0, 1] and that the interval [0, 1] has partition
[a]n : 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an = 1.
3.4.1 ‖ Interval-Brier scoring rule
The (half-)Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) is S(p, x) = (p−x)2. Substituting for S in equation
(3.43), we have
2(p− x) = (p− x)dh(p)
dp
(3.85)
giving h(p) = 2p. Identify points ξk ∈ Ik = [ak−1, ak] for all k = 1, . . . , n. Then g(k) =
h(ξk+1) = 2ξk+1. Choose f(x) = (x+ 1)S(x, x) = 0.
With these choices of f and g, equation (3.41) gives the following scoring rule for interval-
probabilistic forecasts
s(Ik, x) = 0 −
k−1∑
i=1
(2ξi+1 − 2ξi) (x− ai) (3.86)
which may be rewritten as
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 = S(ξk, x) − S(ξ1, x) −
k−1∑
i=1
{S(ξi+1, ai) − S(ξi, ai)}

.









(ak − ak−1)2 + (a1x− x2) (3.88)
=(x− ak−1)(x− ak) + (a1x− x2). (3.89)
Define
s∗(Ik, x) = s(Ik, x) − (a1x− x2) = (x− ak−1)(x− ak). (3.90)
Then, by Lemma 3.1.2, s∗ is an interval-proper scoring rule, which we refer to as the interval-
Brier scoring rule.
We note too, that if the partition is equally-spaced, then, letting ∆ = ak − ak−1 for all
































(ak−1 + ak) − x
)2
(3.92)
by Lemma 3.1.2, s◦ is interval-proper, in agreement with Corollary 3.2.4.
3.4.2 ‖ Interval-Ignorance scoring rule
The Ignorance scoring rule (Good, 1952) is defined by
S(p, x) = −x log(p) − (1 − x) log(1 − p). (3.93)
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Substituting into equation (3.43) gives
p− x




We have, therefore, that for p ∈ (0, 1), h(p) = log{p/(1 − p)}, from which g(k) = h (ξk+1) =
log {ξk+1/ (1 − ξk+1)}, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Following the guidance of setting f(x) = (x+1)S(x, x),
f(x) = 0 and the expression (3.41) for s(Ik, x) becomes















= S(ξk, x) − S(ξ1, x) −
k−1∑
i=1
{S(ξi+1, ai) − S(ξi, ai)} . (3.95)
We note in passing, that this is of the same form as was obtained for the Brier scoring rule
(see equation (3.87)). No simple choice of ξk reduces equation (3.95) to an intuitive scoring
rule.
3.4.3 ‖ Pseudo-spherical scoring rule
Fix α > 1. The α-pseudo-spherical scoring rule (Roby, 1964) is
S(p, x) =
{−xp + (x− 1)(1 − p)}α−1
{pα + (1 − p)α}α−1α
. (3.96)




(α − 1){(p− 1)p}α−2
{pα + (1 − p)α}2− 1α
. (3.97)
Solving for h, we have
h(p) =
−(−p)α−1 − (p− 1)α−1
{pα + (1 − p)α}α−1α
. (3.98)
Set g(k) = h(ξk+1) and choose
f(x) = (x+ 1)S(x, x) =
[




{xα + (1 − x)α}α−1α
]
(3.99)
i.e. f(0) = (−1)α−1, f(1) = 2(−1)α−1. (If α = 2, the pseudo-spherical scoring rule is referred
to as the spherical scoring rule.)
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⌊ 3.5 ⌋ Interval-Proper Scoring Rules in Practice
Theorem 3.3.1 gives the characteristic form of all interval-proper scoring rules, under the con-
dition that the forecasts are closed intervals: given the partition 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an = 1,
the ith interval is Ii = [ai−1, ai]. If a forecaster’s actual belief for the probability that X = 1,
q, falls in the (open) interval (ai−1, ai), the forecaster will issue Ii = [ai−1, ai] as their forecast
and will receive a score of s(Ii, x) if X = x (and have an expected score of s(Ii, q)).
In practice, closed intervals have an inherent problem: if q = ai then it is unclear whether
the forecaster should issue Ii−1 = [ai−1, ai] or Ii = [ai, ai+1], either interval being acceptable
as both intervals contain q. To avoid this difficulty, the intervals from which the forecaster
must select a forecast are presented as semi-open intervals i.e. [a0, a1] and (ai−1, ai] for all
i = 2, . . . , n.
However, for semi-open intervals a strictly proper scoring rule does not exist. This follows
from previous work by Lambert and Shoham (2009, Definition 4, Theorem 4.1), Lambert
(2013, Theorem 1) and the more general result of Frongillo and Kash (2014, Definition 3.3,
Theorem 5.2) 2, which when applied in our context proves that a strictly proper scoring
rule for forecasts issued as intervals, exists only if the intervals are closed and intersect at
their boundaries: the intervals must have the form [ai−1, ai], i = 1, . . . , n. The following
proposition gives a direct proof.
Proposition 3.5.1. For a binary observation, X, taking the values 0 or 1, there is no strictly
proper scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts expressed as semi-open intervals. 
Proof. Let the intervals from which the interval-probabilistic forecasts are chosen be the
semi-open intervals I
′
1 = [a0, a1], I
′
k = (ak−1, ak] for k = 2, . . . , n. Assume there exists a
strictly proper scoring rule, s′, for the semi-open interval-probabilistic forecasts. Then for r
a precise probability that X = 1,
s′(I
′
k, r) < s
′(I
′
j , r) for all r ∈ I
′






j−1, aj−1) < s
′(I
′
j, aj−1) for all j = 1, . . . , n− 1. (3.101)
Further, given that X is a binary observation with a value of either 0 or 1, we have for any
2Also highlighted in a personal communication from Professor R.M. Frongillo of the University of Col-
orado, Boulder, U.S.A., in response to Mitchell and Ferro (2017).





s′(Ij , r) = (1 − r)s′(I
′




from which we note that s′(I
′
j, r) is continuous in r; in particular, if r ∈ I
′
j , limr↓aj−1 s
′(I
′




Therefore, fix a semi-open interval I
′
j . For any r ∈ I
′
j , because the semi-open intervals are
disjoint, r /∈ I ′j−1 and s′(I
′
j, r) < s
′(I
′
j−1, r) , because by assumption s
′ is a strictly proper
scoring rule. But then
s′(I
′








j−1, r) = s
′(I
′
j−1, aj−1) . (3.103)
But inequality (3.103) contradicts inequality (3.101). Therefore our initial assumption that
s′ is strictly proper is false and we have shown that there does not exist a strictly proper
scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts of semi-open intervals. 
In other words, for a precise belief that equals an interval boundary any scoring rule will
regard each interval adjacent to this boundary as being an equally reasonable forecast and
assign both adjacent intervals the same expected score (there are no strong grounds for pre-
ferring either interval). Therefore, if a scoring rule is to be strictly proper, the boundary
must be shared by both intervals (otherwise the strictly proper scoring rule would necessarily
assign the interval containing the boundary a strictly lower expected score in contravention
of the scoring rule’s assignment of equal expected scores to both intervals).
However, as we prove in chapter 4 with the interval-Brier scoring rule, proper scoring rules
do exist for forecasts that are semi-open intervals. More generally, we now show that scor-
ing rules that are strictly proper for closed intervals remain proper (but cannot be strictly
proper) if the intervals are made semi-open.
Let s be a (negatively-oriented) interval-proper scoring rule with respect to the closed inter-
vals Ii and for X ∼ q, set q = ai. There are two approaches to consider.
(a) The forecaster predetermines always to forecast the lower of the two intervals, i.e.
Ii = [ai−1, ai]. The forecaster’s expected score is s(Ii, q) . But, because s is interval-proper,
if q = ai, then q ∈ Ii and q ∈ Ii+1 so s(Ii, q) = s(Ii+1, q) . Therefore, the forecaster receives
the same expected score as they would do if they had predetermined always to forecast the
upper of the two intervals, Ii+1. Whether the forecaster decides always to report Ii or al-
ways to report Ii+1, when their precise-probabilistic belief falls on the boundary of the two
intervals, will make no difference to the forecaster’s expected score.
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(b) The forecaster adopts a randomised approach: the interval forecast is chosen according to
the value of an independent binary random variable, Y , where Y has a Bernoulli distribution
with parameter θ. For example, on each occasion that q = ai, the forecaster flips a coin for
which the probability of obtaining a head is θ and chooses to forecast either Ii = [ai−1, ai]
if the coin shows tails (Y = 0), or Ii+1 = [ai, ai+1] if the coin shows heads (Y = 1) (it is
assumed that the coin has no chance of landing on its edge). The score for the forecast will
be (1 − Y )s(Ii, x) + Y s(Ii+1, x) when X = x. But, the forecaster’s expected score is
E[(1 − Y )s(Ii, X) + Y s(Ii+1, X)] (3.104)
By construction, Y and X are independent, so the expected score in equation (3.104) is
equal to
(1 − θ)E[s(Ii, X)] + θE[s(Ii+1, X)]
≡(1 − θ)s(Ii, q) + θs(Ii+1, q) (3.105)
and, for q = ai ∈ Ii, Ii+1, because s is interval-proper, s(Ii, q) = s(Ii+1, q) , so that the
expected score is
(1 − θ)s(Ii, q) + θs(Ii+1, q) = s(Ii, q) = s(Ii+1, q) . (3.106)
Under a randomised policy, the forecaster’s expected score is the same as it would be under
a non-randomised policy (as in (a)).
In summary, if q = ai, the forecaster may choose to report either Ii or Ii+1, or vary (ran-
domly) between these choices without changing their expected score. It follows that if a
forecaster is presented with a collection of semi-open intervals, [a0, a1], (a1, a2], . . . , (an−1, 1],
the forecaster can behave as though the intervals are closed and adopt the approach of al-
ways selecting the lower interval of [ai−1, ai] and [ai, ai+1] when q = ai. By such means, the
scoring rule will be proper for forecasts that are semi-open intervals.
⌊ 3.6 ⌋ An Application
Equation (3.38) presents the form that an interval-proper scoring rule must have, with sec-
tion 3.4 giving specific examples. We now investigate the implications of using an improper
scoring rule for interval forecasts. We use actual precise-probabilistic forecasts provided by
two separate meteorological offices, from which we simulate interval-probabilistic forecasts.
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From these synthetic, yet representative, interval-probabilistic forecasts, we can establish
empirical measures of the influence of impropriety.
3.6.1 ‖ The Data
Two separate data sets, in both cases precipitation data, were used. The amount of precip-
itation per day (the 24-hour period beginning at midnight local time) is converted into a
binary variable, X, by choosing a threshold rainfall level (in mm) and defining X = 1 if the
recorded amount of precipitation is greater than the threshold level; otherwise X = 0. Fore-
casts are precise-probabilistic forecasts as described below. Missing data (either observed
precipitation or precise-probabilistic forecast) were omitted not imputed.
3.6.1.1 | UK Met Office (UKMO) Data
The UKMO provided data for two locations: Heathrow Airport (Station Number 03772)
and Eskdalemuir (Station Number 03162). For each location, the observation was precip-
itation level (in mm) and the forecasts were precise-probabilities issued as a set of nodes
(zj, F (zj)) j = 1, . . . , m of the cumulative distribution function (F ) of the precipitation level
in mm (z), from which the precise probability of the precipitation level exceeding a threshold
of 1mm was calculated (if necessary, the nodes were linearly interpolated and the tails were
linearly extrapolated, subject to a maximum possible value for F (z) of 1 and a minimum
possible value for F (z) of 0). Daily forecasts for a period of approximately two years were
available, and on each date there were forecasts for 58 lead-times (from 6 to 348 hours at
6-hourly intervals). Climatology was provided as a single cumulative distribution function
which had been determined empirically from daily observations between 1 January 1983 to
31 December 2012 (a total of 10951 observations).
3.6.1.2 | Australian Bureau of Meteorology (ABOM) Data
The ABOM provided data for 18 locations around Australia for a period of 290 consecutive
days. On each day, the observation at each location was rainfall (in mm) in the 24 hours
following midnight of the given day and the forecast was the precise-probabilistic forecast of
receiving more than 0.2mm of rain in the same 24-hour time-interval. On each day and for
each location 7 forecasts were provided: a forecast issued 12, 36, 60, 84, 108, 132 and 156
hours before the day. Forecasts were provided for two different forecasters, of which only
one forecaster will be considered 3.
3Results for the forecaster not used in this chapter appear in Mitchell and Ferro (2017).
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3.6.2 ‖ Simulating Interval-Probabilistic Forecasts
We assume that each precise-probabilistic forecast, p, is determined under a precise-proper
scoring rule and so represents the forecaster’s true belief that X = 1. A partition is fixed
and the (negatively-oriented) scoring rule for the corresponding interval forecasts is selected
(see for example, Gneiting (2011a) on the need for the forecaster to be made aware of the
scoring rule).
The simulated interval forecast is the interval which minimises the expected score the fore-
caster receives under the precise-probabilistic forecast: Iissued = arg minIk s(Ik, p) . If s is an
interval-proper scoring rule, the interval issued by the forecaster will be the interval con-
taining p. Under an interval-improper scoring rule, the forecast interval will not necessarily
contain the forecaster’s true belief p.
UKMO precise probabilistic forecasts were translated into interval-probabilistic forecasts
(see below) using the following partition of the interval [0, 1] used by the UKMO: a0 = 0,
0.025, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.90, 0.95, 1 = a15.
The ABOM precise probabilistic forecasts were converted to interval-probabilistic forecasts
(see below) using the following partition of the interval [0, 1]: a0 = 0, 0.025, 0.075, 0.15,
0.25, 0.35, 0.45, 0.55, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.925, 0.975, 1 = a13; a similar partition is used by
the ABOM.
For each precise-probabilistic forecast, therefore, two interval-probabilistic forecasts are sim-
ulated: one when s is an interval-improper scoring rule and one when s is an interval-proper
scoring rule. We emphasise that all interval-probabilistic forecasts so calculated are hypo-
thetical and are not actual interval-probabilistic forecasts provided by either the UKMO or
the ABOM.
3.6.3 ‖ Calculating Forecaster Skill
Let xi be the ith outcome (with value either 0 or 1) and Iki be the interval-probabilistic








For large N , assuming that the forecast-outcome pairs are independent, s̄N is approximately
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(s(Iki, xi) − s̄N)2 . (3.108)
We denote the accuracy of the climatological forecaster by
µ̂clim = s̄N,clim ≈ Eclim[s(I,X)] (3.109)
and the accuracy of the perfect forecaster (who always issues the interval In when the outcome
is 1 and the interval I1 when the outcome is zero), by
µ̂perf = s̄N,perf ≈ Eperf[s(I,X)]. (3.110)







A skill of 1 for a forecaster demonstrates a perfect forecast record for the forecaster, while
a skill of 0 indicates that the forecaster is no more skilful than a climatological forecaster.
Assuming that accuracy of the climatological and perfect forecasters is constant, it follows












N (µ̂perf − µ̂clim)2
(3.113)
from which we have an approximate 100(1 − α)% confidence interval for forecaster skill of
(ψ̂ − z1− α
2





is the α/2-quantile of the standard normal distribution.
3.6.4 ‖ Example: Interval-Brier scoring rule
Let s be the interval-proper interval-Brier scoring rule (equation (3.90)) and s̃ be the interval-
improper (adjusted) Brier midpoint-scoring rule











= (x− ak−1)(x− ak) +
1
4




(For equally-spaced intervals s and s̃ are equivalent and s̃ is interval-proper. But, here,
unequally-spaced intervals are supposed and were s̃ to be interval-proper, then by Lemma
3.1.2, the Brier midpoint-scoring rule would be proper, contradicting Corollary 3.2.4.)
Figures 3.3a and 3.3b compare forecaster skill under s (proper) and s̃ (improper). In Figure
3.3a, the skill of interval-probabilistic forecasts at Heathrow Airport for different lead-times
is shown, while Figure 3.3b displays the skill of the 12-hour lead-time forecasts at each of 18
different locations around Australia.
The immediate conclusion from Figures 3.3a and 3.3b, is that there appears to be no mate-
rial difference in skill measured under the interval-proper and interval-improper scoring rules.
But, there is a insidious danger from impropriety: impropriety permits hedging, wherein the
forecaster chooses to publish an interval-probabilistic forecast that differs from the interval
they truly believe is appropriate. In such cases, a forecaster’s accuracy (or skill) does not
measure their true forecasts but measures their given forecasts, thereby misrepresenting their
ability. In the presence of hedging, decisions based on the forecaster’s ability, in particular
whether one forecaster is better than another, are invalid.
Denoting the forecaster’s true (precise-probabilistic) belief that X = 1 by q, whether a fore-
caster is induced to hedge depends on the values of s̃(I, q) for different intervals I, and
therefore, given s̃, hedging depends only on the partition from which the interval forecasts
are selected. In Figures 3.4 to 3.6, we demonstrate the effect of the choice of partition on a
forecaster’s hedging profile.
Each of Figures 3.4 to 3.6 shows a bar-graph. Every bar is centred over the upper bound
of an interval, the height of a bar being the proportion of times the interval is issued as
a forecast. For each bar, the white area (if any) is the proportion of times the interval is
forecast and is a hedge that understates the forecaster’s true interval belief; the brown area
(if any) is the proportion of times the interval is forecast and is a hedge that overstates the
forecaster’s true interval belief. The points marked by •, are the proportion of times the
interval is a hedge (either an overstated or understated interval) given the interval is forecast,
that is, the points marked • show the propensity to hedge.
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In Figure 3.4, the distribution of the 12-hour lead-time forecasts at Heathrow Airport is
shown. The relative frequency of hedging is about 5% with hedging existing in both the
lower and upper mid-ranges of the [0, 1] interval. A hedge in the lower mid-ranges of the
[0, 1] interval may be either an understatement or an overstatement, as too a hedge in the
upper mid-ranges may be. There is no simple trend in the propensity to hedge across the
subintervals.
An altogether different set of features is displayed in Figure 3.5, a bar-graph of the 12-hour
lead-time interval-probabilistic forecasts at Perth Airport. Here, the relative frequency of
hedging is approximately 6% and the forecaster only tends to hedge when issuing forecasts
in the extremities of the [0, 1] interval. Hedges in the lower ranges of the [0, 1] interval will
understate the forecaster’s beliefs while hedges in the upper ranges of the [0, 1] interval will
overstate the forecaster’s beliefs.
To examine the impact of the form of the partition on the hedging profile, Figure 3.6 presents
a bar-graph of the 12-hour lead-time interval-probabilistic forecasts at Heathrow Airport as-
suming the same partition that was applied at Perth Airport. The relative frequency of
hedging is about 6% and hedging behaviour is now much more similar to the hedging be-
haviour seen for the Perth Airport forecasts: the partition appears to affect both the type
and propensity to hedge.
An examination of single site and lead-time forecasts, for a predetermined partition and
preselected interval-improper scoring rule, as in Figures 3.4 to 3.6, is helpful in assessing
local properties of a forecaster’s hedges. Of interest too, is aggregate hedging behaviour, the
proportion of times the forecaster hedges (either understates or overstates their true beliefs)
as the site and forecast lead-time changes. In Figure 3.7, the relative frequency of hedging
is shown for different lead-times at two sites: Heathrow Airport and Eskdalemuir. Hedging
is, on the whole, higher for Heathrow Airport than for Eskdalemuir, although the pattern
of hedging is similar over the different lead-times: hedging occurs on no more than 12% or
so of occasions, tending to peak shortly before the 150-hour lead-time forecast and is lowest
for the longest lead-times.
In Figure 3.3b, the relative frequency of hedging when issuing interval-probabilistic forecasts
is compared for a number of lead-times across different locations in Australia. Here, hedging
occurs in between approximately 0% and 20% of forecasts. Hedging levels are similar for
sites that are geographically close. For many sites, hedging is higher for shorter duration
lead-times with hedging decreasing as the lead-time increases.




Figure 3.3: In each figure, estimated forecaster skill (equation (3.111)) and 95% con-
fidence intervals (equation (3.114); ) are shown under the interval-proper Brier scoring
rule (× and ) and the interval-improper adjusted Brier midpoint-scoring rule ( and
). (a) Skill of interval-probabilistic forecasts at Heathrow Airport for different fore-
cast lead-times. (b) Skill of interval-probabilistic forecasts for the 12-hour lead-time at
different locations in Australia.
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Figure 3.4: The relative frequency of 12-hour lead-time interval-probabilistic forecasts
issued for Heathrow Airport. The height of each entire bar is an estimate of the proba-
bility that the interval is the forecast. The white portion of each bar ( ) is an estimate
of the probability that the interval is the forecast published and is a hedge that under-
states the forecaster’s true belief. The brown portion of each bar ( ) is an estimate of
the probability that the interval is the published forecast and is a hedge that overstates
the forecaster’s true belief. The • points are estimates of the conditional probability that
when the interval is forecast, it is a hedge. (The tick-labels on the horizontal axis are the
upper end-points of each subinterval.)
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Figure 3.5: The relative frequency of 12-hour lead-time interval-probabilistic forecasts
issued for Perth Airport. For an interpretation of the bars see the caption to Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.6: The relative frequency of 12-hour lead-time interval-probabilistic forecasts
issued for Heathrow Airport under the same partition used for the forecasts issued for
Perth Airport in Figure 3.5. For an interpretation of the bars see the caption to Figure
3.4.
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Figure 3.7: Relative frequency of hedging when issuing interval-probabilistic forecasts
for different lead-times (hours). Hedging profiles for two different locations are shown:
Heathrow Airport ( ) and Eskdalemuir ( ).
University of Exeter 118 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 3
Figure 3.8: Relative frequency of hedging when publishing interval-probabilistic fore-
casts, for different locations in Australia. Each line shows the hedging profile for forecasts
of a particular lead-time: 12-hour ( ), 36-hour (△),60-hour (×),84-hour (▽),108-hour
(),132-hour (×),156-hour ().
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⌊ 3.7 ⌋ Discussion and Conclusion
If the observation, X, for an event can have one of only two outcomes (e.g. 0 or 1), a
probabilistic forecast is a statement about the probability that the outcome is 1, Pr(X = 1).
There are two types of probabilistic forecast: a precise-probabilistic forecast, which is an
exact value for Pr(X = 1), or an interval-probabilistic forecast, which is an interval in which
Pr(X = 1) lies, the interval being selected from a set of predetermined and exhaustive subin-
tervals of the unit interval [0, 1].
An important instance of interval-probabilistic forecasts is rounded-probabilistic forecasts. A
rounded-probabilistic forecast occurs when a precise-probabilistic forecast is rounded before
being issued. Each rounded probability represents a range of probabilities, namely those
probabilities that, when rounded, reduce to the forecast probability. For example, if precise-
probabilistic forecasts are rounded to the nearest 10%, a rounded probabilistic forecast of
20% can be represented as the interval-probabilistic forecast [15%, 25%).
A forecaster hedges if they issue a forecast that differs from their true belief, because by
doing so they improve their expected score. To assess any probabilistic forecast a proper
scoring rule must be used if hedging is to be precluded. There is a well-established charac-
terisation of scoring rules that are proper for precise-probabilistic forecasts (see, for example
Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). Scoring rules for interval-probabilistic forecasts can be con-
structed by applying a scoring rule for precise-probabilistic forecasts to some probability
selected from the interval forecast. However, even if the precise-probabilistic scoring rule is
proper, the derived scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts need not, in general, be
proper.
In this chapter, we show that in order for a scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts
to be proper, the scoring rule must have a particular form. From this general form spe-
cific scoring rules can be determined that are counterparts to the familiar scoring rules for
precise-probabilistic forecasts (e.g. Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950), ignorance scoring rule
(Good, 1952) and pseudo-spherical scoring rule (Roby, 1964)).
The need to have scoring rules that are proper for interval forecasts, which we refer to as
interval-proper scoring rules, is not that interval-proper scoring rules will give substantially
different values of forecaster skill than interval-improper scoring rules (we give an exam-
ple in which the differences in forecaster skill between an interval-proper and a similar but
improper scoring rule are very small). Rather, as we demonstrate using synthetic interval
forecasts generated from precise probability of precipitation (PoP) forecasts provided by The
Australian Bureau of Meteorology and the UK Met Office, under an improper scoring rule,
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a forecaster may be induced to hedge (the relative frequency of hedging in the cases we con-
sider lies approximately in the range of 0−15%). Skill is calculated from published forecasts,
so if hedging occurs, the published forecasts do not completely reflect the forecaster’s true
beliefs and the measured skill is not a faithful representation of their forecasting ability (i.e.
their substantive insight). Propriety insures against such misrepresentation.
Interval-proper scoring rules depend explicitly on the partition that determines the intervals.
For the same precise-probabilistic forecast held by the forecaster, different partitions will lead
to different interval-probabilistic forecasts being issued and a different expected score for the
forecaster. A natural question arises as to whether there is an optimal set of intervals. We
define optimal as follows: let n be the number of non-zero nodes in each possible partition.
As n increases, we assume that the interval-probabilistic scoring rule, s, tends to a precise-
probabilistic scoring rule, S. For fixed n, we propose that the optimal partition is the
partition [a]n : 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an = 1 that minimises the difference between S(p, q)







d(S(p, q) , s( [ai−1, ai], q))dq dp (3.116)









(S(p, q) − s( [ai−1, ai], q))2dq dp. (3.117)
To compute the optimal partition, noting that a0 = 0 and an = 1, the points a1, . . . , an−1
must be chosen to minimise D([a]n) subject to the conditions
ai−1 < ai i = 1, . . . , n (3.118)
which is a (n− 1)-dimensional non-linear constrained optimisation problem.
As an illustration, suppose that S is the (half-)Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) and s is the











(p2 − 2pq + q) − (q − q(ai−1 + ai) + ai−1ai)
]2
dq
=(p2 − ai−1ai)2 − (2p− ai−1 − ai)(p2 − ai−1ai) +
1
3
(2p− ai−1 − ai)2. (3.119)
Integrating equation (3.119), gives






























































from which D([a]n) can be immediately calculated by summation over i.
To find the optimal partition for a given n, subject to constraints (3.118) and a0 = 0, an = 1,
we adopt the following approach.
Set a0 = 0 and define the function D
∗ by
D∗(z) = D([a]n) for




ezi , for i = 1, . . . , n. (3.121)
Using the optim function (with the Nelder-Mead method) in R (Ihaka and Gentleman, 1996;
R Core Team, 2017), we find those zi for which D
∗(z) is minimised; denote the minimising
zi by z
∗
i . The optimal partition is then determined by transforming the z
∗
i to the ai using
(3.121).
As an example, Table 3.1 shows the optimal partition for n = 10.
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10
0 0.082 0.172 0.271 0.381 0.501 0.621 0.730 0.829 0.918 1
Table 3.1: The values of the optimal partition for the interval-Brier scoring rule, where
optimal is defined as minimising D([a]n) in equation (3.117). The preset value of n is
10. The optimal nodes of the partition are given to 3 decimal places (minimum value of
D([a]n) is 0.0005 to four decimal places).
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4 Decompositions and Dual Decompositions of Proper Scoring
Rules for Interval-Probabilistic Forecasts of Binary Events
Summary. The previous chapter defined and characterised proper scoring rules for
interval-probabilistic forecasts of binary observations. For a given scoring rule, accuracy,
the expected score over the joint distribution of the forecasts and outcomes, is a measure
of the overall fit of the forecasts to the outcomes. But accuracy is an incomplete measure
of forecast performance. A more comprehensive evaluation of forecast performance requires
the measurement of additional properties of the joint distribution of forecasts and outcomes.
Indirect measurements of the properties of the distributions of forecasts and outcomes can
be obtained by decomposing accuracy into several components, each component quantifying
a feature or attribute of the forecasts. Decompositions of proper scoring rules for precise-
probabilistic forecasts are well-established, but no decompositions have yet been proposed
for proper scoring rules of interval-probabilistic forecasts. In this chapter, we derive the
uncertainty-resolution-reliability (URR) and refinement-discrimination-correctness (RDC)
decompositions for the interval-Brier scoring rule. These decompositions are compared to
the known URR and RDC decompositions of the Brier scoring rule for precise-probabilistic
forecasts. Estimators for the attributes of the decompositions of the interval-Brier scoring
rule are proposed, and used to compute values for the attributes of interval-probabilistic
forecasts of precipitation.
⌊ 4.1 ⌋ Introduction
As was noted in chapter 2, Murphy and Winkler (1987) advocate that forecast verification
should be wholly directed to the examination of the properties of the joint distribution of
forecast and observation, this joint distribution representing the total information available
for the purposes of evaluating the forecasting system.
Although qualitative analysis of the joint distribution’s properties provides some insight into
the relationship between forecast and observation, to make definitive statements it is nec-
essary to quantify these properties. One approach to measuring the properties of the joint
distribution is to specify a scoring rule (Winkler, 1996) which assigns, to each forecast and
outcome, a score according to how closely the forecast and outcome correspond; as in earlier
chapters we continue to assume that all scoring rules are negatively-oriented, so lower scores
indicate better correspondence (Winkler and Murphy, 1968), and we consider only proper
scoring rules (see chapters 2, 3). Having selected a proper scoring rule, the expectation of the
scoring rule under the joint distribution gives a summary measure of forecaster performance,
accuracy.
But, as has been discussed (see, for example, chapter 2), accuracy, by its definition, can-
not convey many of the finer details of the correspondence between forecast and obser-
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vation. These finer attributes of the forecasting system can be indirectly evaluated by
decomposing accuracy into the sum of components, each component representing a par-
ticular attribute. A comprehensive analysis must consider two distinct decompositions: the
uncertainty-resolution-reliability (URR) decomposition (which is related to the joint distri-
bution through the conditional distribution of the observation given the forecast) and the
refinement-discrimination-correctness (RDC) decomposition (related to the joint distribu-
tion by the conditional distribution of the forecast given the observation).
In chapter 2, general forms of the URR and RDC decompositions were obtained for any
type of forecast, but examples of their application were given only for point-forecasts and
precise-probabilistic forecasts, and not for interval-probabilistic forecasts, which had not, at
that stage, been introduced.
Interval-probabilistic forecasts (for binary observations) were described in the previous chap-
ter and interval-proper scoring rules, i.e. proper scoring rules for interval-probabilistic fore-
casts, were defined and their general characteristic form derived. Several examples of interval-
proper scoring rules were also given.
With the setting for interval-probabilistic forecasts established, it is now possible to con-
sider the URR and RDC decompositions for interval-probabilistic forecasts. We do so by
determining these decompositions for the most amenable of the interval-proper scoring rules
given in chapter 3, the interval-Brier scoring rule.
In the section that follows we re-introduce the interval-Brier scoring rule in preparation
for determining its URR decomposition in section 4.3 and RDC decomposition in section
4.4. Computational formulae for the attributes of both decompositions are outlined in sec-
tion 4.5 and having considered their statistical properties, we estimate the attributes of the
interval-forecasts of chapter 3, which were synthesised from actual forecasts of the probabil-
ity of precipitation (PoP) provided by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and the United
Kingdom Met Office. We re-extend our thanks to, Dr. D. Griffiths, Ms. I. Ioannou, and Dr.
M. Mittermaier, for their help in making this data available. The chapter ends with a short
review in section 4.6.
⌊ 4.2 ⌋ Interval-Proper Scoring Rules
We consider a binary observation, X, with possible outcomes in X = {0, 1}, and the set P
of probability distributions for X. A precise-probabilistic forecast for X is the publication
of an exact value for the probability that X = 1, Pr(X = 1). Because X is binary, the value
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Pr(X = 1) completely identifies a probability distribution for X i.e. a member of P. In other
words, for each p ∈ P, the probability that X = 1 under p, Prp(X = 1) is known if and only
if p is known. In this case, therefore, we will write, for ease of exposition, p = Prp(X = 1)
for the precise-probabilistic forecast.
All precise-probabilistic forecasts p ≡ Prp(X = 1), will be values in the interval [0, 1]. A
partition of the interval [0, 1], with nodes 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an−1 < an = 1, divides the
interval [0, 1] into a set of sub-intervals
I1 = [a0, a1],
Ik = (ak−1, ak] k = 2, . . . , n
(4.1)
(see chapter 3 for a discussion on semi-closed versus closed sub-intervals). Given this set
of sub-intervals, the interval-probabilistic forecast corresponding to the precise-probabilistic
forecast p, is f (p) = I(p), the interval containing p; if p ∈ Ik then I(p) = Ik. Let I be the
set of possible interval-probabilistic forecasts {Ik|k = 1, . . . , n}.
Note that for a published interval forecast, the underlying precise-probabilistic forecast (i.e.
probability distribution of X) need not be known. When reference is made to the underlying
distribution of an interval forecast it is understood to be latent and not an indication that
the probability distribution is available.
A scoring rule for interval-probabilistic forecasts is a function, s : I × X → R, with value
s(I(p), x), the score when the forecast I(p) is accompanied by the outcome x for X. For r
any probability distribution of X, we write
s(I(p), r)
def
= Er[s(I(p), X)] (4.2)
and define a (negatively-oriented) scoring rule for interval forecasts as proper if and only if
s(I(r), r) ≤ s(I(p), r) for all p, r ∈ P (4.3)
(compare equation (2.22) of Definition 2.5.2 on page 30, setting f (p) = I(p)) that is, if and
only if the optimal expected score assuming X ∼ r is obtained when the interval forecast is
the interval containing r. If a scoring rule for interval forecasts, s, is proper, we say that s
is interval-proper.
An example of a negatively-oriented interval-proper scoring rule is the interval-Brier scoring
rule, which we now describe.
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4.2.1 ‖ Interval-Brier Scoring Rule
For the set of possible interval-probabilistic forecasts in (4.1), the interval-Brier scoring rule
is defined in chapter 3, equation (3.90), to be the scoring rule
s(Ik, x) = (x− ak−1)(x− ak). (4.4)
We can rewrite (4.5) without direct reference to the partition 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an = 1.
For p ∈ P and interval-probabilistic forecast f (p) = I(p), let I−(p) be the infimum of
I(p) and let I+(p) be the supremum of I(p) (for example, if I(p) = Ik = (ak−1, ak], then
I−(p) = ak−1 and I
+(p) = ak). Then the interval-Brier scoring rule can be defined (compare
with (4.5)) as the scoring rule
s(I(p), x) = (x− I(p)−)(x− I(p)+) for x ∈ {0, 1}, I(p) ∈ I. (4.5)
The propriety of the interval-Brier scoring rule follows from the general characterisation re-
sult of chapter 3, but we give a specific proof of this propriety here.
Lemma 4.2.1. If s is the interval-Brier scoring rule defined by equation (4.3) then s is
interval-proper. 
Proof. By (4.3), it is required to show that if r is a probability distribution of X, then
s(I(r), r) ≤ s(I(p), r) for all p, r ∈ P (4.6)
For each p ∈ P, I(p) ∈ I = {Ik|k = 1, . . . , n} where the intervals Ik correspond to some
finite partition of [0, 1]. Therefore, the requirement (4.6) may be restated as
s(Ik, r) ≤ s(Ij , r) for r ∈ Ik, and all j (4.7)
By definition (4.5) of the interval-Brier scoring rule, for x ∈ X = {0, 1}, and any j ∈
{1, . . . , n},
s(Ij , x) = (x− I−j )(x− I+j ) = x− x(I−j + I+j ) + I−j I+j . (4.8)
Therefore,
s(Ij , r) = r − r(I−j + I+j ) + I−j I+j = r(1 − r) + (r − I−j )(r − I+j ). (4.9)
If Ik = Ij then equation (4.7) is immediate. So, suppose that Ik 6= Ij. There are two cases
to consider.
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k . For r ∈ Ik 6= Ij , I+j > I+k ≥ r and I−j ≥ r > I−k
(as r cannot be in both Ik and Ij , the intervals being disjoint). So,
(r − I+j ) < (r − I+k ) ≤ 0 and (r − I−j ) ≤ 0 < (r − I−k )
⇒(r − I−j )(r − I+j ) ≥ 0 ≥ (r − I−k )(r − I+k ). (4.10)








k . For r ∈ Ik 6= Ij , then I+j < r ≤ I+k and
I−j < I
−
k < r, giving
(r − I+k ) ≤ 0 < (r − I+j ) and 0 < (r − I−k ) < (r − I−j )
⇒(r − I−j )(r − I+j ) > 0 ≥ (r − I+k )(r − I−k ). (4.11)
In either case, equation (4.7) is satisfied. 
⌊ 4.3 ⌋ URR Decomposition
For interval-probabilistic forecasts, f (p) = I(p) for all p ∈ P and the URR decomposition of
an interval-proper scoring rule s becomes (following from equation (2.32) with f (p) = I(p)),
E[s(I(P ), X)] = s(I(q), q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uncertainty
− (s(I(q), q) − E[s(I(qI(P )), qI(P )) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Resolution︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sharpness
+ E[s(I(P ), qI(P )) − s(I(qI(P )), qI(P )) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reliability
(4.12)
where, as before, q is the unconditional (or, marginal, or climatological) distribution of X
and qI(p) is the conditional distribution of X given that the interval forecast is I(p).
It is clear that the URR decomposition is expressed in terms of the (distribution of the)
issued forecasts (which are available) and not the underlying probability distribution of X
(which, in general, is not available).
To determine the URR decomposition for the interval-Brier scoring rule, we require expres-
sions for s(I(q), q) and s(I(qI(p)), qI(p)) for each interval forecast I(p) (i.e. each p ∈ P).
University of Exeter 127 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 4
From equation (4.7), setting r = q and Ij = I(q) gives
s(I(q), q) = q(1 − q) + (q − I−(q))(q − I+(q)) (4.13)
and, on setting r = qI(p) and Ij = I(qI(p)) we have
s(I(qI(p)), qI(p)) = qI(p)(1 − qI(p)) + (qI(p) − I−(qI(p)))(qI(p) − I+(qI(p))). (4.14)
For X binary, q = E[X] and qI(p) = E[X|I(P ) = I(p)]. Using equations (4.13) and (4.14), it
is a short calculation to show that
E[s(I(P ), X)] = UNCI − RESI︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sharpness
+RELI (4.15)
where, noting the dependency on the set of possible interval forecasts, I, uncertainty for the
interval forecasts is
UNCI = E[X](1 − E[X]) + (E[X] − I−(E[X]))(E[X] − I+(E[X])), (4.16)
resolution for the interval forecasts is
RESI = E
[
(E[X|I(P )] − E[X])2
]
+ (E[X] − I−(E[X]))(E[X] − I+(E[X]))
− E
[
(E[X|I(P )] − I−(E[X|I(P )]))(E[X|I(P )] − I+(E[X|I(P )]))
]
(4.17)
and reliability for the interval forecasts is
RELI = E
[
(E[X|I(P )] − I−(P ))(E[X|I(P )] − I+(P ))
− (E[X|I(P )] − I−(E[X|I(P )]))(E[X|I(P )] − I+(E[X|I(P )]))
]
. (4.18)
Equation (4.18) shows that interval-probabilistic forecasts are perfectly reliable if E[X|I(P )] ∈
I(P ) for then I(E[X|I(P )]) = I(P ), reducing the reliability term to zero.
The intervals in I are determined by the partition a0 < a1 < . . . < an. As n changes the
partition will change. For any n, write an,0 < an,1 < . . . < an,n for the associated partition.
If, as n tends to infinity, the mesh of the partition, µn = max{an,i − an,i−1 | i = 1, . . . , n},
tends to 0, so that for all q ∈ P, I(q) → q, it can be seen from equations (4.16) to (4.18)
that the URR decomposition for the interval-Brier score, tends to the URR decomposition
in equation (2.7) for the Brier scoring rule (for precise-probabilistic forecasts) (Brier, 1950).
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⌊ 4.4 ⌋ RDC Decomposition
Our overriding concern in decomposing accuracy is to quantify the features of the joint
distribution of forecast and observation. The joint distribution governs the distributions
(marginal and conditional) of the observation and the distributions of the forecasts. So by
examining, separately, the distributional properties of the observation and the distributional
properties of the forecasts, we can reflect on the features of the joint distribution.
The URR decomposition quantifies the distributional properties of the observation. The
distributional properties of the forecasts are measured by the RDC decomposition, which
examines the marginal, conditional (on the observation) and ideal distributions of the fore-
casts.
The ideal distribution, given X = x, of the interval-probabilistic forecasts in I, is the
distribution δ∗x that assigns probability 1 to the interval in I containing x, I(x), i.e. Prδ∗x(I =





I1 = [a0, a1] if x = 0
In = (an−1, an] if x = 1.
(4.19)
The marginal, conditional and ideal distributions of the interval-probabilistic forecasts are
elements of the set I∗, the set of all probability distributions over I. To find the RDC
decomposition for the interval-Brier scoring rule, s, it is necessary to establish a (negatively-
oriented) scoring rule s∗ : I∗ × I → R, with score s(r∗, I) for r∗ ∈ I∗ and I ∈ I, such that
s∗ is proper and s∗ extends s in the sense that s∗(δ∗x, I) = s(I, x).
To compose a scoring rule s∗ extending s, we begin by noting that the interval-Brier scoring
rule (4.3) may be written in terms of I(x) as
s(I, x) =
(
(1 − x)I−(x) + xI+(x) − I−
)(
(1 − x)I−(x) + xI+(x) − I+
)
. (4.20)





























By definition of I(x), it is seen that






s′(I, I1) if x = 0





(I−1 − I−)(I−1 − I+) if x = 0





(0 − I−)(0 − I+) if x = 0
(1 − I−)(1 − I+) if x = 1
= (x− I−)(x− I+)
= s(I, x). (4.22)
We extend s′ to a scoring rule s∗, by associating with each r∗ ∈ I∗ an interval Ir∗ ∈ I (see
below) and defining
s∗(r∗, I) = s′(I, Ir∗). (4.23)
For r∗ ∈ I∗, the interval Ir∗ is set to be the interval in I closest to
Er∗ [I] = (Er∗ [I
−],Er∗ [I
+]] (4.24)
that is, Ir∗ is the interval closest to the expected interval when the interval-probabilistic
forecasts are distributed according to r∗. Here we use the term closest in the sense that, for















Ir∗ = Ijmin, where
jmin = arg min
j
(I◦j − Er∗ [I−])(I◦j − Er∗ [I+]). (4.26)











+] = I+(x), then
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Iδ∗x = Ijmin, where
jmin = arg min
j





1 if x = 0
n if x = 1
(4.27)
giving Iδ∗x = I(x). It follows from equations (4.22) and (4.23), that
s∗(δ∗x, I) = s
′(I, I(x)) = s(I, x). (4.28)
Therefore, s∗ extends s. For s∗ to be an proper extension of s it remains to show that s∗ is
proper, that is, that
s∗(r∗, r∗) ≤ s∗(p∗, r∗) for all p∗, r∗ ∈ I∗. (4.29)
Proposition 4.4.1. The scoring rule s∗ defined by equation (4.23), satisfies equation (4.29)
and is, therefore, a proper scoring rule. 
Proof. For p∗ ∈ I∗, define Ip∗ according to equation (4.26), so that Ip∗ ∈ I. Let ⌊Ip∗⌋ be the
index of Ip∗ in I. For example, if Ip∗ = Ik then ⌊Ip∗⌋ = k.



































I◦p∗ − Er∗ [I−]
)(




Therefore, s∗(p∗, r∗) is minimised for that probability distribution p∗ ∈ I∗ for which
(I◦p∗ − Er∗ [I−])(I◦p∗ − Er∗ [I+]) (4.32)
is smallest. But, by definition of Ip∗ , expression (4.32) is smallest for p
∗ = r∗ and we can
conclude that s∗ is proper. 
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For q∗ the marginal (i.e. unconditional historical) distribution for the interval-probabilistic
forecasts and q∗x the conditional historical distribution of the forecasts given X = x, from
equation (4.31) we have














E[I−|X = x] + E[I+|X = x]
)
+ E[I−I+|X = x]. (4.34)
Referring to equation (2.41) the RDC decomposition for the interval-Brier scoring rule is, in
terms of s∗,
E[s(I(P ), X)] = s∗(q∗, q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Refinement
− (s∗(q∗, q∗) − E[s∗(q∗X , q∗X) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discrimination︸ ︷︷ ︸
Excess
+ (E[s(I(P ), X)] − E[s∗(q∗X , q∗X) ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Correctness
(4.35)
which, using equations (4.33) and (4.34), reduces in a few lines to
E[s(I(P ), X)] = REFI − DISI︸ ︷︷ ︸
Excess
+CORI (4.36)





















− E[I−|X] − E[I+|X]
)]
(4.38)
which measures the extent to which different outcomes are preceded by different forecasts,
and can be quantified by measuring how much less the variance of the interval-probabilistic
forecasts preceding each distinct outcome is, than the overall variance of the interval-









− E[I−|X] − E[I+|X]
)]
(4.39)
which measures on average, how close the average of the forecasts preceding each outcome
is to the outcome.
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As was the case for the URR decomposition, let n → ∞, such that µn → 0 and the intervals
tend to singletons (precise-probabilistic forecasts for X). In this case, each p∗ ∈ I∗ becomes
a distribution over the elements of P (the precise-probabilistic forecasts for X). In addition,
for any r∗ ∈ I∗, Er∗ [I] becomes the single value Er∗ [P ] and Ir∗ , the closest value to Er∗ [P ],
must equal Er∗ [P ]. It follows that I
◦
r∗ = Ir∗ = Er∗ [P ]. With these limits, it is seen that the
RDC decomposition for the interval-Brier scoring rule tends to the RDC decomposition of
the Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950) for precise-probabilistic forecasts (given in equation (2.8)).
⌊ 4.5 ⌋ Computational Formulae for the Attributes
We will be interested in computing not only the decompositions of the interval-Brier scoring
rule, but also the decompositions of the Brier scoring rule. We consider the Brier scoring
rule both for comparative purposes, and because, as far as we are aware, evaluating the RDC
decomposition of the Brier scoring rule has not been studied before in the literature.
One approach to computing the attributes of the URR and RDC decompositions from a
sample of forecast-outcome pairs, is to estimate the marginal, conditional and joint proba-
bility distribution functions of the forecasts and observation using the empirical distribution
function. For precise-probabilistic forecasts, the distribution function over the continuum of
values [0, 1] can be approximated in many ways; we shall assume that the precise-probabilistic
probabilities that can be issued form a (perhaps large) finite set of distinct points.
For a sample size of T , for each t = 1, . . . , T , denote by x(t) the outcome (which may be
either 0 or 1), p(t) ∈ [0, 1] the precise-probabilistic forecast preceding x(t) and I(t) ∈ I =
{I1, . . . , In} the interval-probabilistic forecast preceding the outcome x(t).
Under the empirical distribution function, the estimates of the (unconditional) means are






























(the semi-open interval in equation (4.40) being a closed interval, should I−(t) = 0 for all
t). Estimates of the conditional means are
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For the RDC decomposition of the interval-Brier scoring rule, we also require estimates for
the values I◦q∗ and I
◦
q∗x




, jmin = arg min
j




, jmin,x = arg min
j
(I◦j − Ī−x )(I◦j − Ī+x ). (4.43)
Using equations (4.40) to (4.43), estimators for accuracy and the attributes of the URR
and RDC decompositions for both the interval-Brier scoring rule and (for comparison) the
(precise-, half-)Brier scoring rule are given in Table 4.1.











(x(t) − I−(t))(x(t) − I+(t))





(q̂ − q̂p(t))2 1T
T∑
t=1










(p(t) − q̂p(t))2 1T
T∑
t=1





























(x− p̄x)2q̂x(1 − q̂)1−x
1∑
x=0
(x− Î◦q∗x)(x+ Î◦q∗x − Ī−x − Ī+x )q̂x(1 − q̂)1−x
Table 4.1: Estimators for the accuracy (SCR), uncertainty (UNC), resolution (RES),
reliability (REL), refinement (REF), discrimination (DIS) and correctness (COR) of the
(precise, half-)Brier scoring rule and the interval-Brier scoring rule. Estimators are de-
rived by substituting, into the theoretical formulae of the accuracy and attributes, the
empirical distribution function for the marginal, conditional and joint distribution func-
tions.
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Assume that the sample pairs (p(t), x(t)) for t = 1, . . . , T , and separately (I(t), x(t)), t =
1, . . . , T are instances of independently and identically distributed random pairs. Then,
Bröcker (2012) proves that the empirical estimators for the URR attributes in Table 4.1, of
the Brier scoring rule, are biased; and, while the estimator for uncertainty has a negative
bias, the biases for the empirical estimators of resolution and reliability are positive i.e. the
estimates of resolution and reliability are, on average, higher than the actual attribute values
(so, resolution is worse and reliability better than the estimates suggest). In our notation,









p the sum over distinct values of p, the expressions for the biases are (see
also Ferro and Fricker, 2012)
bias(ÛNC) = E[ÛNC] − UNC = − 1
T
var[X],












Pr(Np > 0)var[X|P = p]. (4.45)
It can be proved in a manner similar to the analysis of Bröcker (2012) and Ferro and Fricker





the empirical estimators of the attributes of the RDC decomposition of the Brier scoring
rule in Table 4.1 are also biased, with biases,
bias(R̂EF) = E[R̂EF] − REF = − 1
T
var[P ],












Pr(Nx > 0)var[P |X = x]. (4.47)
Refinement has a negative bias and correctness has positive bias. But, noting that for all x,
for T ≥ 1, Pr(Nx > 0) ≥ Pr(X = x) so that















(var[P ] − var[E[P |X]) , (4.48)
the bias of the empirical estimator for discrimination may be positive or negative. In other
words, the estimate of uncertainty is, on average, below the true value of uncertainty and
the estimate of correctness is, on average, above the actual attribute value (so, correctness
is better – incorrectness is less – than the estimates indicate). If the estimator for discrim-
ination has positive bias, then estimated discrimination will overstate true discrimination;
similarly, if the estimator for discrimination has negative bias, the estimates will, on average,
undervalue actual discrimination.
Unfortunately, the biases of the empirical estimators of the attributes of the URR and RDC
decompositions of the interval-Brier scoring rule are less amenable to analytical examina-
tion. Nonetheless, if the intervals determined by the partition grow increasingly narrow as n
increases, it is possible to conclude that the degree of absolute bias of the interval-estimators
will increase (although the increase is an overall increase and not necessarily a monotonic
trend). This can be seen by considering, first, the case of only a single interval (n = 1).
For a single interval, a little algebra shows that the empirical estimators of all the attributes
(of both URR and RDC decompositions) are unbiased (here, because I◦k is undefined when
n = 1, without loss of generality we set I◦k = 1). As n increases, the bias of the empirical
estimators of the (interval-Brier) attributes of the interval-probabilistic forecasts tends to the
bias of the empirical estimators of the (Brier) attributes of the precise-probabilistic forecasts
(i.e. the difference between the two biases decreases). This follows from noting that in the
limit of ever finer partitions, the empirical estimators of the attributes of the interval-Brier
scoring rule tend to the empirical estimators of the attributes of the Brier scoring rule, which
are biased. However, the nature of the increase of absolute bias will depend on the structure
of the partition.
4.5.1 ‖ Illustration: Simulated Data
We demonstrate the computation of the attributes and the level of bias using simulated data.
To generate the data, let
X ∼ Ber(q)
P |X=x ∼ Beta(αx, βx) x ∈ {0, 1}. (4.49)
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We choose q = 0.225, α0 = 2, β0 = 10 and α1 = 5, β1 = 2. Each sample of precise-
probabilistic forecasts and associated outcomes has size T = 50 and was generated from
the joint distribution determined by model (4.49). In the sample, all precise-probabilistic
forecasts are rounded to 2 decimal places; the rounded precise-probabilistic forecasts are con-
sidered the issued forecasts. For each simulated precise-probabilistic forecast in the sample,
the value of the corresponding interval-probabilistic forecast was determined by finding the
interval in which the precise-probabilistic forecast fell. By this method, to each sample of
precise-probabilistic forecasts and outcomes, a corresponding sample of interval-probabilistic
forecasts and outcomes was constructed.
Figures 4.1a and 4.1b show the unconditional and conditional probability distributions of
the precise-probabilistic forecasts and interval-probabilistic forecasts respectively, for model
(4.49).
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: Figure 4.1a shows the unconditional ( ) and conditional densities of P
(given X = 1, ; given X = 0 ). For the interval-probabilistic forecasts, Figure 4.1b
shows the unconditional ( ) and conditional probability distributions (given X = 1, ;
given X = 0, ). Both Figure 4.1a and Figure 4.1b correspond to model (4.49).
To estimate the attributes it remains to define the partition 0 = a0 < a1 < . . . < an = 1.
We use the following approach which allows for the easy generation of customised partitions
by setting the nodes of the partition to be the quantiles of a chosen probability distribu-
tion (different probability distributions then determining different partitions): (a) choose a
distribution function, Fpart, the probability mass function of which has support [0, 1], (b)
having fixed the number of non-zero nodes in the partition, n, set the nodes to the 100/n%
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percentiles of the distribution function Fpart i.e. ai = F
−1
part(i/n) for i = 0, . . . , n. In our
illustration, we choose to have a partition for which the intervals nearer the end points of
the interval [0, 1] are narrower (in other words, the more certain the forecasting system, the
more precise it is required to be), by selecting Fpart to be the distribution function of a
Beta(1/2, 1/2) random variable.
In Figure 4.2, the calculated attributes are displayed. The boxplot in Figure 4.2a compares
the values of the attributes of the precise-probabilistic and interval-probabilistic forecasts
with respect to the Brier and interval-Brier scoring rules. Also displayed in Figure 4.2a
is the mean estimate and the actual (model) value for each attribute. It is seen that the
mean estimate is (up to sampling error) less than the actual value for uncertainty and refine-
ment, but the mean estimate is greater than or equal to the actual value for the remaining
attributes, with the bias in reliability and resolution being much greater than the bias in
discrimination and correctness. In Figure 4.2b the ratio of the true attribute values under
the precise-probabilistic forecasts to the true attribute values under the interval-probabilistic
forecasts is displayed, and shows the degradation in attribute values that accompanies the
loss of precision in the forecasts: for the interval-probabilistic forecasts, uncertainty is lower,
resolution is poorer, as is reliability, while there is less refinement, weaker discrimination and
more incorrectness.
In Figure 4.3 the absolute difference between the level of bias of the empirical estimators of
the attributes under precise-probabilistic forecasts (‘precise-bias’) and the level of bias of the
empirical estimators of the attributes under interval-probabilistic forecasts (‘interval-bias’)
is shown. As the number of intervals increases, the interval-bias converges to the precise-bias
(i.e. the absolute difference decreases); note, however, that this convergence is particular to
partitions for which all intervals narrow as n increases (a property of a partition defined by
our approach above).
These results serve to offer some guidelines when interpreting the results of applying the
estimators to real data. An example of such an application is presented now.
4.5.2 ‖ Application: Precipitation Data
We evaluate estimates of the attributes of the URR and RDC decompositions of the Brier and
interval-Brier scoring rules for precipitation data provided by the UKMO and the ABOM. A
detailed description of the data is given in chapter 3. Briefly, the raw data provided by the
respective meteorological offices is transformed first into a set of precise-probabilistic forecast
and outcome pairs, where each outcome is that of the dichotomous observation rain/no rain.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.2: The values of the attributes under the theoretical model (4.49) are shown
in Figure 4.2a (values for precise-probabilistic forecasts are shown in green, values for
interval-probabilistic forecasts are shown in brown). Estimates of the true values were
calculated by applying the formulae in Table 4.1 to samples of size T = 50 simulated
from the model. A total of M = 1000 samples were simulated, giving M estimates of
each attribute, which were used to calculate a boxplot and a mean estimate (marked by
◦) of each attribute. Also shown are the true values of the attributes (marked by •;
where necessary in computing the true values, integrals were evaluated numerically using
the integrate function in R (Ihaka and Gentleman, 1996; R Core Team, 2017)). The
difference between the true and mean-estimates of each attribute are approximations of
the bias of the empirical estimators. The ratio of the true attribute values under the Brier
scoring rule and the interval-Brier scoring rule are shown in Figure 4.2b, demonstrating,
for the given partition, the relative differences between the quality of the interval and
precise forecasting systems.
The precise-probabilistic forecasts are used to synthesise interval-probabilistic forecasts by
assigning to each precise-probabilistic forecast the interval in which it falls. The partitions
used are given in Table 4.2 (as we have emphasised in chapter 3, the interval-forecasts are
artificial and are not forecasts that have been issued by either meteorological office).
The UKMO data was used to examine how the estimated attribute values change with
lead-time (hours). In contrast, the ABOM data was used to determine how the estimated
attribute values varied at different locations for the same lead-time (hours). The behaviour
of the estimates is shown in Figures 4.4 to 4.11.
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Figure 4.3: The model is (4.49). For each value of n, the intervals from which the
interval-probabilistic forecasts can be selected are determined by setting the nodes to
be the (100/n)-percentiles of the Beta(1/2, 1/2) probability distribution (as described
above). For each set of intervals (i.e. each n), M = 1000 samples of T = 50 forecast-
outcome pairs were generated for both precise-probabilistic and interval-probabilistic fore-
casts (according to model (4.49)). For a given n, the bias of each attribute’s estimator
was calculated as the mean estimate (over the M samples) for the attribute less its actual
(model) value; the bias of estimators under precise-probabilistic forecasts is ‘precise-bias’,
the bias of estimators under interval-probabilistic forecasts is ‘interval-bias’. The absolute
difference between the precise-bias and interval-bias of each attribute is plotted against
n (uncertainty , resolution , reliability , refinement , discrimination and correctness
). As n increases, the interval-bias converges to the precise-bias.
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a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15
UKMO 0 0.025 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.90 0.95 1
ABOM 0 0.025 0.075 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.925 0.975 1
Table 4.2: The nodes of the partitions used to define the interval-forecasts synthesised
from the precise-probabilistic forecasts provided by the UKMO and the ABOM.
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Figure 4.4: URR Attributes for precise-probabilistic forecasts. The figures display
estimates of each attribute at different lead-times (hours); the estimates are computed
from UKMO precipitation forecasts at Heathrow Airport (for each lead-time the sample
size was T = 590, less one or two missing data for some lead-times). The purple line ( )
shows the attribute estimate (â) calculated from that sample associated with the value on
the horizontal axis, the blue lines ( ) show the 95% confidence interval calculated as (â−
z0.975σ̂B, â − z0.025σ̂B), where σ̂B is the standard deviation of the estimate approximated
from B = 100 bootstrapped samples. The abbreviations used are: SCR for expected
score, UNC for uncertainty, RES for resolution, and REL for reliability.
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Figure 4.5: URR Attributes for precise-probabilistic forecasts. The figures show esti-
mates of each attribute. The estimates are calculated using ABOM precise-probabilistic
forecasts for precipitation, at different locations around Australia for a 12-hour lead-
time; all sites between two vertical grey lines are neighbouring locations (for each site
the sample size was T = 285, except in the case of missing data). The green line ( )
shows the attribute estimate (â) calculated from that sample associated with the value
on the horizontal axis, the brown lines ( ) show the 95% confidence interval calculated
as (â − z0.975σ̂B , â − z0.025σ̂B), where σ̂B is the standard deviation of the estimate ap-
proximated from B = 100 bootstrapped samples. The abbreviations used are: SCR for
expected score, UNC for uncertainty, RES for resolution, and REL for reliability.
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Figure 4.6: RDC Attributes for (UKMO) precise-probabilistic forecasts of different
lead-times (hours) for precipitation at Heathrow Airport. For a description of the data
and a key to the figures, see the caption for Figure 4.4. Abbreviations used in the above
figures are: SCR for expected score, REF for refinement, DIS for discrimination, and
COR for correctness.
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Figure 4.7: RDC Attributes for (ABOM) precise-probabilistic forecasts with a lead-
time of 12 hours at different locations in Australia. For a description of the data see the
caption for Figure 4.5. Abbreviations used in the above figures are: SCR for expected
score, REF for refinement, DIS for discrimination, and COR for correctness.
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Figure 4.8: URR Attributes for interval-probabilistic forecasts. The figures display
estimates of each attribute at different lead-times (hours); the estimates are computed
from interval-probabilistic forecasts constructed from UKMO precise-probabilistic fore-
casts for precipitation at Heathrow Airport (for each lead-time the sample size was
T = 590, less one or two missing data for some lead-times). The magenta line ( )
shows the attribute estimate (â) calculated from that sample associated with the value
on the horizontal axis, the cyan lines ( ) show the 95% confidence interval calculated
as (â − z0.975σ̂B , â − z0.025σ̂B), where σ̂B is the standard deviation of the estimate ap-
proximated from B = 100 bootstrapped samples. The abbreviations used are: SCR for
expected score, UNC for uncertainty, RES for resolution, and REL for reliability.
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Figure 4.9: URR Attributes for interval-probabilistic forecasts. The figures show esti-
mates of each attribute. The estimates are calculated using interval-probabilistic forecasts
synthesised from ABOM precise-probabilistic forecasts for precipitation, at different lo-
cations around Australia for a 12-hour lead-time; all sites between two vertical grey lines
are neighbouring locations (for each site the sample size was T = 285, except in the case
of missing data). The red line ( ) shows the attribute estimate (â) calculated from that
sample associated with the value on the horizontal axis, the orange lines ( ) show the
95% confidence interval calculated as (â − z0.975σ̂B, â − z0.025σ̂B), where σ̂B is the stan-
dard deviation of the estimate approximated from B = 100 bootstrapped samples. The
abbreviations used are: SCR for expected score, UNC for uncertainty, RES for resolution,
and REL for reliability.
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Figure 4.10: RDC Attributes for (UKMO) interval-probabilistic forecasts of different
lead-times (hours) for precipitation at Heathrow Airport. For a description of the data
and a key to the graphs, see the caption for Figure 4.8. Abbreviations used in the above
figures are: SCR for expected score, REF for refinement, DIS for discrimination, and
COR for correctness.
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Figure 4.11: RDC Attributes for (ABOM) interval-probabilistic forecasts with a lead-
time of 12 hours at different locations in Australia. For a description of the data and the
caption, see the caption for Figure 4.9. Abbreviations used in the above figures are: SCR
for expected score, REF for refinement, DIS for discrimination, and COR for correctness.
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The attributes of both the precise-probabilistic forecasts and the interval-probabilistic fore-
casts deteriorate as forecast lead-time increases, with precise- and interval-probabilistic fore-
casts displaying similar patterns. While the environmental conditions are stable (i.e. uncer-
tainty is constant across lead-times), forecasts with longer lead-times are less capable than
forecasts with short lead-times of distinguishing the outcomes that will eventually occur (i.e.
resolution decreases or worsens as lead-time increases), although there is only a small differ-
ence between the forecasts of different lead-times in their ability to identify the proportion
of occasions on which precipitation is recorded. The RDC attributes show that as lead-time
increases, the forecasts become more similar (i.e. refinement decreases), but because the
environment will not change with lead-time, this similarity reflects that at longer lead-times
the forecasts are more uniform, with different outcomes being preceded by much the same
forecasts (shown by discrimination decreasing with increasing lead-time). It is also seen from
the correctness attribute that the forecasts with longer lead-times are more incorrect than
the forecasts of shorter lead-times, an intuitive trend.
In comparison, the attributes are broadly stable across different locations. For sites with
lower uncertainty and less changeable environmental conditions (e.g. Alice Springs (AP)),
forecasts need not vary and this gives lower resolution and will show lower refinement and
discrimination, but these same forecasts may, nonetheless show good (i.e. low) reliability and
correctness. Interestingly, in the first group of neighbouring sites (on the left of each graph),
the uncertainty differs markedly within the group (a consequence of the contrast between
Hobart on the coast of Tasmania to the nearby yet inland and elevated Mount Wellington)
and forecasts perform quite differently (forecasts for Hobart show better resolution and relia-
bility than Mount Wellington and better discrimination and correctness, although across the
group of sites forecasts are similarly refined, suggesting that the forecasting system does not
account materially for the substantive factors affecting precipitation at Mount Wellington
that are additional to those factors affecting precipitation at Hobart).
⌊ 4.6 ⌋ Discussion and Conclusion
Probabilistic forecasts for a binary observation, X (with values 0, for non-occurrence, and 1,
for occurrence) are typically studied as precise-probabilistic forecasts, forecasts expressed as
precise probabilities that X = 1. Often, however, probabilistic forecasts for X are published
as interval-probabilistic forecasts, forecasts expressed as an interval of values for the prob-
ability that X = 1. In the previous chapter, proper scoring rules for interval-probabilistic
forecasts, referred to as interval-proper scoring rules, were introduced.
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While interval-proper scoring rules advance the evaluation of interval-probabilistic forecasts
by allowing for the accuracy, i.e. expected score, to be calculated, a thorough evaluation of
interval-probabilistic forecasts requires additional measures of the qualities of the forecasts.
For precise-probabilistic forecasts, standard measures of forecast quality have historically
been computed by decomposing accuracy. There are two common decompositions: the
uncertainty-resolution-reliability (URR) decomposition and the refinement-discrimination-
correctness (RDC) decomposition.
In this chapter we have derived versions of the URR and RDC decompositions for one partic-
ular interval-proper scoring rule, the interval-Brier scoring rule. These decompositions allow,
in principle, a complete evaluation of interval-probabilistic forecasts for binary observations
evaluated using the interval-Brier scoring rule.
For such a comprehensive analysis to be practical, estimators of the components of the
decompositions are required. Empirical estimators, estimators based on the empirical joint
distribution function of forecasts and outcomes, were proposed and their statistical properties
considered. The estimators were then applied to interval-probabilistic forecasts of precipi-
tation synthesised from actual precise-probabilistic forecasts. The estimates suggested that
as the lead-time of interval-probabilistic forecasts increases, the quality of the forecasts de-
creases. Estimates were also computed for different sites at the same lead-time. Although,
in general the estimated attributes were similar across all sites, there was enough deviation
in the estimates to argue for a review of the forecasts at some sites, so demonstrating the
usefulness of the decompositions in the verification of interval-probabilistic forecasts.
Throughout this chapter, comparison is made between the attributes of the interval-Brier
scoring rule and the attributes of the Brier scoring rule for precise-probabilistic forecasts.
While theoretically, the attributes of the interval-Brier scoring rule generalise the attributes
of the Brier scoring rule, it is in evaluating estimates for both sets of attributes that it is
most clearly seen that precise-probabilistic forecasts, if available, have a higher quality than
their corresponding interval-probabilistic forecasts, but that the interval-probabilistic fore-
casts, although of lower quality, display the same general patterns of performance.
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5 Possible Directions for Future Work
⌊ 5.1 ⌋ Introduction
From the position reached in earlier chapters, we now consider some extensions that either
reinforce the results we have obtained or build on them. We look separately at: (i) topics
more closely aligned with decompositions of proper scoring rules, and (ii) the smaller but
promising area of interval-probabilistic forecasts.
⌊ 5.2 ⌋ Applying the Decompositions
The general URR and RDC decompositions developed in chapter 2 have been applied to sev-
eral of the more well-known proper scoring rules for (precise-)probabilistic forecasts. There
are other prominent proper scoring rules, for example the Dawid-Sebastiani scoring rule and
kernel scoring rules (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007), for which the URR and RDC decomposi-
tions are, as far as we are aware, unknown and to which the URR and RDC decompositions
of chapter 2 could be applied.
Deriving the URR and RDC decompositions for a proper scoring rule is only one aspect de-
termining the qualities of a forecasting system. It is also necessary to estimate the attributes
established by the URR and RDC decompositions. We have briefly discussed empirical es-
timators for the attributes of the different decompositions we have examined, but a more
thorough consideration of estimation and statistical inference for the attributes is needed
(we mention this again briefly when reviewing interval-probabilistic forecasts below).
Our derivations of the URR and RDC decompositions of the expected score have given re-
gard only to the marginal and conditional distributions of the forecasts and outcome. This
approach has been led by the work of Murphy and Winkler (1987) who emphasise that it is
only the joint distribution of the forecasts and outcomes that need be taken into consider-
ation for evaluating a forecasting system. However, the framework of Murphy and Winkler
(1987) can be criticised as being too narrow.
Ehm and Ovcharov (2017) (see also the references therein) have recently proposed that there
may be “auxiliary information”, other than the information provided by the forecasts and
outcomes, that is material to the evaluation of a forecasting system. By grouping forecasts
according to the supplementary information a more detailed and nuanced assessment of the
forecasts is possible. For example, in assessing weather forecasts, the geographical region
of each forecast may enhance the forecasts’ evaluation. As another example, separating
global economic forecasts according to the size of the economies to which the forecasts relate
University of Exeter 153 of 163 K. Mitchell, PhD Thesis
Chapter 5
(or some similar division) can present a more subtle analysis of the forecasts’ performance.
Such detail is more pressing when the supplementary information by which the forecasts are
grouped concerns extremes: how well do hydrological forecasts perform during a drought, or
how well do public health forecasts anticipate the reach of a serious virus.
One approach to incorporating supplementary information in the verification of forecasts
is by using scoring rules that include a weighting function to amplify the contribution of
a subgroup of forecasts (see, for example, Lerch et al. (2017)). But Ehm and Ovcharov
(2017) have recently considered an alternative approach: to adopt a conventional scor-
ing rule, but change the decomposition to recognise the additional information available.
Ehm and Ovcharov (2017) derive a URR decomposition in which the resolution and relia-
bility terms are ‘localised’ by explicitly conditioning on a random variable representing the
supplementary information. The result of Ehm and Ovcharov (2017) is a quite general URR
decomposition, but has the disadvantage that the attributes of their URR decomposition
can be negative, which they admit “makes interpretations difficult” (Ehm and Ovcharov,
2017). To avoid negative attributes, one route may be to develop conditional-proper scoring
rules. In this regard earlier work by Lindley (1982) (see also, Gilio and Sanfilippo (2011))
who proposes a definition for conditional scoring rules may be of some help. Should a
definition of conditional-proper scoring rules be agreed and, together with the ideas of
Ehm and Ovcharov (2017), allow for a conditional-URR decomposition with everywhere-
positive attributes, there is the further potential for the derivation of a conditional-RDC
decomposition.
⌊ 5.3 ⌋ Interval-Probabilistic Forecasts
Interval-probabilistic forecasts are, in the form in which we have introduced them in this
thesis, new to verification theory and there is no other published work in this area that
we are aware of, apart from the more general and abstract studies of Lambert and Shoham
(2009); Lambert et al. (2008); Lambert (2013) and Frongillo and Kash (2014) that we have
mentioned. This leaves many interesting questions still to be answered, some of which we
now touch upon.
Proper scoring rules for interval-probabilistic forecasts, which we have called interval-proper
scoring rules, were introduced in chapter 3. In chapter 4, the URR and RDC decompositions
of one particular interval-proper scoring rule, the interval-Brier scoring rule, were derived.
Yet as was discussed in chapter 2, the attributes in the decompositions, although important,
are indirect measures of the properties of forecasts. For precise-probabilistic forecasts, as
was originally emphasised by Murphy and Winkler (1987), the direct measures of forecast
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quality are distributional i.e. defined in terms of the joint probability distribution of the
forecasts and outcomes. So far, no definitions, in distributional terms, of the properties
of interval-probabilistic forecasts have been proposed or investigated. In the context of
chapters 3 and 4, for which the observation, X, is binary, the forecaster’s belief is held as a
precise-probability, p, and the forecast associated with this belief is the interval containing p,
I(p), then following similar definitions in chapter 2 for precise-probabilistic forecasts, natural
definitions for some distributional qualities are,
(i) no resolution, if
Pr(X = x|I(P ) = I(p)) = Pr(X = x) for all p ∈ P, x ∈ X , (5.1)
(ii) perfect reliability, if
Pr(X = 1|I(P ) = I(p)) ∈ I(p) for all p ∈ P, (5.2)
(iii) no discrimination, if
Pr(I(P ) = I(p)|X = x) = Pr(I(P ) = I(p)) for all x ∈ X , p ∈ P. (5.3)
The corresponding attributes of the URR and RDC decompositions (see equations (4.17),
(4.18) and (4.38)) are necessarily zero if equations (5.1) to (5.3) hold.
Having proposed definitions of the distributional attributes, approaches must be developed
that allow these distributional definitions to be applied. A useful method of assessing reliabil-
ity as defined in equation (5.2), would be a reliability diagram analogous to the fundamental
reliability diagram for precise-probabilistic forecasts. Label the intervals that can be fore-
cast as Ik, k = 1, . . . , n, for some n, with interval Ik having infima I
−
k and suprema I
+
k .
One possible construction of a reliability diagram for interval-probabilistic forecasts would
be to choose, for each k, a point pk ∈ Ik and plot three interpolated curves: (a) (pk, I−k ),
k = 1, . . . , n, (b) (pk,Pr(X = 1|Ik)), k = 1, . . . , n, and (c) (pk, I+k ), k = 1, . . . , n. In the
absence of any information about the distribution of the forecaster’s beliefs within each in-




k )/2. We refer to the curves (a), (b) and (c) collectively
as an interval-reliability diagram. As the number of intervals, n, increases, curves (a) and (c)
should converge to the line of perfect reliability and the interval-reliability diagram becomes
a standard reliability diagram for precise-probabilistic forecasts. The interpretation of the
interval-reliability diagram mirrors the interpretation of the reliability diagram for precise-
probabilistic forecasts (see, for example Wilks, 2006, pages 288-289): if curve (b) lies entirely
below curve (a) then the forecaster is overforecasting (Pr(X = 1|Ik) < I−k for all k); if curve
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(b) lies entirely above curve (c) then the forecaster is underforecasting (Pr(X = 1|Ik) > I+k
for all k); the forecaster is overconfident if curve (b) lies above curve (c) for small k and
below curve (a) for large k, while an underconfident forecaster has an interval-reliability
diagram in which curve (b) is below curve (a) for small k but above curve (c) for large k.
An interval-reliability diagram (of any form) does not amount to a statistical assessment
of the reliability of interval-probabilistic forecasts. For precise-probabilistic forecasts, there
are statistical tests of reliability (see, for example, Bröcker (2012); Lemeshow and Hosmer
(1982); Lemeshow et al. (1988); Spiegelhalter (1986); Stallard (2009) as well as Redelmeier et al.
(1991); see also Bröcker and Smith (2007b) for a discussion of the statistical assessment of
reliability through reliability diagrams). Currently no comparable statistical analysis exists
for the reliability of interval-probabilistic forecasts.
To evaluate the discrimination (in distributional terms) of interval-probabilistic forecasts, an
approach based on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve can be employed. Con-
ceptually, interval-probabilistic forecasts are no different to responses to a rating-scale experi-
ment of signal-detection theory (see, for example, McNicol (1972, pages 25,99), Green and Swets
(1966, pages 40,86)) in which the recipient of data (of some form) must chose from a scale,
their degree-of-belief that the data represented a signal (rather than noise); rating-scale
experiments are familiar in medicine (e.g. Hanley and McNeil, 1982). The conceptual equiv-
alence of interval-probabilistic forecasts to rating-scale experiments allows the large body of
theory developed for investigating discriminatory performance in rating-scale experiments,
the core of which is ROC curve theory, to be applied to evaluating the discrimination of
interval-probabilistic forecasts; ROC analysis has its criticisms (see, for example, Hand
(2009) and Hand and Anagnostopoulos (2013)) and an alternative is the Lorenz curve ap-
proach of Lee (1999). In either case, the pivotal step is to index the intervals that can be
forecast, Ik, k = 1, . . . , n, and then define a random variable κ with values in the set of indices
{k|k = 1, . . . , n}. Either a ROC curve or Lorenz curve can be constructed from estimates of
the conditional probabilities Pr(κ = k|X = 0) and Pr(κ = k|X = 1) for k = 1, . . . , n.
The distributional attributes described above are concerned with the detailed features of
interval-probabilistic forecasts. Here, the interval-probabilistic forecasts are selected from
a fixed collection of exhaustive intervals by the forecaster whose belief is held as a precise
probability. This leads readily to two particular extensions.
First, the interpretation of an interval-probabilistic forecast is that every probability in the
interval is equally likely as the probability of a 1-outcome for X. To address this limitation,
the forecaster could be allowed to issue probabilistic-probabilistic forecasts in which the in-
tervals remain fixed, but the forecaster issues a distribution over the interval as their forecast
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(the current interval-probabilistic forecasts are a special case in which the forecaster chooses
a uniform distribution over an interval as their probabilistic-probabilistic forecast).
Second, a singular premise in our development, in chapters 3 and 4, of verification results
for interval-probabilistic forecasts, is that the forecaster’s belief for the outcome X = 1, is
held as a precise probability (but must be issued by choosing an interval of probabilities).
It is interesting to consider how verification might be performed when the forecaster’s belief
is also an interval; in other words, the forecaster is only able to form their belief as a range
of probabilities. The forecaster’s belief should then also be expressed as an interval, either
from a predetermined set, or if greater freedom is to be permitted as imprecise probabilities
(for a brief overview of imprecise probabilities, see Troffaes et al., 2001).
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